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ABSTRACT
Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan
And its Implications for Pakistan
September 1985
Riffat Sardar, B.A., University of Peshawar
M.A., University of Peshawar
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Anwar H. Syed
This study investigates whether the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan is a threat to Pakistan, and how it affects Pakistan's
relations with both its neighbours and extra-regional powers. The
immediate problem, from the Pakistani point of view, is that the
existence of a communist regime in Kabul, and Soviet military actions
to sustain it in the face of domestic opposition, have caused the
Afghan refugees to come into Pakistan. The problem from the
Soviet-Afghan perspective is that the insurgents use Pakistani
territory for launching attacks on Soviet-Afghan forces inside
Afghanistan and that Pakistan serves, with or without its government's
consent, as a conduit for the supply of weapons and funds to the
insurgents.
The Soviets are poised for an extended stay in Afghanistan. The
cost of their operations in Afghanistan is not high enough for them to
abandon the strategic gains they have made in Afghanistan. They may
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withdraw but they will make sure that they leave behind a regime which
is responsive to their wishes. The prospects of the Geneva talks do
not look very promising. The Afghan refugees in Pakistan will perhaps
never go back. This refugee problem has become a permanent problem
with which Pakistan must learn to live. The Muslim countries were not
able to take any concrete actions which could move the Soviets out of
Afghanistan. The dimensions of American interests in Pakistan are
modest. The US will continue to assist Pakistan and the Mujahideen to
resist the Soviet-Afghan coercion as long as, and to the extent, they
can. The Afghan crisis has given Pakistan a reason to normalize its
relations with India, and it offered to sign a no-war pact with India.
The Zia regime could not bring the Afghan crisis, and the problems it
has generated, much closer to a solution. A regime which is not
popular at home cannot deal effectively with external crisis.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In April 1978 two factions of a communist organization in
Afghanistan, called the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA), joined together to overthrow the regime of Sardar Mohammad
Daoud, who himself had seized power in 1973 by ousting King Zahir
Shah. In less than three months, the two factions — Parcham, led by
Babrak Karmal, and Khalq, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki in association
with Hafeezullah Amin — fell apart. Taraki and Amin emerged
victorious and jailed some of their Parcham opponents. Other Parcham
leaders, including Karmal, went into exile in Eastern Europe. As the
Taraki regime moved to institute socialist reforms in the economic and
social life of the country, many Afghans saw these as being
antithetical to their Islamic faith and revolted. The revolt soon
developed into a large-scale insurgency that the regime could not
suppress. Partly as a result of disagreement over how to deal with
the insurgency, Hafeezullah Amin, apparently without consulting the
Soviet Union, staged a coup in September 1979 and ousted Taraki. His
moves toward improving the internal situation and Afghanistan's
relations with Pakistan and the West did not meet with Soviet
approval. Moscow, it would seem, determined that Amin could not
subdue the rebellion or act as a dependable Soviet ally, and decided
1
2to put Babrak Karmal in his place. Accordingly, claiming that it had
been invited by the government of Afghanistan to come into the country
to help defeat the insurgents, the Soviet Union moved 85,000 combat
troops into the country starting December 27, 1979. In other words,
the Soviets invaded their own ally. Amin was killed and Babrak Karmal
was installed as head of the communist government in Kabul.
Five years have passed since the Soviet invasion, but the
insurgency goes on as does the Soviet military presence. More than
110,000 Soviet troops are said to be deployed in Afghanistan. They
engage the insurgents ("Mujahideen") in inconclusive encounters, and
bomb what they think may be Mujahideen hideouts or sanctuaries. The
Mujahideen, in turn, ambush Soviet and Afghan government personnel,
convoys, installations, and infrastructure. While all this has been
going on, more than three million Afghans have moved into Pakistan and
are living there as refugees. Their number increases every week. As
we will see later in these pages, their continued presence in Pakistan
imposes economic, social, and political strains on that country.
The Soviets appear to be poised for an extended stay in
Afghanistan. They have built numerous military bases, including some
in the southwestern part of the country which place them at less than
one hour of jet flight away from the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian
Gulf. As we will further discuss in a subsequent chapter, the Soviets
continue to be present in Afghanistan partly because, following the
Brezhnev doctrine, they will not allow a counter-revolutionary force
3to overthrow the communist regime in a client state in their sphere of
influence — and Afghanistan has been their client for nearly a
quarter century — and partly because they want to utilize the
opportunity, which the events in Afghanistan have offered them, of
establishing their military, and consequently political, presence in
close proximity to the oil-prcducing regions of Southern Iran and the
Persian Gulf. The cost of their operation in Afghanistan — financial
outlays and casualties — is not too high for them to sustain for
quite a few years to come, as we will see later.
Our main focus in this study is, of course, not the Soviet
military presence in Afghanistan but rather its implications and
consequences for the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan.
These flow not only from what the Soviet and Afghan governments do but
also from Pakistan government's reactions and responses to the
Soviet-Afghan moves. The immediate problem, from the Pakistani point
of view, is that the existence of a communist regime in Kabul, and
Soviet military actions to sustain it in the face of domestic
opposition, are causing an increasing stream of Afghan refugees to
cross the border into Pakistan. The problem from the Soviet-Afghan
perspective is that the insurgents maintain their political
headquarters in Pakistan, use Afghan refugee camps and other locations
in Pakistan as places to rest and recuperate, and use Pakistani
territory for launching attacks on Soviet-Afghan forces inside
Afghanistan. Moscow and Kabul charge also that Pakistan serves, with
4or without its government's consent, as a conduit for the supply of
weapons and funds to the insurgents.
From the longer-term perspective there are more severe problems.
If a communist government becomes well-established in Kabul and comes
to control all of Afghanistan, it may be able to export its ideology
and politics across the border into Pakistan. This may be made easier
by the fact that in many instances the same Pathan tribes live on both
sides and have traditionally moved back and forth without paying much
attention to the border as such. Secondly, if the Soviet Union
continues to maintain a substantial military presence in Afghanistan,
it may be in a position to intimidate Pakistan so as to influence the
latter '3 foreign and domestic policies, and it may even choose to
foment separatism in Baluchistan, if not also in the North West
Frontier Province. Political influence in Baluchistan could, once
again, place Soviet forces at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. The rise
of a communist regime and Soviet military presence in Afghanistan,
thus, pose grave threats to Pakistan's ideology, national
independence, and territorial integrity. These threats are examined
in greater detail in subsequent chapters.
What can Pakistan do to protect itself from the
afore-mentioned dangers? Needless to say, it does not have the
military capability to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan. It has
used its connections with the Islamic world, the United States, China
and other friendly countries to condemn the Soviet operation in
5Afghanistan and to put pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw its
forces from that country. This pressure has had little effect,
because it has been insufficient, consisting mainly of resolutions
passed at the United Nations, Islamic Conferences, and other forums.
For the last three years or so, Pakistan has had talks, from time to
time, with the Afghan and Soviet governments, indirectly through an
assistant to the United Nations Secretary General, concerning a
peaceful "political" settlement of the Afghan problem. But the terms
which each side has put forward are such as the other side cannot
meet. In a subsequent chapter we will see that Pakistan has
fashioned the terms that it has because it is constrained partly by
the present regime's alleged Islamic character and partly by its
connections with the Islamic countries, the United States, and
possibly also China. The "talks" have made no significant progress.
Pakistan's ability to resist Soviet-Afghan pressures on its
politics and its territiorial integrity depends on the state of its
internal cohesion and national solidarity as well as on the state of
its international relations. With regard to domestic cohesion, the
situation is far from satisfactory. Of Pakistan's four provinces,
the Punjab has more than 60 percent of the population and is dominant
in the bureaucracy, the military, and possibly even in the economy.
The smaller provinces feel disadvantaged. From time to time,
politicians in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan
have voiced separatist demands. Since the execution of Zulfikar Ali
6Bhutto
— prime minister of Pakistan, December 22, 1971, to July 4,
1977 ~ similar demands have been heard in Sind. The sense of
disadvantage, and separatism, are heightened by the fact that during
much of its history Pakistan has been ruled by bureaucratic-military
dictatorships which have regarded talk of the minority provinces'
grievances as treasonous and kept their more vocal spokesman in jail.
Even Mr. Bhutto's government was a dictatorship despite its appearance
as a parliamentary democracy. As political repression increases, and
as politicians who speak for the rights of the smaller provinces are
unable to function as politicians within a Pakistani framework, the
talk of separatism gains ground. On the other hand, separatism
declines when the prospect appears that Pakistan may be a democracy in
which opposition politicians as well as as the ruling politicians may
do their political work, bargain, and come to terms.
While Pakistanis are divided within, they are more vulnerable to
outside pressures. United they may be able to resist these pressures
more effectively. But even then Pakistan's international relations
are clearly important to the preservation of its dependence and
territorial integrity. In the following pages we will examine the
state of Pakistan's relations with friends and foes in the outside
world and how it bears on its ability to deal with the dangers
emanating from a Soviet-controlled Afghanistan. Suffice it to say
here that in its immediate neighborhood Pakistan's relations with
China and Iran have been traditionally friendly. China has been
7waging its own cold war with the Soviet Union since the early 1960-3
and has an interest in containing Soviet influence. But China is not
anxious to take on the Soviet Union in a military conflict: it did
not take any overt action to help Pakistan when the Soviets aided
India in dismembering Pakistan in 1971, and it is doubtful that it
will, or can, intervene to help Pakistan in case the latter becomes
involved in a military confrontation with the Soviets.
Iran, under Khomeini, poses no threat to Pakistan,
notwithstanding the ayotallah's occasional invitation to Pakistanis to
overthrow their present military rulers. Many Afghans have taken
refuge in Iran also so that Iran is interested in the Afghan
"problem". It is not participating in the UN-sponsored talks referred
to above, but it is kept informed. In any case, considering Iran's
somewhat uncertain domestic economic, if not political, situation, its
4-year war with Iraq, and its difficulties with the United States, it
is not likely to be able to offer Pakistan any significant materail
help in resisting the Soviet-Afghan pressures should they materialize.
Pakistan and India have fought three wars, the last of which
(1971) Pakistan clearly lost. India is now eight times as large as
Pakistan in population and several times as large in terms of economic
and military capability. Even if India does not want to absorb
Pakistan, it does want to reduce Pakistan to the position and role of
a pliant "little brother". India would like to see Pakistan remains
as a buffer between itself and a communist Afghanistan. It does not
8welcome Soviet military presence in Afghanistan but, given its large
network of economic and military relationship with the Soviet Union,
it feels constrained to keep a low profile on the subject. In other
words, Pakistan cannot expect any help from India in getting the
communist regime or the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. Rather,
Pakistan continues to worry about Indian intentions, for Gandhi's
government is not averse to putting its own pressures on Pakistan as
the latter '3 domestic and/or foreign problems intensify. During the
last three years Pakistan has gone out of its way to pacify India and
has offered to sign a no-war pact with it.
The Soviet Union's stance toward Pakistan has been largely
adversarial even though it has also offered Pakistan economic and
technical assistance from time to time. It has sided with India and
Afghanistan in their territorial disputes with Pakistan. It has been
resentful of Pakistan's military alliance with the United States and
of its cordial relations with China. It is probably not committed to
the undoing of Pakistan. But if in time opportunities of establishing
its influence in Pakistan's Baluchistan and North West Frontier
Province presented themselves, it would probably take advantage of the
same. In the meantime, it sees no reason for accepting Pakistan's
demands for its own military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Indeed, if
Pakistan were to step up its support of the mujahideen against Soviet
troops, Moscow would probably mount some kind of punitive action
against Pakistan.
9Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan itself have never been
cordial, though there have been periods of relative calm. Afghanistan
has pushed claims or schemes that would take away large areas of
Pakistan. At worst it wanted to swallow a part of Pakistan; at best
it want to be recognized as having a legitimate interest in the
economic and political wellbeing of the Pakistani Pathans and
Baluchis. Pakistan has been disposed to concede neither of these
Afghan positions as we will see later. It is possible that the Karmal
regime may give up these claims and roles in exchange for Pakistan's
recognition of it as a legitimate government and Pakistan's
dissociation with the Mujahideen. But the domestic ideological
postures of the present government in Pakistan and the aid it receives
from the United States and some Islamic countries virtually preclude
the possibility of such Pakistani concessions to Kabul.
Of the powers outside the region, only the United States need be
mentioned here. It coopted Pakistan as an ally and provided it
military aid between 1955 and I965 to serve the Americans purpose of
resisting and containing the communist threat. Pakistan saw no
external communist threat to its security and took the aid largely to
enhance its military capability vis-a-vis India. The war with India
in 1965 highlighted the divergence of American and Pakistani goals and
brought an end to the American military aid. After that, from time to
time, the United States sold spare parts and some whole units to
Pakistan. But it was not until after the Soviet intervention in
10
Afghanistan that the United States once again embarked upon a supply
of modern weapons, in some significant quantity, to Pakistan.
The American weapons will not enable Pakistan to take on the
Soviet Union in a regular military conflict. They are probably
intended to enable Pakistan to inhibit Soviet-supplied Afghan MIG
fighters from entering Pakistani air space and strafing and bombing
suspected Mujahideen concentrations and supplies. They may lift the
morale of Pakistan armed forces, and may also be used to combat
Soviet-sponsored insurrections within Pakistan should these develop.
The declared objective of the United States is that the Soviet
withdraw their forces and the conflict in Afghanistan come to an end.
But it is not unlikely that the United States finds some satisfaction
in the prospect of the Soviets being pinned down in a long and
apparently unwinnable guerrilla war in Afghanistan. The United States
supports Pakistan's efforts to achieve a "political" settlement of the
Afghan crisis through the UN-sponsored indirect negotiations. But it
also supports the Pakistani conditions for a political settlement
which, as we will see later, are simply unacceptable to the Karmal
regime in Kabul and probably also to the Kremlin. In the meantime,
the United States provides some assistance to the Mujahideen.
The United States has no intention of going to war with the
Soviet Union over Afghanistan and, most probably, will not do so even
if the conflict were to spill over into Pakistan. But the United
States is willing to assist Pakistan and the Mujahideen to resist
11
Soviet-Afghan coercion as long as, and to the extent, they can.
Pakistan is a small state in the sense that relative to three of
its neighbors
- India, China, and the Soviet Union - it does not
have the means of defending its independence and territorial integrity
and, for doing so, it must depend on its external connections. In
that sense the present study is one of small state behavior in an
international environment that is, to a significant degree, hostile.
We will see that through an adroit use of its connections with China,
the United States, and the Islamic states, Pakistan has been able to
defy the will and show of military might of the Soviet Union. Yet its
defiance has not been of an order that would provoke the Soviet Union
into taking military, or even strong diplomatic, action against
Pakistan. Indeed, Soviet aid to a Pakistan steel mill near Karachi
has continued and other modest gestures of economic cooperation have
been forthcoming. On the other hand, we will see also that there are
limits to what adroitness can accomplish. Pakistani policy has not
brought the Afghan crisis, and the problems it has generated for
Pakistan itself, much closer to a solution. Babrak Karmal continues
to be the head of the government in Kabul, such as it is; the Soviet
troops remain and the war goes on as do social and economic
destruction and dislocation; millions of Afghan refugees stay in
Pakistan and more of them come in every week. Quite possibly the
Afghan "problem" is one of those that turn out to be unresolvable and
with which those concerned must learn to live. The Afghan refugees,
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or most of them, will probably never return to their old country, m
the long-term perspective, the small state may be constrained to
accept what it cannot change. Pakistan has been governed by an overt
military dictatorship for the last seven years. The regime is not
popular, and it seeks to legitimize itself by claiming to be a
champion of Islam. Its posture has generated sectarian divisions in a
society that was already segmented along regional and linguistic
lines. The presence of several million Afghans in the country further
strains domestic cohesion. But the government of Pakistan can neither
send them back, nor stop more of them from coming, for it cannot make
its Islamic claims and yet turn away Muslims who are fleeing from, or
resisting, godless communism. The Islamic establishment in the
country, whose support the present regime wants to retain, will not
allow such a policy. The Pakistani government does not even want to
take the risk of talking directly with the Karmal regime in Kabul.
Thus our study will show the linkages between domestic and foreign
policies in the case of Pakistan. Lastly, we will see that a given
issue or crisis in a nation's foreign policy cannot be treated in
isolation, for it is connected with numerous other positions that it
has taken in its international relations. Pakistan's disposition
toward the Afghanistan problem is a function also of what it has said
and done, and hopes to achieve, in its relations with the Islamic
countries, the United States, and others.
CHAPTER II
THE REGIONAL SETTING (1947-78)
Pakistan and the Soviet Union
Some time back President Zia of Pakistan said that "Pakistan had
no disputes with the Soviet Union", that the Soviet Union had extended
valuable financial and technical assistance in the fields of energy
and heavy industry, and that Pakistan did recognize that the Soviet
Union, being a super power, had obvious interests and areas of
influence. He however, regretted that the Soviet Union had not
recognized Pakistan's "principled stand" on the Afghan issue.[1]
These statements reflect the pattern of relationship between Pakistan
and the USSR. The apologetic note on the one hand, and the assertive
maintenance of Pakistan's "principled stand" on the other, is typical
of numerous such encounters in their relationship.
Through the years the Soviet Union has followed a policy of
pressure and intimidation towards Pakistan, balancing it at times with
offerings of mutually advantageous relationship. Pakistan's reactions
have not been such as to have pleased the Soviets. On the contrary,
Pakistan irritated the Soviet Union first by joining
American-sponsored alliances, and then by seeking Chinese friendship.
13
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Pakistan's quest for national integrity and security has been the
primary and most constant theme in her foreign policy. Right from the
time of its independence in 1947, the new state of Pakistan felt
insecure. It looked around and to the east it saw India as hostile
power ready to dismember and absorb it. To the west it saw
Afghanistan, a fellow Muslim state, but unfriendly to the extent of
casting the only negative vote in the United Nations when Pakistan
requested membership. To the north it saw the USSR ~ a
Marxist-Leninist state, whose leaders looked upon Pakistan's
independence with disdain because it had been brought about by what
the Soviets regarded as feudal elements who colluded with the British
authorities for the extention of Western imperialism. [2] This is not
to say that the two countries remained entirely aloof. The Soviets
made some initiatives, professed interests in Pakistan's friendship,
invited its prime minister (Liaquat Ali Khan) to visit Moscow in
1949. [3] The latter first accepted but then decided against the
visit. [4] Ambassadors were exchanged in 1950, and relations were
established, but they were to remain minimal and cool at least for
some time.
Initial barriers towards good relations
Pakistan did not respond enthusiastically to the tentative
gestures of friendship that Moscow had extended in the late 1940 's.
Pakistan felt miffed because the Soviet Union had moved slowly in
15
extending recognition to Pakistan and Russian leaders had sent no
congratulatory messages to Jinnah when Pakistan came into
existence. [5] When in 1948 Pakistan's dispute with India over Kashmir
came to the Security Council, the Soviet Union remained neutral. [6]
This irked Pakistan because by remaining neutral, the Soviet Union was
in effect favoring the status quo in Kashmir which was quite
acceptable to India but not at all to Pakistan.
Pakistan's independence movement contained much rhetoric
concerning the Islamic ideology. Many Islamic scholars regarded the
Marxist-Leninist ideology as antithetical to their own. On their
part, the Soviets scorned "Islamic Ideology", the concept of an
"Islamic State", and its call for the creation of an "Islamic Bloc"
comprising the Muslim states of the Middle East. In Pakistan
professions of dedication to Islam militated against the possibility
of an extensive cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. [7]
Besides, the elites that made Pakistan's foreign policy at the time
were Western educated and therefore quite western oriented. They were
not inclined to give serious thought to the option of forging close
links with Communist Russia.
Pakistan inherited well-trained military manpower but very little
of equipment. Its weapons were not only low in numbers but outdated.
By the beginning of the 1950' s, Pakistan had already fought one war
with India as a result of which the latter took possession of by far
the larger, and the more desirable, part of the disputed state of
16
Kashmir. The Indian posture toward Pakistan, as seen by Pakistani
government leaders, remained one of hostility. The Government of
Pakistan thus felt an urgent need to acquire a sufficiently large and
modern military capability. Yet, it did not have the financial
resources to assemble it. In this situation, the United States,
looking for allies in behalf of its containment policy, appeared as a
source of military supplies at virtually no cost to Pakistan. The
Soviet Union, by contrast, had neither the interest nor the resources,
at this time, to arm Pakistan with modern weapons. It is not
surprising then that Pakistan joined American alliances, intended to
contain the Soviet Union and China, in the hope of becoming better
able to contain its own hostile neighbors, namely India and
Afghanis tnan. [8]
The Soviet Union did not do anything positive to prevent Pakistan
from joining the Western alliance system. There were no counter
offers of aid nor assurances of security; it was the search for
security and aid which had led Pakistan into the Western camp. It
seems that Pakistan's actions suited the Soviet Union. It enabled the
Soviet Union to bring India closer to its international thinking, as
it could clearly see that India would be the one country most
concerned about United States aid to Pakistan.
However, the Soviet Union did send a diplomatic protest to
Pakistan concerning acceptance of United States military assistance.
It warned, "The Soviet Government could not regard with indifference
17
reports of negotiations between the United States and Pakistan
concerning the establishment of American airbases in Pakistan nor
reports that Pakistan and United States Governments were negotiating
on the question of Pakistan joining in plans to set up "a military
aggressive bloc in the Middle East". [9] Pakistan Government denied
any negotiations for the establishment of American bases on Pakistani
soil but affirmed that it is "the duty of Pakistan Government to take
every step to safeguard the security of Pakistan and in the discharge
of this paramount duty and all other duties that fell upon the
Government, to adopt and take such measures as may appear appropriate
and adequate". The Soviet Union was assured that Pakistan "would not
take any step in hostility or unfriendliness to the USSR". [10]
The Soviet Union knew that Pakistan Government was more
interested in resisting India than in containing the Soviet Union or
China. Pakistani alliance with the United States might be irksome but
the Soviet officials did not see it as a credible threat to their
security. Nevertheless, between 1955 and 1958, they made it clear
that they resented Pakistan's participation in US-sponsored defense
pacts, and warned of "dire consequences" should it continue to pursue
the American imperialist line. [11] They showed their annoyance by
supporting India in its contention with Pakistan over Kashmir, [12]
and by supporting Afghanistan's demand for "Pukhtoonistan" , the more
extreme versions of which meant that Pakistan's western provinces —
Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province -- be separated from
18
Pakistan and joined with Afghanistan (we will have more to say about
"Pukhtoonistan" later). Afghanistan, being smaller and much less
powerful, may not have been so bellicose without Soviet support, which
Prime Minister Bulganin voiced in Kabul, Afghanistan, in December
1955: "We have sympathy for Afghanistan's attitude to the
Pukhtoonistan problem and think that the Pathans should be consulted
on the solution of the problem"
.[ 1 3]
At the same time, the Soviet Union expressed an interest in trade
relations with Pakistan. The two countries signed their first trade
agreement on June 27, 1956. [14] In 1959, the Soviets offered Pakistan
technical assistance in the fields of irrigation, soil conservation,
and water logging. Pakistan's exports to the Soviet Union and
other communist countries rose from $5.1 million in 1955 to $35.8
million in I960. For the same period years, imports increased from
$0.6 million to $14.7 million. [15]
Diplomacy of pressure continued
Despite some cooperation in non-political matters, the Soviet
Union continued its diplomacy of pressure on issues to which Pakistan
was sensitive. During his visit to Kabul in March I960, Khrushchev
condemned Pakistan, likening its behavior to that of its own former
"colonial oppressors", and endorsed Afghanistan's claims in behalf of
Pukhtoonistan. The joint communique declared: "The solution of the
problem of people on the Pak-Afghan border should be reached under the
19
principles of the United Nations Charter. [16] A few days later, the
Soviet ambacsador to Pakistan called for a plebiscite to determine if
Pakistani Pathans wished to remain in Pakistan, form an independent
state, or join Afghanistan. Pakistan Government termed this Soviet
support to Afghanistnan as interference in Pakistan's internal
affairs. According to the President of Pakistan, it aggravated
problems in the area. [17] The Pakistani press, showing a more bold
front, ridiculed Khrushchev's statements in support of
Pukhtoonistan. [ 18]
After two months, another development strained their
relationship. On May 9, I960, when it became known that an Amerian
U-2 espionage mission over the Soviet Union had originated from an
airfield near Peshawar in Pakistan, Khrushchev strongly warned
Pakistan and threatened to wipe out Peshawar. [ 19] Pakistan denied
having been an accomplice to military intelligence over the USSR. [20]
President Ayub Khan of Pakistan said that "After all, Russian threats
are not new things for us. We are not afraid of such threats. [21]
The American communications base was permitted to continue its
surveillance.
In December 1959, Eisenhower had visited India after visiting
Pakistan, and had failed to influence India to agree to a resolution
of the Kashmir dispute. [22] American aid to India was not affected
despite its refusal to heed Eisenhower's advice for a Kashmir
settlement. Pakistan realized that India continued to be America's
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favorite. The U-2 incident occured at a time when US-Pakistani
relations were on a seesaw. Even though Pakistan stood up to USSR
threats, this incident forced them to think whether alliance with
America was worth the physical risk it entailed in the form of Russian
rockets. President Ayub Khan expressed that he saw no reason why
Pakistan could not "do business" with the Soviet Union. [23]
Soon thereafter, Pakistan, probably to placate the Soviet Union,
sent Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then a minister in President Ayub Khan's
government, to Moscow in the summer of I960 to sign an agreement for
Soviet assistance in Pakistan's oil and mineral exploration. [24] The
following year Moscow extended a credit of $32.4 million to develop
Pakistan's oil industry
. [25] The Oil Exploration Agreement of 1961,
as Bhutto recalled, was the first "tangible step toward the
establishment of good cooperation" between the two countries. [26]
Cooperation between Pakistan and the Soviet Union has been
selective. The Soviet Union is a superpower whereas Pakistan is only
a small developing country, but one that occupies a strategic location
in close proximity to USSR. Like most other developing countries,
Pakistan perceives the Soviet Union planting its influence wherever it
can in the geostrategic areas of the world. [27] Beyond this, it
assesses Soviet diplomacy in terms of Soviet support of Pakistan's two
adversaries — India and Afghanistan. Therefore, whether the Soviets
offered positive incentives — technical assistance, economic aid —
or whether they used negative incentives — vilifying propaganda.
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threats
- Pakistan has always thought that had the Soviet Union not
lent support to Afghanistan and India, they might not have been so
intransigent over Pukhtoonistan and Kashmir disputes.
On the other hand, the other superpower, the United States,
despite its alliance with Pakistan, has only offered lukewarm support
to Pakistan over Pukhtoonistan issue which did not extend beyond
recognition of the Durand Line as the international frontier between
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and not much more than benevolent neutrality
in Pakistan's dispute with India. And India, in spite of its
pro-Moscow bias, has enjoyed the benefits of substantial American
economic and technical assistance and, after the Indo-Sino war of
1962, even received some American military aid.
During President Eisenhower's visit to Kabul in December 1959,
the Kabul Government was assured of continued US assistance "in its
task of strengthening its economic and social structure". The routine
wording of the joint communique issued from Kabul said that both the
Governments had agreed that "in the present day, it is imperative that
international disputes be settled by peaceful means. ..". [28]
The US did not do much to discourage the Afghans from pressing
the Pukhtoonistan issue. It did not have any leverage with
Afghanistan because it gave Afghanistan only a modest amount of
assistance. It did not give a whole lot because Pakistan would have
objected to that. The United States did give a lot to India but still
did not acquire sufficient leverage — power to compel — because
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India was too large and politically too strong to submit to American
pressure
.
A change in attitude
In the 1960's, especially after the Indo-Chinese war of 1962,
Pakistan began to reappraise its policy of complete identification
with the west. It made friendly overtures to China which were to
disturb Moscow as well as Washington. But Pakistan did not make this
shift without taking into consideration their reactions. To avoid
antagonizing anyone, the strategy evolved was to set up a "bilateral"
relationship with each of the three great powers. Bilateralism meant
that relations with one power should not be at the cost of relations
with the others.
A change took place in Moscow's attitude as well. Khrushchev's
successor did not approve of the excessively pro-Indian or pro-Afghan
bias of Soviet policy. Besides, in March 1963, Prime Minister Sardar
Daoud Khan of Afghanistan, who had been an uncompromising spokesman
for Pukhtoonistan resigned. His resignation resulted partly from his
strong stand on this issue which had brought about diplomatic break
and border clashes with Pakistan in 1961, and with it severe strains
on the Afghan ecconomy .[29] After his resignation, Afghanistan
toned down its position on Pukhtoonistan. Soviet Union thought this
to be an opportune time to improve relations with Pakistan. Its prime
interest was to counter the influence of China. It should not upset
the Afghans or the Indians. The Afghans themselves were mellowing
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towards Pakistan, and the Indians would benefit in the long run if
Chinese influence in Pakistan could be contained. So starting with
the Oil Exploration Agreement of 196I and terminating with the civil
war in East Pakistan in 1971, Pakistan and the Soviet Union
experienced a considerable lessening of tension in their relationship.
Improved relations
The Soviets are quick to take advantage of the opportunities
that arise as a result of instabilities in the region. As one
observer has noted, they actively promote and seek such opportunities
to extend their influence. [ 30] The 1965 war between India and
Pakistan provided an excellent opportunity for the Soviets to contain
the influence of America or China in South Asia and to extend their
own. During the war, Moscow adopted an apparent posture of
neutrality, even though it continued to send military supplies to
India. [31] It continuously offered its good offices, and finally
mediated a formal end to the war at the Tashkent Conference. This
turned out to be a diplomatic feat for the Soviets. Labelled by the
west as potential aggressors, they were able to project themselves as
peacemakers. The Soviet Union greatly increased its prestige,
especially in the Afro-Asian countries where it was competing for
influence with China. [32] Moreover, it further softened its attitude
towards Pakistan. As a concession to Pakistan, the Soviet Union
withdrew its open support of Pukhtoonistan. They tried to persuade
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Pakistan to leave the Western Alliance system and decrease relations
with China.
Pakistan had been disappointed over the American arms embargo
during and after the war. It would not formally withdraw from SEATO
or CENTO or diminish its relationship with China. But it did ask the
United States to close down its communications base near
Peshawar. [33] Soviet economic assistance to Pakistan progressively
increased, and during 1966-67, the Soviet Union even provided Pakistan
with a small inventory of military vehicles and helicopters. In
1968, it signed an arms agreement with Pakistan but assured India that
it had no intentions of upsetting the military balance in the
subcontinent. [34]
It was at the Tashkent Conference also that Kosygin had first put
forth his proposal for regional economic cooperation and an overland
trade route between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Soviet
Union. [35] He made it more formally when he visited these countries
in 1969. A conference on the issue was planned in 1969, but President
Yahya Khan of Pakistan rejected the idea. Soviet arms deliveries to
Pakistan tapered off thereafter. President Yahya Khan visited the
USSR in June 1970, and the Soviets agreed to provide assistance for
the construction of a steel mill.
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End of good relations
As Richard Nixon became president of the United States in 1969
and Henry Kissinger became his National Security Advisor, Washington
decided to seek a rapproachment with Communist China as a counter to
the Soviet Union. China's relations with the Soviet Union had been in
the mode of a cold war since 1959 when Sino-Indian border conflict
became public knowledge. But if American overtures to China were not
well received in Peking, the new administration would be greatly
embarrassd both at home and abroad. In the past, Pakistan had been
offering its good offices to bring about a normalization of
Sino-American relations. President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger now
decided to employ President Yahya Khan of Pakistan as an intermediary
to arrange a secret mission for Henry Kissinger in Peking and this
Yahya Khan did with considerable enthusiasm, skill, and secrecy.
When news finally came in 1971 that Kissinger had visited Peking
and arranged for Nixon's visit to China the following spring, and that
Pakistani diplomats had facilitated all this, shock waves were felt in
many capitals, not the least in New Delhi and Moscow. Pakistan's
role annoyed the Soviets for it was understood that a Sino-American
reconciliation was intended to weaken their international position.
It should be noted that Pakistan was experiencing a civil war in
its eastern wing at the same time that Yahya Khan was helping the
United States in establishing contact with China. The United States
made som€ efforts at bringing about a reconciliation between the
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government of Pakistan and the East Pakistan rebel leaders but these
did not succeed, partly because of India's negative pressures on the
rebel leaders, whom it hosted, and partly because of Yahya Khan's own
tardiness in seeing that East Pakistan could not be held by force.
Mrs. Gandhi's government in Delhi saw the conflict in East
Pakistan as an opportunity to break up Pakistan. But if India
intervened on the side of the rebels, China might intervene on the
side of the government of Pakistan. In order to preclude the
possibility of Chinese intervention, she proposed to sign a treaty of
friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union which the latter had
been suuggesting to India for a number of years. The treaty was
signed, and soon thereafter, the Soviets rendered military and
diplomatic support to India in the 1971 war between India and Pakistan
which resulted in the formation of Bangladesh.
The Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 again provided an opportunity to
the Soviets to pressure Pakistan to leave the western alliance and
decrease relations with China. The Soviets, while pleased with
Pakistan's exit from SEATO, wanted it to leave CENTO as well and to
support Soviet plans for a collective security arrangement in Asia.
Pakistan resisted these pressures. Referring to the proposed Asian
Security Pact, Mr. Bhutto observed: "Pakistan has suffered a great
deal from pacts" adding that the deeper question was "Asian security
against whom?". [36]
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In spite of the Soviet support for the dismemberment of Pakistan,
Mr. Bhutto was careful in his attempts to build bridges with the
USSR. He went to Moscow in March 1972, but he made it clear to his
hosts "...that friendly relations between us should not be constructed
at the expense of our friendly relations with other countries". [37]
In other words Pakistan would not improve ties with the Soviet Union
at the expense of its relations with China. The Russian leaders were
not pleased to hear this and, in turn, they told him that if history
were to repeat itself, Soviet policy would follow the same path as it
had in the Bangladesh crisis — meaning that they would support
"national liberation" movements against the integrity of Pakistan if
the same surfaced again, presumably in Baluchistan and the North West
Frontier Province.
As Pakistan's relations with the US became strained again,
following news of Pakistan's agreement to purchase a nuclear
reprocessing plant from France in 1976, the Soviet press praised the
Pakistani Prime Minister for his opposition to "Imperialism". Soviet
relations with the Bhutto regime remained reasonably cordial. But it
has found it difficult to establish a rapport with Bhutto's successor,
General Zia-ul-Haq who professes Islamic zeal, opposes secularism, and
has been trying to take Pakistan closer to the United States.
Much has changed since the Soviets mediated the Indo-Pakistan
conflict at Tashkent in 1966. After Pakistan's defeat in the 1971
war, India has insisted that disputes between the two countries be
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settled bilaterally without Peference to third parties and that
includes the Soviet Union. After occupying Afghanistan, the Soviet
Union has become a neighbor of Pakistan. Even if the developments in
Afghanistan had not taken place, there would have been definite limits
to the improvement of Soviet-Pakistani relations. And the fighting in
Afghanistan has affected the prospects very much for the worse.
Pakistan and Afghanistan
Stormy beginnings
Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have not been a happy
experience. Tensions have resulted from Afghanistan's ambition with
respect to the North West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces of
Pakistan. In the mid 1940s when it became apparent that the
subcontinent would be partitioned to form India and Pakistan,
Afghanistan launched a vigorous public and diplomatic campaign to
demand that all tribes living east of the Indo-Afghan frontier, called
the Durand Line, occupying the provinces of North West Frontier and
Baluchistan, be allowed to join Afghanistan. In 1946 a referendum was
held in NWFP to ascertain the wishes of the Pathans on the question of
joining Pakistan. [38] The results were favorable, and the Pakistani
government cited them as total and complete proof of the wishes of the
Pukhtoons in Pakistan.
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Afghan leaders soon realized that Pakistani Pukhtoons did not see
that they had much to gain by making their areas part of Afghanistan.
Even Pathan groups who were in opposition to the ruling elites in the
central government of Pakistan - for instance, the "Red Shirts", led
by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, did not entertain the thought of union with
Afghanistan. Pathan leaders desired local autonomy, but they were not
anxious to forge organic links with Afghanistan. [39] They had been
participants in a politico-administrative system established by the
British in India and were familiar with it. They wanted to extend and
enlarge the democratic values implicit in that system. Afghanistan,
on the other hand, was ruled by an autocratic monarchy which, in the
late 1940's and early 1950*3, professed, or encouraged, no democratic
aspirations. The regime in Pakistan might also be autocratic,
especially in its dealings with dissident Pathan leaders, but
significant elements in the Pakistani political culture demanded
democracy and the implementation of its values. Secondly, Pakistani
Pathan leaders could by no means be certain that they would retain
their leadership roles, and join the ranks of the rulers, by joining
Afghanistan. The old and established Afghan elites might soon look
upon the Pathan leaders as intruders in their political system. The
move might accomplish for them nothing more than transferring from
Pakistan's government repression to Afghan government repression.
Occasional, and vague, verbal support for the idea of Pukhtoonistan
might be useful to gain political concessions from the ruling elites
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in Pakistan. But as a serious and practical course of action, it is
doubtful that Pakistan's Pathan leaders ever really wanted union with
Afghanistan. Afghan authorities soon discovered this and redefined
"Pukhtoonistan" to mean its independence of Pakistan, without
necessarily being a part of Afghanistan. They changed their claim,
but continued to speak for the Pukhtoons on the basis that Pukhtoons
were akin to them racially and linguistically. Defining the idea of
Pukhtoonistan, Sardar Daoud Khan (who later became the prime minister
of Afghanistan) stated: "Afghanistan never wanted to enlarge her
territory. We have certain responsibilities with regard to our
Pakhtoon brothers because they are one with us in blood and
culture. "[40]
The other factor which caused friction between the two countries
was the transit of Afghan trade through Pakistan. Afghan goods were
subjected to delays at ports, resulting in high demurrage charges.
Limitation was put on the number of railway cars transporting goods to
Afghanistan. Often items in transit never reached Afghanistan or were
damaged en route. [41] While Afghan officials saw these inconveniences
as deliberately caused by Pakistan authorities, one has to remember
that Pakistan itself was faced with many difficulties and upheavals
after partition which could have caused some of these bottlenecks.
In the years immediately following independence, hostile radio
and press propaganda from both sides continued unabated and at times
there were reports of border clashes. In 1949-50 after such
31
skirmishes, Pakistan sealed its border which resulted in the virtual
stoppage of trade between the two countries and interruption of
transit facilities which landlocked Afghanistan had traditionally
enjoyed through Pakistani ports and territory
. [42] At home Pakistani
authorities came down hard on their own people in the NWFP who were
accused of being pro-Pukhtoonistan and anti-Pakistan but who claimed
to be only pro-democracy. In an effort to suppress the Red Shirts,
their meetings were attacked and their leaders jailed. [42] Pakistani
bombers and fighters shelled tribal territories, and armed clashes
occurred between Pathan tribesmen and Pakistan army units. The
economic blocade, the crackdown on Pathan leaders, and the hostile
propaganda were enough to provoke the Afghan government to recall its
ambassador from Karachi. The Afghan King, in his opening address to
the Parliament said: "... great obstacles have been created affecting
Afghanistan's relations with our neighbouring state, Pakistan,
notwithstanding Afghanistan's desire to the contrary. The aggressive
action by Pakistan aircraft bombing the Afghan territory only
increased the tension and obliged the Afghan Government to take
serious steps." He further said, "note must be taken of the
freedom-loving aspirations and the repeated protests of the
trans-Durand Afghans, and, having regard to the principles of justice
and the right of these people to their independence, Afghanistan is
responsible for the attainment of their oft-desired
independence . "[44] Such were the beginnings of the mercurial.
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fluctuating relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The issue
of Pukhtoonistan, which at times meant secession of the area from
Pakistan, and at times local autonomy and recognition of local elites,
remained the bone of contention in their relationship.
Daoud's first era — relations at its worst
In the years between 1953 and I963, when Sardar Daoud Khan was
the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Pakistani-Afghan relations
deteriorated to their lowest point. Daoud was the first cousin and
brother-in-law of King Zahir Shah. In 1953 he became the prime
minister replacing his uncle, Shah Mahmoud. Before that he was the
war minister. His base of support was the armed forces, which made
him stronger than the king, who had a weak disposition. Daoud's
generation of the royal family had become impatient with Shah
Mahmoud's policies on three grounds: slowness of economic and social
reforms; concern that growing dependence on the west, especially on
the US might compromise Afghan neutrality and complicate relations
with the Soviet Union; and displeasure with what Daoud in particular
considered inadequate official support for the Pukhtoonistan issue.
One of Daoud's first acts as prime minister was to abrogate in
December of 1953 the 1921 Treaty which had acknowledged the Durand
Line as the international boundary between Afghanistan and what was
then British India.
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Partly with a view to balancing the legislative representation of
East and West Pakistan in a future Parliament, and partly as an
economy measure, the government of Pakistan decided on March 27, 1955
to amalgamate the four provinces of West Pakistan - Punjab, Sind,
Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier — into a single political
and administrative unit (popularly referred to as the ""One Unit").
This meant, among other things, that Pathans and Baluchis, Sindhis and
Punjabis, would no longer have their own provincial political and
governmental apparatuses. Instead, they would be ruled by a
provincial government headquartered in Lahore and the central
government in Karachi, both of which were dominated by the Punjabis
and the Urdu-speaking immigrants from India. In other words, the
Pathans would not rule even in their own lands, for their province had
been disestablished.
The Afghan government saw this development as a further setback
to their advocacy of some form of autonomy for Pakistani
Pukhtoons. [45] On March 28, the day after the establishment of the
"one unit". Prime Minister Daoud made an inflammatory speech on Kabul
radio denouncing the action, and the next day the Pakistan Embassay in
Kabul was sacked and the flag desecrated by mobs apparently operating
with the Afghan government's approval. A retaliatory attack was made
a few days later on the Afghan consulate in Peshawar, and Pakistan
once again clamped a blockade on Afghan imports and exports, and
diplomatic relations between the two governments were severed. [46] In
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early May 1955, Prime Minister Daoud Khan ordered full mobilization of
the Afghan army. The quarrel was eventually patched up, the blockade
lifted, and the Afghan army demobilized. But two significant
realizations came home to the Afghan government. First, Afghanistan's
total dependence on Pakistan for the transit of its imports and
exports gave Pakistan the ability to virtually strangulate its trade
and thus dislodge its economy; and second, that Afghanistan's military
strength was no match for that of Pakistan's, which was rapidly
improving with American help. Consequently Afghanistan, in order to
achieve economic flexibility, made arrangements with the USSR for the
transit of its trade. In November 1955, Daoud Khan called a Leo Jirga
(or Grand Assembly) of the tribes and announced his intention to
continue to support the cause of Pukhtoonistan, and to obtain arms
wherever he could to increase Afghanistan's military capability. He
also let it be known that efforts to obtain sympathy and support from
the west toward this end had been rebuffed.
In 1957 and 1958 the Pukhtoonistan agitation diminished, largely
because Afghanistan wanted to cultivate good relations witn the west,
but it flared up again in I960 and 1961. In the latter year, border
clashes occured, diplomatic relations between the two countries were
severed again, and the border was closed. [47]
This time the rupture in diplomatic and economic relations
produced a devastating effect on Afghanistan's trade and economy. It
ended Afghanistan's average 100 truckload transaction via Torkham and
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an
Chaman in Pakistan. The export to Pakistan, mostly fruit, fell to
insignificant earning of 43,910 afghanis (Afghanistan's currency)
1962 as against 185,263,000 afghanis in 1961 and 588,42,000 afghanis
in I960. Similarly, the imports from Pakistan dropped from 96,180,000
afghanis in I960 to 9,430,000 in 1962. [48]
Afghanistan produced about 200,000 tons of guapes each year. [49]
It accounted for twenty percent of its foreign earnings. After the
border closing, this commodity had to be airlifted which did not prove
to be profitable. For instance, in India the price of Afghan grape
shot up to rupees 65 per kilo as against the previous price of rupees
15 per kilo when it was exported from Pakistan road transit facility.
Other items of fruit export, both dry and fresh, met similar fate
during the eighteen month's suspension of trade through Pakistan.
Foreign goods intended for Afghanistan perished in Pakistan
warehouses. [50]
Because of the disruption in trade, prices in Kabul itself rose
over 100 percent on certain items, especially food. The brunt of all
this was mostly felt not only by the common man, but by the grower,
transporter, and the businessman. Pakistani refusal to let in Afghan
nomads who crossed and recrossed the frontier on their annual winter
shelter in Pakistan, posed another worry for the Afghan government.
All this led to the unpopularity of Prime Minister Daoud Khan and to
his resignation. The consensus was that he had advanced Afghanistan's
economic development, but that his usefulness ended when his
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stubborness over the Pukhtoonistan issue closed the border. [51]
Post Daoud era — mildness in relations
The new Prime Minister replacing Daoud, Dr. Mohammad Yousaf was
restrained in his references to Pukhtoonistan. On May 29, 1963
diplomatic and trade relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were
restored, partly through the efforts of the Shah of Iran. Both sides
agreed to abide by their 1958 Transit Agreement, to approach all
mutual problems in accordance with international law, and to continue
to "create an atmosphere of good understanding, friendship, and mutual
trust". Essentially, the issue of Pukhtoonistan was separated from
normal diplomatic and economic relations.
For the next ten years, relations between the two countries were
quieter. Internal political changes in both made for an improved
relationship. The new Prime Minister of Afghanistan, unlike his
predecessor, was not a hardline protagonist of Pukhtoonistan.
Furthermore, the adoption of a comparatively more liberal constitution
in 1964, and the elections under it the following year, further
weakened the political power of the royal family and the Daoud
faction. In Pakistan, President Ayub's resignation from office a few
years later (1969) similarly assisted the process of rapprochment
between the two countries. The new president. General Yahya Khan,
pursued a more conciliatory line toward Afghanistan. On April 1, 1970
he promulgated an order that disestablished the "one unit", the
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province of West Pakistan, and restored the original provinces of
NWFP, Baluchistan, Sind, and Punjab. This pleased the Afghans,
because they had been, in the name of Pukhtoonistan, demanding local
autonomy for the Pathans and Baluch people. To the Afghans, this
development appeared to suggest that NWFP and Baluchistan, operating
as autonomous units within the federation, might have some measure of
self-government; that the Pukhtoons and Baluchis would have more voice
in selecting their own leaders, and in carrying on their day to day
political activities free from interference or domination by other
provinces. It pleased the local Pukhtoons and Baluchis as well, who
deeply resented the "one unit". [52] And it also pleased the local
politicians, who particularly in their campaign against the "one
unit", had joined hands in 1955 and formed the National Awami Party.
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who had been in exile in Afghanistan, declared
that with the reestablishment of the old provinces, all his political
objectives had been achieved
. [53] The improved situation was further
refelected by Pakistani Finance Minister's visit to Kabul in May 1970,
which resulted in an agreement for increased economic cooperation
between the two countries, and the acceptace by Afghanistan of a
Pakistani offer of technical assistance. [54]
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Grievances and reconciliation
The demonstrated willingness on both sides to have correct, if
not altoghether cordial, relationship was not to last for long.
Sardar Daoud Khan once again came on the scene. In July 1973, he
overthrew King Zahir Shah and made himself the President of the
Republic of Afghanistan. Once again, he revived the demand for the
creation of Pukhtoonistan with full force. This time the Afghan move
was not without some justification. A civil war had broken out in
Baluchistan in 1973, and the Bhutto Government had dealt severe
harassment to the Pathan and Baluch leaders of the National Awami
Party. Daoud could capitalize upon such state of affairs. He had
overthrown the king, and obviously needed every issue he could get
hold of to justify himself and gain legitimacy.
In April 1972, the National Awami Party (NAP) in coalition with
Jamiatul-Ulama-Islam (JUI) formed ministries in NWFP and Baluchistan.
For the first time a government where popularly elected local
politicians could play a commanding role was established in these
provinces. After a brief period of cooperation between Bhutto and
these opposition governments in the frontier regions, strains
developed. In February 1973 the central government, on the pretext of
controlling separatist tendencies, moved against them. Both the North
West Frontier and Baluchistan provincial governments were dismissed
and caretaker regimes favorable to Bhutto and his party were installed
in their place. [55] In February 1975, Bhutto banned the NAP and
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ordered the arrest of Wall Khan (son of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and leader
Of NAP), and Sixty top NAP leaders. Later they were subjected to a
long and slow and inconclusive trial. Bhutto not only i.p.isoned the.
on a Charge of high treason but went about publicizing their alleged
disloyalty, overlooking the damage that this would cause to Pakistan's
national fabric. To designate public leaders, identified with
PuKhtoon or Baluch aspirations, as traitors was to inflame provincial
and ethnic animosities. The arrest of these leaders antagonized
Baluchi tribes and pushed them into an open war with Pakistani troops.
As the fighting escalated, Daoud government gave sanctuary and
other assistance to the Baluch insurrectionists and to the Pathans who
had fled to Afghanistan. The Afghan government threatened Pakistan
with "an all-out war", and warned that war would come if Pakistan
government continued aerial bombing against the Baluch people. Bhutto
replied by saying that Pakistan was quite capable of defending its
frontiers. [56] But Bhutto was later able to conciliate Daoud when
they met in Kabul in 1976, and the two agreed to abide by the "Bandung
principles of peaceful coexistance"
. [57] In the same year later,
Daoud also visited Pakistan.
When General Zia came to power after ousting Bhutto, he met
President Daoud in October 1977. Both leaders agreed to sustain the
reconciliation created in 1976. Zia pledged aid to Afghanistan in
meeting its severe food shortages, and in December 1977 a consignment
of 10,000 tons of Pakistani rice arrived in Kabul. [58] In early June
40
1978, he released Wall Khan and other Pathan and Baluoh leaders fro.
prison. I'le gesture spoke for Itself Pakistan wanted peace with
Afghanistan. However, Zla-s attempts to calm his troubled frontier
was oomplloated by the sudden turn of events In Afghanistan. In April
1978, President Daoud and ..any of his government's top oivilian and
".lUtary leaders were killed by elements of the Afghan armed forces
that established a new marxlst government.
Afghanistan, the US and USSR
Background
The ability of the United States to build political influence in
Afghanistan suffered a setback from the very inception of formal
contacts. After British India's reorganization of Afghanistan as an
independent state in 1919, Afghanistan sought to establish ties with
the United States but was repeatedly rebuffed. In 1921 King Amanullah
sent a high level diplomatic mission to Europe and America to obtain
recognition of Afghan independence. While the mission was warmly
received in USSR and Europe, and the USSR became the first country to
recognize Afghanistan, the US chose to withhold recognition for
fourteen years. The US finally recognized Afghanistan in 1934 but it
was not until 1948 that the two countries exchanged ambassadors.
Afghanistan, like Iran and some other neighboring countries, signed a
Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1921. Until the end of
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India might provide. [60]
The united States however, did not respond favorably to Afghan
requests for military aid and a possible alliance relationship.
The Afghans, nevertheless, actively courted American influence.
In 1946 the Afghan Minister of Education proposed to reorganize the
educational system along American lines, [61] and with their limited
foreign exchange, the Afghans hired American teachers for their elite
schools. In the same year they employed the large Morrison Knudson
Construction Company to help in an ambitious land development scheme
in the Helmand Valley. By 1949 the Morrison-Knudson connection had
cost Afghanistan $20 million. When in 1949 the Afghan foreign
exchange resources dwindled, they turned to America, sending their top
economic official. Minister of National Economy, Abdul Majid Zabuli,
to Washington to negotiate a loan of $55 million for a national
economic development plan. The Export-Import Bank, to which Zabuli
was referred by the State Department, approved a much smaller loan of
$21 million in November 1949, and that too restricted only to the
Helmand Valley Project, thus assuring the American Company's
construction profits. Zabuli protested that such unbalanced
development would be costly and uneconomic, but Afghan political
leaders were more interested in the political effects of American
involvement and so they accepted the loan. Zabuli eventually
resigned. [62]
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the Secon. World War, during which Afghanistan re.aind neutral, Afghan
relations with the Soviet Union were generally correct hut not without
occasional tensions. Afghanistan was critical of Soviet policies
toward the Central Asian Muslims and even trained so.e anti-Soviet
Musli. rehels. The Soviets expressed opposition to these Afghan acts,
varying from mild protests to military intervention.
After the war, although Afghanistan was not faced with immediate
Soviet threats to its territorial integrity as Iran and Turkey were,
yet it sought an alliance relationship with America in order to be
able to offset any potential Soviet threat. The Afghan leaders
thought the US would be an ideal substitute for the receding British
power since, being distant, it posed no imperialistic threat to
Afghanistan and it could work as a countervailing force to perceived
Russian expansionism. m 1946, the Afghan Prime Minister, Shah
Mahmoud, was quoted as saying "America's attitude is our
salvation". [59] In 1948, according to US State Department records:
Afghanistan urgently wants US arms to maintain internal
security.... Secondly, it wants US arms to make a
positive contribution in the event there is war with
the Soviets. Properly armed and convinced of US
backing, Afghanistan could manage a delaying action in
the passes of Hindu Kush which would be a contribution
to the success of the armed forces of the West and
might enable them to utilize bases which Pakistan and
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A3 Zabuli had foreseen, the Hel.end Valley Project, with its slow
Paybac. and
.any social, technical, and administrative problems,
became a serious burden for many years. Certain drawbacks in the
project meant that more and more capital had to be spent after the
first investment. The fi.st loan in 1950 was followed by a second
one. in June 1953, the Export-Import Bank issued another $18.5
million loan. [63] Resettlement of nomads in the new lands and complex
technical and managerial problems required skills the Afghans did not
have. They requested American technical assistance which the US
agreed to provide because by this time American prestige had become
involved in what came to be known as the "American project".
One might say that American economic assistance to Afghanistan
originated in a political need to rescue a very dubious project. In
all other respects, American response to the requests and overtures of
what was then a very stable and strongly pro-western Afghan government
was indifferent and niggardly. This American attitude probably
resulted from Afghanistan's perceived remoteness and unawareness of
its strategic importance. The Americans did not see Afghanistan as
important to American interests, and were therefore reluctant to make
large or long-term commitments. It could also be said that they were
apprehensive of adverse Russian reaction to American influence in a
country which bordered Russia, and therefore kept their hands off,
hoping the Russians would exercise similar restraint. Yet, this fear
of provoking Russia did not prevent the United States from befriending
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other countries of the region Uke Tur.ey, Iran, and Pakistan.
ms 13 not to say that taerlca ha. totally negleoted
Afghanistan. In fact, It do-nlnated Afghanistan's external trade, aid,
and cultural oontaots until ,953. But in
.onetory te™s thi
interaction between the two countries regained at a figure below one
million dollars a year. [64] This
.odest econoeic relationship between
Afghanistan and the US did not provoke any countervailing
.oves on the
part Of Soviet union. But with the heightening of the cold war,
Russia's concern over militarHy weak and economically underdeveloped
Afghanistan
- just then receiving its first US technical aid - would
soon grow measurably and revive the memory of earlier Russian
interventions.
The turning point came in 1950 when, following fierce exchanges
on the border, Pakistan blocked the transport of goods to Afghanistan.
Afghanistan faced many shortages, including petroleum. The Soviet
Union immediately made a four year barter trade agreement with
Afghanistan, exchanging oil and textiles for wool and raw cotton.
This agreement was followed by a major economic deal including Soviet
loans and participation in several projects [65], including oil
exploration in northern Afghanistan, the construotinon of several
large gasoline-storage tanks, highways, silos, and the establishment
of a Soviet Trade Office in Kabul. The Soviets also agreed to permit
Afghan goods free transit through Soviet territory.
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During the 1950-3, American aid was largely concentrated in the
Hel.and Valley Project. The Americans did not reel that Arghanistan
was ready for industrialization, so they confined their aid to the
Hel.and and other agricultural projects, road-building and education.
By contrast, the United States showed
.uch more interest in Pakistan
When the latter decided to heco.e its ally. A^erica-s dominant
position in Pakistan was a cause of anxiety for the Russians. They
were concerned about hostile acts that would be launched fro. any
bases the United States
.ight build in Pakistan, and this was
undoubtedly a strong factor in their moves to broaden their relations
With the "barrier state". They felt that the growing linkage of the
Southwest Asian countries with the United States posed a threat to
their security. Therefore, they thought it wise to pay more attention
to Afghanistan. Luckily for them, Prince Daoud became Prime Minister
in 1953, and pursued policies which had the unintended result of
putting Afghanistan under Russian influence.
Daoud 's reversal of Afghan policy
Daoud
-s appointment as the Prime Minister, was motivated partly
by an increasing dissatisfaction with the country's foreign policy and
its internal rate of economic development. The issue of
Pukhtoonistan continued to vex Afghan leaders. The American
involvement in the Helmand Valley had failed to produce satisfactory
results, and the US had declined Afghan requests for military
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a33i3tance.[66] The disruption of transit facilities through Pakistan
had created serious economic difficulties for the Afghans, and their
military capability was insignificant as compared to that of Pakistan.
It was not even good enough to preserve internal security and
authority Of the central government Which were threatened by armed
tribes in the hills. [67] Daoud, being a shrewd politician, pursued
the following major interrelated goals: rapid economic modernization;
aggressive agitation of the Pukhtoonistan issue; and creation of a
strong Afghan military force. To further these policies, Daoud
reversed centuries of isolationism and fostered both American and
Russian competition inside Afghanistan in order to rebalance
Afghanistan's non-alignment. Rewards soon followed. Within the
American government there were sharp differences about the new Afghan
policies. Some officials believed that the Afghan leaders had
abandoned the West and joined the Soviet bloc. They urged that the US
should not further invest in the country. Other American officials
argued that Daoud 's policies, while dangerous, were not based on
ideological leanings, that Daoud and most Afghans were fiercely
independent and wanted American presence to balance Soviet influence,
and that American aid should be increased to provide an alternative to
complete Soviet domination and to preserve Afghanistan's freedom and
non-alignment. In a pragmatic way American economic aid did greatly
increased, and project by project, case by case, the US designed a
program aimed at restoring the earlier balance. [68]
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This Daoud.
3
policy Shift was not simply an invention of his
mind. Nor should it be seen merely as a reaction to the country's
internal problems. It was conditioned by external factors as well.
Within the context of the Cold War, the US was building a system of
defense alliances with countries bordering the Soviet Union. The
death of Stalin marked a change in Soviet policy towards
non-communist, non-aligned nations. Afghanistan became the first
recipient of the new Soviet foreign aid program, and on January 27,
1954, the first Soviet loan of $3.5 million was made to
Afghanistan. [69] A month later. President Eisenhower announced the
United States' approval of Pakistan's request for military assistance.
American military assistance to Pakistan put the Afghans in a
critical position. A well-armed Pakistani army, in contrast to the
untrained and ill-equiped Afghan forces, represented a threat to
Afghanistan's position on the question of Pukhtoonistan. An insecure
border and an army incapable of functioning effectively even as an
internal security force made the obtaining of military assistance an
urgent matter. Daoud, if he was to make a more viable and strong
Afghanistan, did not have much choice but to reverse the policies of
the previous regimes.
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The issue of military aid
The i3,ua Of .Ultary aid was troubl.ao.e In Afghan-taerlcan
relations, and of aubstantxal importance in Afghan-Russian relations.
The Afghans had sought taerloan military training and assistance as
early as ,9M. while they considered it as a matter of vital national
security and even survival, the Americans took a more relaxed view.
Afghan requests for military aid persisted for a number of years and
were finally abandoned when they decided to accept Russian military
help. Afghan overtures to the United states first met with
bureacratlc and legal evasions and finally with a clear negative
response
.
On August 13, 1951 the Afghans prepared a list of arms request
and delivered it formally to the American Ambassador. On November 27,
1951, the Ambassador was instructed by Washington to reply to the
Prime Minister, Shah Mahmood, that "the arms request will cost $25
million. They will have to be paid for in cash. Transit through
Pakistan will have to be arranged with no help from the US. The sale
will have to be made public, and it would help if the Pukhtoonistan
claim is dropped. "[70] The Afghan government could not accept these
terms
.
Daoud, soon after he became the Prime Minister, tried again to
get arms from the US. The Americans replied that extending military
aid to Afghanistan will only create problems, not resolve them, and
that the Afghans should instead settle the Pukhtoonistan dispute. The
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latte. „e.e out.a,e.. «ot only was t.el. oonn.entlal
.e^uest
refused, was disclosed to Pakistan, and tne sensitive Issue of
Pu.htoo„istan injected into the refusal. Daoud ,overn.ent
Officially stated that the United States had refused military aid
because the Afghans would not sign Mutual Security Agreements or Join
the Baghdad Pact. [71]
A3 stated earlier, the PuKhtoonistan dispute brought Afghanistan
and Pakistan to the verge of war in March 1955. The US could play no
role in its resolution, having lost diplomatic leverage in Kabul and
being unwilling to pressure its ally, Pakistan. The USSR, on the
other hand, could do something about the situation and did. A transit
agreement, signed on June 21, 1955, rerouted a large part of Afghan
trade through the Soviet Union, thus avoiding the Pakistani blockade.
In November the Loyah Jirgah (Grand Tribal Council) approved the
government's acceptance of the Soviet Union's long-standing offer of
military aid which the Afghans had until then ignored. On December
1^ 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev arrived in Kabul. On the I8th,
three agreements were announced as a result of which the USSR offered
Afghanistan a loan of $100 million, the largest ever made outside the
socialist bloc; confirmed the 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and
Non-aggression between the two countries; and expressed Soviet support
for Pukhtoonistan. A fourth secret agreement, not announced until
August 25, 1956, provided for extensive Soviet military aid to
Afghanistan. These were offers too tempting for Daoud to refuse.
50
In 1956, soviet ar.3 began to arrive in Afghanistan. The
Afghan.Sov..et military agreement, involving so.e $25 million, included
T-34 tanks, MiG 17 fighters, 11-28 bombers, helicopters, and small
arms from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and East
Gennany. They were paid for in barter goods over an eight-year
period. The Soviets also helped to construct and expand military
airfields in Mazar-i-Sharif
, Shindad, and Begram. Later, Soviet
-litary aid was expanded to create a modernized Afghan army,
dependent almost exclusively on the Soviet bloc countries for new
weapons, spare parts, and military instructors and advisors. And this
is Where the importance of the agreement lies. The Soviets started
training Afghan officers, technicians, and specialists, who were sent
to USSR at the rate of 200 to 300 per year. By 1979, when the Soviet
Union marched its troops into Afghanistan, it had trained some 10,000
men or about 10^ of Afghanistan's servicemen, including almost the
entire officer corps. Some of these became revolutionaries later, and
held key staff positions when the time came for the Afghan Marxists to
strike in 1978.
American denial of military aid to Afghanistan was primarily
because of Pakistan. It was also consistent with its Mutual Security
program. Afghanistan was a non-aligned country and would not sign any
mutual security agreement with the US, whereas Pakistan had such an
agreement with the US. The American policy at the time required that
no weapons be given to any nation which might use them for aggressive
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purposes. The US insisted that weapons
.e use. only to
.esist
aggression and, preferably, co^unist aggression. Nations which did
not accept these stipulations were normally refused arms aid under
standard
.utual assistance agreements. The Afghans questioned the
conditions such agreements imposed. For instance, how could it be
determined who the aggressor was in a given conflict? If the
Pakistani Pukhtoons should revolt, could the government of Pakistan
use weapons supplied by the US to suppress the Pukhtoons? For the
Afghans the three key concerns characterizing their position were
non-alignment,
( "bi-tarafi" as they called it), independence, and
development. They did not want to let go of any one of these, because
the failure of any one of them would weaken the other two. The
Soviets, in contrast to the Americans, did not demand any verbal or
written pledges, because they realized such commitments were not
necessary. Once military arms and equipment had been delivered,
instructors and spare-parts would be needed, giving the Soviet Union
considerable political influence in Kabul. [72]
We cannot say that Daoud's acceptance of Soviet aid meant that he
was pro-Soviet in the cold war. His immediate concern was the balance
of power in the region. Not only was Afghanistan at odds with
Pakistan, but its relations with Iran were also impaired over
boundaries and water in the southwest. The US refusal to provide
military aid to Afghanistan together with the delivery of substantial
quantities of American arms to Pakistan, Afghanistan's principal
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regional rival, led the Afghan government to accept Soviet arma.
Therefore, it waa partly toerica-s Inflexible arms aid policy, and
partly Afghanistan's perception of a threat to its security, that made
It dependent on the USSS, which was later to lead to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan.
It was mainly With Soviet help that military institutions were
built in Afghanistan. By 1977, the Soviet Union had supplied more
than 700 tanks (T-34s, T-54/55s and T-62s), and 184 combat aircraft
(MiG-17s, MiG.21s, I1-28s and SU-7s). The resulting military forces
would not suffice to deter external invasion, but as internal security
forces, they were quite capable to bring about a coup, it was with
the help of the Afghan army that Daoud overthrew the King and seized
power in 1973, and again it was the backing of the armed forces that
enabled the Marxists to oust Daoud and take power.
Afghanistan's economic relations with US and USSR
The Soviet-Afghan military agreement of 1956 was followed by a
larger measure of economic cooperation. Soviet Bloc short-term credit
financing had been available to Afghanistan since 1953. The first
Soviet loan of $3-5 million financed the construction of two grain
elevators, a mechanized flour mill, and a bread-baking plant. Then a
Soviet technical aid and credit agreement of $1.2 million, signed in
July 1954, was made available for the construction of a gasoline pipe
line across the Oxus River, and three gasoline storage plants. The
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third agreement, reached in August 1954, was a $2.0 million credit to
pay for street-paving and road-building equipment. The fourth Bloc
aid agreement, signed with Czechoslovakia in August 1954, involved a
credit Of $5 million for the construction of cement Plants. Usually
the terms were easy: loans were to be paid back in commodities (wool,
hides, cotton, and vegetable oil), at an interest rate of 3 percent.
In 1955, as mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union had offered
Afghanistan $100 million in credit for agriculture and industrial
projects (military airport in Baghram, docking and ware-housing
facilities on the Oxus, stretches of roads north-south of Kabul,
Saland Pass tunnel linking Kabul directly with the north, a cement
Plant and a power station north of Hindukush mountains, irrigation
canals in the eastern provinces). In August 1957, the King of
Afghanistan visited Moscow and still another credit of $15 million and
technical cooperation agreements with the Soviet government were
announced; this time aiming at oil prospecting and oil drilling in the
northern provinces. In 1959, the standing economic cooperation
agreement with the Soviets was further extended to include the
reconstruction and enlargement of the Kabul airport, and the
reconstruction of the north-west road linking between Kushka and Herat
and Kandahar. In summary, the aid agreements with the Soviet Bloc
between 1954 and 1959 authorized expenditures of about $246
million. [73] By contrast, US financial aid, excluding wheat aid and
technical assistance, for the same period, totaled $105.8 million. Of
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this amount m .nnon was ea^ar.e. ror t.e Hel.an. Valley
Project.[74] (For US and Con..unxst aid to Afghanistan see Tables 1-6).
At this ti.e, Afghanistan traded with a number of countries other
than the Soviet Union, m 1956, Afghan-Soviet trade balanced out at
see 17 Million dollars in each direction. But by the end of Daoud-s
first period of rule in 1963, the Soviet Union was exporting 72.5
million dollars worth of goods to Afghanistan and importing only $23
million. What caused the Soviet Union to gain so swiftly this
position Of dominance was the third eruption of the Pukhtoonistan
dispute into open conflict which resulted in the suspension of the
transit of Afghan trade through Pakistan for two years (I96I-63).
Both the superpowers tried to help Afghanistan by airlifts of its
fruit harvest, but whereas America provided free, ten cargo flights a
week to India for forty weeks, the USSR, for the same period provided
15 flights a day, almost all to the Soviet Union, and for which the
Afghans Ultimately had to pay. It was this same Pukhtoonistan dispute
and its economic consequences which brought about Daoud's exit in
1963, and the advent of a somewhat democratic style of government.
Between 1955-65, the Soviets provided Afghanistan with $552
million in aid. The US aid for the same period came to $350
million. [75] The Americans concentrated their aid on education and
educational institutions (such as the Kabul University), agricultural
projects such as the Helmand Valley Project, and highway construction.
Table 1
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Soviet Financia l A id to Afghanistan As of .Tun. ia.n
Million US $
Purpose of
Loan
Grain silos,
bakery,
flour mill
Gasoline storage
tanks, pipelines
Road building
equipment
Date of
Authorization
January I954
July 1954
August 1954
Cement and other
industrial plants August 1954
Asphalt plant and
paving machines
Industrial, power,
irrigation, road,
airport projects
Arms, ammunition
Oil drilling,
exploration,
transpt. eqpmt.
May 1955
December 1955
July 1956
August 1957
Road Construction May I959
Port development
and wheat
Total
May 1959
Authorized
Loan
3.5
1.2
2.0
5.0
2.1
100.0
32.4
15.0
80.0
5.0
246.2
Source: Peter G. Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West
, National
Planning Association, Washington DC: US GPO, I960, p. 58.
56
After Daoud.s fall, even though America continued to provide so.e
aid to Afghanistan, it did not compete with the Soviet Union as a
donar. m the first decade after the Soviet-Afghan military agreement
(1955-65) the US economic assistance was substantial, but it decreased
steadily during the second decade. By 1968, Afghanistan had received
more than twice as much Soviet aid as American: $550 million to $250
million. It should, however, be noted that while 80 percent of US aid
had been in the form of outright grants, two-thirds of the Soviet
contribution consisted of loans.
Curiously, this decrease in US assistance took place at a time
when the Afghans were experimenting with "democracy", allowing a
greater freedom of the press and political activity. It also
coincided with the increased American involvement in Vietnam and later
with efforts to build a detente with the Soviet Union. In this
connection, one might also consider a developing skepticism of foreign
aid as an important instrument of foreign policy. As a result of
these factors, the US interest in Afghanistan lessened. But that was
not the Soviet response to the apparent lull in superpower
confrontation. The Soviets actively sought position of dominance in
Afghanistan. One could say that Afghanistan benefited from the cold
war, being the object of competing interest from both the superpowers,
and suffered from detente by becoming more dependent on the USSR when
it lost American interest.
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Soviet aid between
,953 and ,973 was .ore than three tl.es that
Of taerloa: $,,500 .lUion to $450 .luion.[76] Daoud • s oo.ing to
power in
,973 again led to stlU further Soviet involvement in the
Afghan eoonooy. i„ ,975, Moscow reaffirmed its deep aid co.itment by
providing the largest amount of economic assistance it had yet
extended in a single year to this border state. The new Soviet
economic credits totalled $437 million. The aid was allocated to
twenty major projects in agriculture, irrigation, electric power,
mineral and metal processing, and transportation. [77] By ,978,
Moscow's total commitment over the previous 24 years amounted to $1.3
billion. Of this commitment, $500 million of project aid remained to
be delivered. [78] During the same year (1978), 2,075 specialists and
technicians of various kinds were present in Afghanistan from the USSR
and East Europe.
Moscow's position as the largest aid donor made it Afghanistan's
principal trading partner as well. Prior to 1950, there had been
almost no trade with the Soviets, but in the 1970's more than 50
percent of Afghanistan's trade was with its northern neighbor. Moscow
became Kabul's principal supplier of capital goods, petroleum
products, and sugar. Soviet imports from Afghanistan included cotton,
fruits, and natural gas. In 1978, imports from the USSR rose by
nearly 25 percent, to $20 million, while exports to the USSR remained
stable at $110 million.
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on
By
The USSR developed Afghanistan's natural gas p.oducti
facilities and constructed pipelines to transport gas to the USSR.
1978, .ore than 40 percent of Afghansitan's exports, including all itl
natural gas, were going to pay off its military and economic aid debts
to the soviet Union. And the price paid by Moscow for the 3 billion
cubic
.eters of Afghani gas annually has been well below
international prices. The Soviets are also engaged in the
construction of a 500,000 ton oil refinery. Eventually, this Soviet
developed petroleum industry Will provide
.ost of Afghanistan's own
needs for oil and leave a small surplus for export. Till the early
fifties, Afghanistan's status as a neutral nation was secure, so it
appeared, as long as neither Russia nor any other major power took
more than a trader's interest in its affairs. As mentioned earlier,
certain events in the fifties gave the Russians the opportunity for a
more active Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Beginning in 1954,
Soviet economic penetration continued apace over the next 25 years.
Whereas American aid in the 1950's was concentrated on improving
Afghan agriculture and husbandry, the primary thrust of So^et
economic assistance was concerned with strategic infrastructure
projects. Soviet engineers from mid-1950's to mid-1970's built a
hardened, all weather highway which linked all four corners of
Afghanistan to the transportation system of the Soviet Union. A
network of Soviet-built transport aircraft facilities also sprang up
during this period. The net result of this economic aid was that
59
during the invasion, in the wor.s of the British P.i.e Minister in the
House Of commons on January 28, 198O, "Soviet tanks crossed
Afghanistan on roads built with Soviet money, and their aircraft
landed on airfields similarly financed"
. [79]
Table 2
US Economic Loans and Grants to
Afghanistan
Million US $
1946-80 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
537 21 13 21 12 11
"^"dbQQt^ of Economic Statistic... iQfti, National Foreign
N::eTb:rri98i:1?
'sT'^'
intelligence Agency, Washington DC:US 0?l
Table 3
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Communist Economic Credits And Grants f.n
Afghanistan
^^^^r"^^ Million US $Total USSR E Europe China
1»378 1,263 39 76
Source Comm^ Non-Communist Less n.v.i....
Tn.^^^ ^ I '
^^^^^^^ F^^^ Assessment Center, CentralI telligence Agency, Washington DC:US GPO, September, 1979 p To
iSigl int'ef^"^"'^
Statistios,
^9J9, Foreign AssessL * C ier,Central I elligence Agency, Washington DC:US GPO, August, 1979, p.
Table 4
Afghan Millt;.rv Personnel Trained
In Communist CountriR.-^
No. of Persons
USSR E Europe
6,795 6,425 370
Table 5
Communist Military Technicians
In Afghanistan
1978
Total
700
No. of Persons
USSR & E Europe China
700 0
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Table 6
Communist Econnmic TechniGian.^
In Afghanistan
1978
No. of Persons
USSR & E Europe China
2»200 2,075
Source of Table 4, 5, and 6:
Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communi ..t r.... n.^.n^p^^
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An Assessment.
The soviet Union „o„ ooouples Afghanistan an. I3 virtually
r-unnlng the count.,. Several historical
.evelop.enta, ao.e avoidable
and others perhaps unavoidable, would see. to have contributed to this
outcome. There la first the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan
over the issue of Pukhtoonistan which, on several occasions, Induced,
even forced, Afghanistan to seek rell,f c™ ^v. . .K ie from the Soviet Union as
mentioned above. Why have the Afghans remained attached to this
issue? Historically, the Pukhtoons, and the area they occupy, have
not firmly belonged to a single political authority for any great
length Of time. At times, not only the land of the Pukhtoons, but
much Of Afghanistan was ruled by kings and emperors in what is now
India. At other times, the sultans in Afghanistan ruled much of what
is now Pakistan. For almost a hundred years, the British maintained
the North West Frontier area of the subcontinent as part of their
Indian empire and this area, upon independence in 1947, officially
became part of Pakistan. But parts of the frontier regions, notably
the tribal areas, have never been brought firmly under control either
by the British or by their predecessors in Delhi, or even by the
sultans in Afghanistan.
This historical background, plus the fact that the Pukhtoons on
both sides of the Durand Line were ethnically and culturally much the
same people
-
even though they have had different political
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expe.ie„=e
,uri„, the B.itiah p.e^enoe in tHe area
,ave the
Sove.™e„t
.„ Kahul the i.ea that the Pu.htoon a.ea. of Pa.,3tah
shoul. legitimately c. appropriately fo™ part of Afghanis^n. It shoul.
note, that in 1947, „any m.iana, and perhap., also othen politioal
leaders expected that Pa.i.tan would not last Ion,, why then not .a.e
and press the olai„, i„ time, it might he realised. The Afghans «ere
by the British imperial power. Why respect it now that the British
power had receded, it is pointless even to ask why the Pakistan
government did not accept Afghanistan's claim and divest Itself of a
large part of its territory. states simply do not voluntarily
dismember themselves. That the British had been the ones to draw the
Durand Line did not detract from its authorltativeness because, after
all, the independence, indeed the very existence, of Pakistan and
India as legally legitimate political entities had been authorized by
an act of the British Parliament, namely, the India Independence Act.
Why did Afghanistan not drop the Pukhtoonistan issue when it saw that
Pakistan had become stabilized, would not concede Kabul's demands, and
could not be coerced because Afghanistan was the militarily weaker
side to the dispute? It is possible, indeed likely, that Afghanistan
saw the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and India, and hoped that
Pakistan, grown weaker or even dismembered, might eventually become
amenable to Afghan demands. With the passage of time, the
Pukhtoonistan issue became entrenched in Afghan politics, just as the
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KasH.,.
.,3pute p.,,,,„,
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
in A.a. poxitios, an. t.e
.uU„, eutea in Katul couM not
..op
It without inviting serious charges of betrayal fr-^o om their opponents.
became Involve, and It beoame even harder to let go of the issue.
Needless to say, if the dispute had not arisen, or if it had heen
qulcXly resolved, Afghanlstan.s need for Soviet help In economic or
military spheres, especially the latter, would not have heen as great
aa it turned out to be. It Is in this context that one has to view
Soviet-American oompetitioh in relation to Afghanistan.
Given the Pukhtoonistan issue, the Afghans needed military
assistance m order to be able to deal with Pakistan more effectively.
Pakistan
- larger and more modern than Afghanistan, with a much
greater reservoir of trained military personnel - offered a much more
promising prospect as an ally to the Americans than Afghanistan did.
Soon it became a key member In the American alliances in Southeast
Asia and the Middle East. Pakistan could barely live with American
economic assistance to its enemy to the east, namely India. But it
would not tolerate American military assistance, or even large-scale
economic aid, to Afghanistan while the latter continued to advance Its
Claims on Pakistani territory or instigated disaffection among
Pakistani Pukhtoons. In other words, American assistance desired by
Afghanistan could not be offered except at the risk of alienating
Pakistan and weakening the American alliances referred to above. This
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appaare. to .e too Mgh a p.ioe for Afghans goodwUl for- the US to pay
at the ti„e. Did the US not see that Ita relative heglect of
Afghanistan, and the ino.eaaing Soviet attention to that country,
would eventually result in "losing.. Afghanistan to the Soviet Union?
It is no exaggeration to say that the us =a«e to aooept the idea that
Afghanistan forced part of the Soviet sphere of Interest. But it did
not anticipate the imposition of a conMunist regime and Soviet
military occupation of that country.
Russia has been interested in Afghanistan since the time of the
Czars, partly because it served as a gateway to the British empire in
India, and partly because of its proximity to the Russian possessions
in Central Asia. More recently, it has gained importance because its
southwestern portions lie a few hundred miles away from the Persian
Gulf. Afghan version of Pukhtoonistan, which include Pakistani
Baluchistan, offer an added attraction to Soviet foreign policy-makers
and military strategists. Given the American involvement with
Pakistan, and its effect on American disposition toward Afghanistan,
it is not surprising that the Soviets took the opportunities for
building influence in Afghanistan that came their way. As a result,
they are only two hours helicopter ride from the Straits of Hormuz in
the Persian Gulf, surrround Iran even more than they did before, have
increased their ability to put pressure on Pakistan and, indirectly,
even on China. As they probably expected, the United States has not
been able to make any effective moves to thwart their designs.
CHAPTER III
COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER AND THE RESISTANCE
Communism in Afghanistan
In a Violent coup on April 27, 1978, the Communists took power in
Afghanistan, organized a Central Revolutionary Committee, which named
Nur Mohammad Taraki President of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan, and Prime Minister of its cabinet. Hafizullah Amin, and
Babrak Karmal were appointed Deputy Prime Ministers. [ 1
]
Yet Afghan Marxism has a short history. Its roots go only as far
back as 1947, when an organization called Wikh-i-Zalmayan (Awakened
Youth) was formed in protest against the abuses of power by the royal
family. A key figure in this opposition was Dr. Abdur Rahman
Mahmudi, who founded a newspaper, Nida-i-Khalq (Voice of the Masses),
which was banned after twentynine issues. Both in its name and its
political orientation (leftist but recognizing the need for temporary
accommodation with the monarchy), this paper was a forerunner of the
more outspokenly communist paper, Kalq. However, as late as I960, one
American researcher had concluded that "Soviet political aims in
Afghanistan do not seem to differ much from those of the US", in part
because that there is "no open or clandestine communist propaganda in
Afghanistan". [2]
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Significant Marxist organization began only i„ ,965 when the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan wa., formed. The tey figure
in thl3 development was Nur Mohammad TaraW, who since September
,963
had been meeting with other leftist figures. These meetings
culminated in a gathering at Taraki. s home on January
,965, at
Which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)'„as
Officially founded. What went on In these meetings Is obscure because
it was only m 1979 that one heard that such meetings had taken
Place. [3] Besides Taraki, the other two persons that were to play an
important role in the Marxist movement of Afghanistan were Hafizullah
Amin and Babrak Karmal.[4]
Taraki, born in 1917, was from a rural Pushtoon background. m
his early youth he went to Bombay (India) as a clerk for an Afghan
fruit exporting company, where he learned English, and finished tenth
grade. In 1937 he came back and got a job in the Government's press
department. By 1950-51 he had become director-general of Publications
in the Ministry of Press and Information, and then editor-in-chief of
the official Bakhtar news agency. During 1948-53, Taraki began to
write about the rural peasant life which gave him prominence in the
narrow Afghan intellectual circles. During this time he also became
active in Wikh-i-Zalraiyan. In 1953, the government sent him to United
States as an embassy press attache, soon to be recalled for denouncing
Daoud, and to be put under police surveillance for some time. During
1955-58, he worked for the United States Aid Mission in Kabul, after
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which he started his own commercial tr^^n.i.^-anslation service. During these
years he continued his wrTHr^r.iting, and wrote about a dozen books,
"largely novels about the lire or peasants". Some or his books
advocated a Soviet economic development model ror Arghanistan. m
1965, he gathered about 30 young men and rormed the PDPA.
Harizullah Amin was born in 1921 in Paghman Just outside Kabul,
Where his rather was a low-level civil servant. Amin went to a high
school in Kabul ror training teachers, received a degree rrom Kabul
University and became a principal or a Kabul high school. In 1957 he
came to Columbia University (New York) on an American scholarship and
got his Masters in Educational Administration. Upon his return he
started working in a teachers
• training institute in the Education
Ministry in Kabul. In 1962 he again came to Columbia University ror a
doctorate. This time he became involved with the Associated Students
Of Afghanistan (ASA) and his political views in the 1964 ASA year book
were found objectionable by the Afghan government, and cost him his
return home in 1965 without completing his doctorate. On his return
he joined the newly formed PDPA. Neither did he have a lengthy
history of lertist activities that Taraki and Karmal brought to the
new PDPA, nor was he present when it was rounded. He rose only slowly
to his later prominance in the party.
Babrak Karmal was born in 1929 near Kabul into a prominent
Pushtoon ramily. His rather, Leutenant General Mohammed Hussein Khan,
was a pillar or the royal ramily and served in many responsible posts.
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in=lu«n« Gove^o. Oene.al or Pa.tia province. Ka™al atten.ea
Oe™an-la„g.aga achools In Kabul, and in ,9^9 entened the faculty of
law at Kabul UnlvenaUy. Ka^al became a leaden In student pcUtios
and Played a pno.lnent nole In demonstrations protesting the closing
Of student debating societies. He was an effective orator in Dani
,
the main language of the Kabul elite and of government, not his tribal
Pushto, Showing his urban alienation fro. his roots. Till then
pontics was an excitement for Kar„al more than an ideological
commitment. He later said that during ,953-55, which he spent in
prison he was converted to communism. Karmal attributed this to Mir
Akbar Khyber, fellow prisoner, who taught himself Russian while in
prison. Karmal returned to law school after his release, graduated in
1957. In 1958 he became a minor official in the planning ministry.
His government service lasted until 1965.
From the beginning it was clear that PDPA's ideological
orientation was communist. "Its programme was an orthodox Communist
one for the period, reflecting analyses associated with Khrushchev or
Brezhnev". [5] After coming to power, the unswerving support that it
gave to all Soviet initiatives is sufficient to indicate where it got
its inspiration.
Afghanistan's 1964 Constitution had introduced some democratic
principles into the polity it established. By this time four general
ideological positions had already emerged among the informed
electorate
—
the Traditionalists, the Adaptors, the Democrats, and
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the Ma.xl.t-Le„i„i3ts.t6] Once the pbp. fo«ed aa an
organization, u contested elections to the Lower House of Parliament
(Woxesi
.i.gah,, „Mcn
.esuite. in victories for a few PDPA Central
Co^ittee
.embers including Babra. Kar.al. iara.i and A.in ran .ut
did not win their contests.
Due to its numerical insignificance in Parliament, PDPA chose to
sabotage that bodys wor. gather than to operate within it. Its
members used their nffiooeo ces to express constant criticism of the
structure and performance of the government. Babrak Karmal, by
mobilizing the student body of Kabul University, forced Pri.e Minister
Yousaf to resign, and when the Parliament elected Maiwandal as the new
Prime Minister, the only votes that were cast against him were those
Of the PDPA members. Following the same policy of disruption, the
PDPA again voted against Prime Minister Etemadi in a vote of
confidence in 1967. [7]
In 1966, PDPA's Secretary General Taraki started publishing a
newspaper "Khalq" (the masses), which vilified the royal family, and
called for sweeping social changes, the expulsion of Western
influences, and closer ties with the Soviet Union. It was closed down
by the government after five issues. [8] After Khalq's demise, there
was no communist journal until Sulaiman Laeq began publishing
"Purcham" (the banner) in March I968. Laeq's co-editor on Parcham was
Mir Akbar Khyber - Karmal 's ideological mentor and Parcham
theoretician
— whose assassination ten years later was to trigger the
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1978 communist coup.
Factionalism among Leftist-..^
In June 1967, the PDPA split into two hostile factions: the
Khalcis under Taraki and Amin, and the Parchamis under BabraK Karmal.
Their constituencies were somewhat different: the Parchamis identified
With the Dari language (Afghan Persian)
, the cosmopolitan life of
Kabul, and appealed to the various ethnic nationalities of
Afghanistan; the Khalqis identified with the Pushto language, and were
more restricted to the Pushto-speaking people. But there was no
ideological reason for their break. Both Taraki and Karmal remained
firmly loyal to Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism, and differed only
as to the tactics: the Khalqis put emphasis on class
conflict, while the Parchamis called for a united democratic front to
work within the framework of the existing order. Similarly, the
difference in their commitment to the issue of "Pukhtoonistan" was
more apparent than real. The Khalqis, being predominantly Pukhtoons,
seemed more committed, but when the Parchamis found it politically
expedient to support Pukhtoonistan, they did so with just as much
vigor.
The main reason for their break is to be found in the personal
antagonism and rivalry for control of the party between the two
leaders
— Karmal and Taraki. Each commanded the loyalty of about
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^alf Of the PDPA movement, and each was to maintain an unb.o.en
hostility toward the other for ten years, until 1977, when a seeming
reconciliation, very probably imposed from outside, took place.
The Afghan parliamentary elections in I969 registered a massive
Shift to the right. Labor strikes in 1968 and student unrest had
disturbed the country. During the elections, Parcham and several
other opposition newspapers were banned, and later there were
allegations that the government had interfered to secure the defeat of
leftist candidates. [9] Both Amin and Karmal got elected. Overall,
the left did lose ground, but the cause was probably less a matter of
government interference than the weakening effect of the Parcham/Khalq
split on the one hand, and popular resentment against leftist
disturbances on the other.
The 1975 Coup
The gulf between the Parcham and the Khalq widened when on July
17, 1973, the Parcham succeeded in carrying out the coup that brought
it and Daoud to power. The coup demonstrated that the Marxists had
extended their operations from campuses and streets of Kabul into the
bases of the armed forces. While Daoud had maintained close relations
with the senior commanders of the armed forces, the Parcham had
penetrated and recruited strategically placed junior officers who
played a major part in the success of the coup.
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in 3uppo.ting Daoud, the Paroha. lea.e.s
.ust .ave thought that
»e ooul. Win popula. acceptance, an. that he would he .ore receptive
to thei. political p.ogra.. By plotting his netu.n to power, Daoud
ostensibly co^ittea himself to the social pnogra^s and pro-Soviet
posture of the Marxists. [ ,0] This however, would not happen.
initially, the new Daoud regi„,e projected a leftist in,age through
revolutionary rhetoric of social and political reforms [1,], and It
installed Parcha. leaders in so.e ministries and the cabinet. But by
1975, Daoud began to purge the Parcham leaders from his government.
Simultaneously, he moved to disengage his government from the Soviet
embrace. One element in close Afghan-Soviet relations had been
revival of the Pukhtoonistan issue. Daoud began to defuse this Issue
by initiating a rapproachment with Pakistan. His moves alienated the
Marxists, and certainly gave the Soviet Union a cause to reconsider
its support.
The Soviets may have thought that reliance on the PDPA factions
alone was insufficient, just as reliance on purely economic
penetration had been insufficient during the previous decade, and that
it was time now for a new approach that would bring about more
substantial Soviet influence on Afghan policies
.[ 12] It is reasonable
to assume that Moscow had some role in bringing the Khaliqis and
Parchamis back together, even if only for a time. Moreover, the two
factions found in government repression a compelling reason to unite.
They set aside their differences and jointly planned a second coup.
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but it appears that each exoeci-Pd t-^ o •pecte to seize power at the expense of the
other. In the course of pyf^^m--:,,^ *.uO executing the coup in April 1978, the Khalq
initially emerged successful
.
[ 1 3]
The oo»u„i3t movement was rather young in Afghanistan. it had
-ffere. fro. faotlonalla.. and
.ustereC only united an. marginal
support, with negligible representation In the succeeding parliaments.
How was It then able to act as an Important partner In the ,973 coup,
and then to sel.e power for Itself In 1978? The Western observers are
inclined to attribute its success to Soviet assistance. „o doubt the
Soviets Played an Important role through their economic and political
penetration, but it should be clear that their success became possible
because of the Internal situation In Afghanistan Itself. The
government's failure to crush the communist movement while It was
still weak reflected a paralysis that afflicted the various cabinets
In the last years of King Zahlr Shah's monarchy, other elements in
the country underrated the communists' potential for political action.
The political Impotence of the anti
-Marxists in best shown by their
acquiescence when the Marxists seized power along with Daoud in 1973.
Another factor which made for communist success, and which m
Itself caused this growing malaise In Afghan political circles, was
the government's inability to cope with the problems and opportunities
of modernization
- understood In the sense of growing literacy and
social mobility.
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By t.e ,970a the s.owi„, „e„i,
,,,,3
^^^^^^^^
mcreaalngly roatleaa and fPuatrated. [ Many educated youth found
that there were few Job opportunities available to the„. Por the „03t
part, the government bureaucracy practiced the traditional patronage
aystem. for which one needed connections, personal or faolUal. This
frustration was deepened by the gap between the standard of living of
those few Who were amassing wealth, and the educated who were still
poor. These people felt that the political system offered little
prospects of Improvement in their lives. Yet, as often Is the case in
developing countries, Afghanistan had not developed institutions
capable of managing the expectations generated by the process of
modernization. The situation became worse when the secondary school
system was expanded between ,965-73. Dissent became increasingly
common, particularly within the growing student bodies of the
secondary schools, teachers' academies, technical institutions, and
the university. In 1965 and ,968 the students took to the streets
because of their dissatisfaction with the system. In this situation.
It was easy for the left to harness the discontent of the young for
agitation against established authority. Soon they were to transform
this experience of student agitation to a more sophisticated level of
political moves for bringing down the government — the government
which (whether it was of the monarchy or of Daoud's republic)
generally had a repressive policy toward any form of dissent.
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Afghan oo^unls. oa.e to power partly aa a reault of support It
receive, fro, the discontent in the ccuntrys ur.an centers. This .ay
see. pu..ung, for Afghanistan is primarily a tri.ai society, whose 18
"inion people are co.posec of disparate ethnic groups, untouched hy
urban institutions, llvinc a^ a h=„.i„ >.
,
i g t a barely subsistence level through their
largely nomadic economy (only 6J of the land is cultivable), isolated
by star, mountains, and the only co„on denominator being Islam. Real
Afghanistan is mostly countryside, but communism did not come to power
m the countryside. It rose from the barrel of a gun in the cities,
and it was m the cities that dissent first began. The resistance is
now in the countryside.
The Saur (April) Revolution
^ 1978
After the coup, the new government struck a delicate balance
between the Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA. In the first
cabinet eleven positions were given to the Khalqis and ten to the
Parchamis. But Taraki, being a Khalqi, by becoming both the President
and the Prime Minister, demonstrated that the Khalq faction was
predominant. [15] The regime avoided the use of communist or socialist
terms to describe itself. [16] In his first press conference, on May
7, 1978, Taraki described the regime as reformist, constructive and
tolerant of Islam. Taraki said he did not intend to bring Afghanistan
within Soviet orbit. [17] He said, "Our relations with all countries
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including the Soviet Onion and all oup neighbours and other countries
government and their help in political and eoono.lc areas". [,8] i„
apite Of emphasizing continuation of Afghanistan's non-alignment in
international politics, the new regime would soon initiate radical
Changes in both its external and internal policies. Externally, it
moved Closer to the Soviet Union. t, 9] and internally it adopted
policies Which provoked large-scale opposition that soon turned into a
major insurgency.
Khalq Gaining Power over Parcham
During its first three months, the new government got rid of the
surviving members of the royal family by either imprisoning them or
expelling them from the country. [20] It dismissed or executed many
senior members of the Daoud government. [21 ] By late July, 1978, signs
of the Khalqis gaining more ground in controlling the government began
to appear. Babrak Karmal and five Parcham cabinet members were sent
out of the country as ambassadors. Karmal was sent to Prague. [22]
This move was accompanied by the first of a series of purges of the
middle and upper ranks of the armed forces and the civil bureaucracy.
By the following March there had been four such purges. Karmal and
his colleagues did not enjoy their ambassadorial positions for long.
In October 1978, they were branded as traitors. A call in the Kabul
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Times of October 15, 1978 urged:
under the blac^u: r nro^ :p »
1^"'''°^^'
--"°n
icoui,ratic ana ms reactionary associates
. [23]
Along with the purge of other government officials, Defense
Minister Abdul Qadlr (hero of the coups of ,973 and 1973) was also
arrested and tried as a traitor, ostensibly for attempting to bring
the Parchamls back to power. Observers believe that Qadlr was removed
because he objected to growing Soviet control of the armed forces and
Khalq.s apparent willingness to rely on the Soviets for political
support.
These developments indicated a two-fold stance of the Khalqis: by
getting rid of the more obviously Moscow-dependent Parchamis from the
cabinet, the Khalqis appeared to be more nationalistic and less
revolutionary; however, by getting rid of Qadir, who wanted to contain
Soviet influence, the Khalqis seemed not to mind growing Soviet
control of the Afghan armed forces. It follows that the Khalqis
simply wanted exclusive power over government, so they got rid of the
Parchamis. But they needed Soviet support in order to remain in
power, so they did not resist control of their armed forces. This was
unwise as later events showed, but the Khalqis at that time did not
have much choice. How did the Soviets feel about the purge of their
protege', Babrak Karmal? They may have felt uncomfortable, but as
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long as they knew that the Khalni^ ,^ i^q s would carry out a pro-Soviet
revolution, they seemed willinK to wait .nH . ux^^ g a d watch and interfere only
when necessary.
Khalq Pol icy and Performance
In the beginning, when the Khalqis and Parchamis shared power,
they proceeded with caution so as not to arouse popular opposition!
They were careful not to offend Islamic sentiment. They attended
Friday prayers in Kabul's mosques, made their proclamations in the
name of Allah, and gave assurance that their reforms would be
consistent with Islamic Law and teachings.
Despite its strong Pushtun flavour, the new regime, in order to
gain popular acceptance, announced a positive policy of equal rights
for minorities. In addition, decrees were issued to declare intent to
reform land holdings, rural credit, marriage arrangements, and
education. It was clear where the new regime stood in foreign policy.
At the Third World Conference in Budapest in the summer of 1978,
Foreign Minister Hafeezullah Amin stated that Afghanistan's
non-alignment was consistent with its membership in the Socialist
camp. [24]
It seems the people did not quite understand what was going on,
so till the fall of 1978, they were rather quiescent. But once the
Khalqis got rid of the Parchamis and felt secure in power, they made
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policies that Showed the. in thei. true colors and evo.ed explosive
responses fro. the rural population. On October 19, 1978, the
government declared that the national flag would 5e modeled after
those Of the soviet republics. [25] This was supposed to serve as
symbol Of revolution, hut it was a very tactless step because it undid
months Of pro-lslamic propaganda. Within a few wee.s of the decision
about the flag, sweeping reforms were announced. The most important
were: 1) land reform designed to transfer 3 million acres of prime
agriculture land from large holders to small holders and the landless;
2) elimination of all usurious credit arrangements betweel
money-lenders and the rural poor; 3) marriage regulations that placed
a ceiling on the customary bride price at 30O afghanis ($6); licensing
Of all marriage, and designation of the minimum age for marriage at 18
years; 4) introduction of mandatory education based on Soviet model
curriculum for both sexes. Introducation of Russian as a required
foreign language in place of English for secondary school students had
been announced before. [26]
For a people who had not known much government interference in
their private lives, this was a rude awakening. The government
constantly labored on the theme that the new social and economic
system would benefit ninety-eight percent of the population which, it
claimed had had no stake in the old order. [27] It maintained that
only two percent (a small "clique" of religious and landed leaders,
and a few urban "capitalists") would resist. When it became obvious
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that the raslstanoe involved „any „ore people, the regime started
bla.ln. foreigners: first the Pakistanis and Iranians, and then the
Chinese and Americana for stirring internal strife in Afghanistan.
Resistance
To the Afghans the reo flag and the reforms demonstrated the
regime's Marxist character. The treaty of Friendship it had signed
With the USSR on December 5, 1978 [28] signified that the radical
transformation of Afghan society would be guaranteed by Soviet power.
The Afghan dissidents felt that their way of life would not survive
unless they were able to remove the Khalq regime. [29]
The first major revolt against the government took place in the
Nuristan province in October 1978, and then in the province of Kunar.
After that, fighting spread to other parts of central Afghanistan and
to the Perwan province. With the formation of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, the Afghans living close to the Iranian border got inspired and
a major uprising took place in Herat, Afghanistan's third largest
City, in March 1979. This uprising was significant in many a sense:
twenty Soviet personnel were killed which led to a greater Soviet
military presence and transfer of arms, including the MI-24 helicopter
gunships; a sweeping reorganization of the Khalq government made Amin
the prime minister, with effective power, even while Taraki continued
as president; it was the first serious urban challenge to the
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.ove.n..„t in as .u=h aa the inau.senta
.ept oont.ol or t.e oit, Ton
three
.ay=. up.n then
.eaiatenoe had heen confine, to the
oou„tryai.e. The gove^enfa au.vlval
.epende. on ita ahiuty to
control the oltlea. While the oltlea regained paaalve. the sover„.ent
oould oontrol the atrateglc
.oada. Inatallatlons and atrongpolnta with
Soviet help and support.
After the Herat uprising, the general security situation in the
country worsened ,uic.ly. insurgents attached the .ajor towns of
Pul-i-Khu.ri, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar, and Jalalabad, m the case of
Jalalabad, even though the insurgents numbered several thousand, and
were helped by some soldiers of the Afghan army who had defected, the
attack did not succeed. The insurgents were not experienced in
large-scale combat, and it became clear also that numbers did not
count against heavy and modern air and ground military forces
. [30]
But these tribal forces were making gains in the countryside
.[ 31 ] By
the end of May 1979, many parts of Kunar, Paktia, Nuristan, Nangarhar,
Gher, Bamian, and Urzgan provinces were under opposition control. In
July 1979, there were reports of fighting at Bahgram, an airbase near
Kabul, and the following month, a mutiny at an army garrison in Kabul
itself. A principal aim of the rebels had been to encourage
desertions from the Afghan army. [32] These uprisings were put down
but there were reports of serious fighting in twenty-three of the
twenty-eight provinces. The Taraki regime survived thus far only
because of its hold on the military and a lack of coordination in the
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scattered re.el actions. The government controlled only the main
Cities and strips along the principal highways - a zone that amounted
to less than half of the country's territory
.[ 33]
Government Re5.pon3e to Resi.^h^nno
Through much of 1978, the TaraKi government denied that there was
any conflict in the country which, it claimed was calm and tranquil.
Yet, as noted earlier, the insurgency had begun by the fall of 1978.
Several groups were involved. The best known were those with an
islamic orientation. They declared a Jihad (righteous war) against
the Khalq government, accusing its leaders of being a "handful of
Kremlin servants who had given Afghanistan to the Soviets"
.[ 34] They
described their resistence as "a total countrywide rebellion against
forced Communism in our country". [35] The New York Times reported
that "Villagers in remote areas, fired by their proud xenophobia and
their strict Islamic tradition, have attacked Soviet advisers. In
response government forces have attacked villages with tanks and
strafed them with MIG jets". [36]
A3 the internal conflict accelerated in 1979, Taraki declared a
holy war of his own against his opponents whom he, at times, referred
to as "Brothers of the Devil". Popular resistance overwhelmed Khalq's
attempts at radical change, so that the government was forced to
forget reform and concentrate on its own survival. During its last
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year in power it «as occupied almost wholly by efforts to pacify the
countrywide. i„ this taa. it had increaalnsly to rely on ita Soviet
sponsors.
At the ti.e Of the coup, there were so.e 3S0 Soviet advisers in
the country.
,y early su:n.er of 1979, there were at least 5,000
soviet advisers, about 1,500 of who. were military specialists
assigned throughtout the Afghan armed forces, down to the companies of
some 200 .en.[37] Soviet units were also attached to man MI-24
helicopter gunships and MIG-23. Whereas earlier most of the Soviet
advisers were stationed in Kabul to train recruits and help
newly.promoted Afghan officers to run the Defence Ministry, now they
were engaged in quelling tribal resistance.
It was after the Herat uprising of March 1979 that the government
had started a succession of purges of its armed forces, which in turn
made it more and more dependent on Soviet supervised force. Despite
these measures, the opposition grew and the regime became increasingly
repressive and opponents from all segments of the political and
religious spectrum, who could be seized, were either liquidated or
jailed. The resulting insecurity led to even greater reliance on
Soviet help and more repressive measures and these in turn further
fuelled the resistance. This vicious cycle manifested itself also in
a growing number of mutinies and defections by the armed forces.
First the Herat uprising, which included a mutiny by most of the
Afghan armed forces there, prompted an increase of the Soviet force.
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in .uly
,„9, .eoauae of t.e f,,Htin. at Ba...a. ai..a.e,
..e n.st
soviet co.tat unit, an airto.ne battalion of a.out .00 „a„, was „ove.
thare to provide security. The following
.onth (August
,979) an
adored unit in 'Ca.ul mutinied and the Soviets reaoted by sending a
Mgh-ranlcing Military delegation, led by the Co„andaP of Soviet
Ground Forces, Oeneral Pavlovs.y,
„ho according to so„e reports.
.eco»ended A^in^s re.oval.[38] But A.in struc. first, and on
September
,6, ,979, Taraki was overthrown and Wiled, Just a few days
after his return fro. Moscow, where he probably had discussed A.in-s
removal with Brezhnev.
Even a stronger central government, unified in purpose and
action, would have found it difficult to cope with the situation. The
Khalq government was neither united nor popular. As the resistance
grew, Amin sought to increase his own power, and a friction developed
between him and Taraki, who was willing to accept a softer line. The
Soviets too had become disillusioned with the policies and performance
Of the Khalq regime, and probably advised Taraki to discharge Amin and
to reorganize the government along more moderate lines.
Amin's success came at the cost of a rift with the Soviets which
Ultimately could not be healed. Their penetration of the armed forces
through their network of advisers seriously limited Amin's freedom of
action. But he insisted on conducting Afghanistan's foreign and
domestic policies without regard to Soviet wishes. [40] Amin
intensified the implementation of unpopular socio-economic reforms
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and, in so doing, helped to strengthen the resistance to his
.egi.e.
in addition, he proceeded to purge the party, the government, and the
armed forces not only of Kar^al^s followers hut also of Taraki-s.
soviet Objections prompted Amin to accuse the USSR of interfering in
the internal affairs of Afghanistan. m early October 1979, his
foreign minister complained bitterly to an assembled group of East
European diplomats Of soviet
"unreliability and treachery"
.[ 41 ] m
the same month, Amin publicly demanded the recall of Soviet ambassador
to Afghanistan
- a request that Moscow could not but honour.
In the meantime, sounds of explosions were heard daily in Kabul,
the Afghan army was disintegrating, the tribal insurgents were gaining
control Of the road system, and their power was growing in the
immediate vicinity of Kabul itself.
The upshot of these developments was that by December 1979,
despite a quarter century of attempted political, economic, and
ideological penetration, Soviet influence was under challenge. it
seemed that military force would have to be used if Soviet influence
in Afghanistan, and Soviet strategic objectives in the region, were to
be furthered. Amin's challenge and the growing turmoil in the country
confronted Moscow with a most unpleasant choice. [42] The USSR could
abandon Afghanistan to its own devices (similar to Tito's expulsion
from the Soviet orbit in 194 8) or it could, by means of military
intervention, force Amin into submission. Thus, on December 25, 1979,
the Soviet military contingent in Kabul, augmented by newly arrived
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r-ei„foPoe„e„t3,
.oved agal„.t the ppeaiaential palace.
„aa
arrestee, a,.d shortly afterwards, executed. 3a.ra. Ka^al returned
fro™ MOSCOW to heco.e Afghanlstan-s new President and Secretary
General of what remained of the PDPA.
CHAPTER IV
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE AFGHAN
The induction of Soviet t.oops on Afg.an soil evo.ed a st.ong
-sponse rro. t.e wo.Id. it 3.owe. t.at wo.X. opinion was not
prepared to condone, leave aside accept, military intervention a
powerful country wit. a view to imposing a political regi.e on a
wealcer one. Some Pakistani observers projected this as upsetting the
global balance of power, with all its implications for world
Peace.Cl] it was thought to have revived confrontation and
uncertainty in international relations xf • .. it intensified
American-Soviet tensions and thus endangered detente.
Nations of every character and location were disturbed. Even the
smallest and most remote of countries felt obliged to respond to the
Changed international environment. Subsequent crises were seen more
ominously because they arose in the Afghan shadow. The Iran-Iraq war
further fragmented a region already threatened by increased
interference by both the two super-powers. The prospects of Soviet
intervention in Poland arose at a time when relations between Moscow
and Washington had seriously deteriorated.
For the Americans, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought
forth the realization that they might lose what was left of their
influence in the Middle East and South Asia. They saw that the Soviet
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military presence 1„ AfshanlsUn posed a threat to the Persian Gulf
region with It enormous ou resources. West European governments
Shared American concerns, voiced disapproval of the Soviet action, hut
were unwilling to take any punitive action against the Soviet Union
auch as economic sanctions advocated by the united States (of which
more will be said later).
To some Non-aligned nations, the invasion came as jarring
evidence that the Soviet Union was prepared to use force to coerce the
people of a small neighbouring country, and that it ultimately wanted
more than just amicable relations. Most non-aligned states being
small, they obviously attached considerable importance to the right of
a people to choose its economic and political system without
intervention and foreign-inspired subversion. The Third World's
concern for the Afghans' right of self-determination was spelled out
in the resolutions adopted by the General Assemly of the UN. [2] The
Third World nations saw also that the Soviet Union did not care much
that they and much of the rest of the world disapproved of its action.
The Muslim countries were the most angry and upset about the
invasion. But the invasion also dramatized the region's fragility and
disunity. Several of the larger states especially Iran, Iraq and
Syria condemned American efforts to counter the Soviet Union's threat
to the region. [3] Because of their disunity, they were not able to
take any joint steps to make the Russians withdraw from Afghanistan.
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The Chinese goveP«ent naturally oa.e out with the strongest
condemnation of what It te™e. as
..na.e. aggression" or Soviet
hegemonlsts. It called the in,,,-^* •o ii a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a "grave
threat to peace and security m Asia and the whole world", and said
the invasion was "not only al.ed at having an Iron grip on that
land-loced nation, but also serving a .ore aggressive and sinister
purpose".!.] Pe.lng saw It as a military step ultimately aimed at
itself. Accordingly It accelerated its efforts to develop closer
relations with the United states. Attempts were also made to thaw Its
Chilly relationship with India.
India too was profoundly disturbed. Recognizing the political and
strategic threat to South Asia posed by Soviet control of Afghanistan,
India has been caught between the desire to maintain close relations
With the Soviet Union and its conviction that Soviet forces must
eventually be Withdrawn. Its response is hampered by the mutual
suspicions and unresolved issues which prevent it and Pakistan from
cooperation in joint defence of their region.
The European Community and the Association of South Asian
Nations (ASEAN) issued a joint statement after the conclusion of their
joint Ministerial Conference, expressing ASEAN backing for an EEC
proposal to neutralize Afghanistan as a precondition for a Soviet
troops withdrawal. [5] However, the ASEAN countries were only able to
give moral support.
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Pakistan's reaction to the Soviet invasion is discussed in the
following Chapter. Reactions of the United States, India, and the
Muslim countries are discussed below in some detail.
US Response to the Soviet Inv...ion of Afghani .t.n
For the US, the invasion suddenly made it obvious that the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan presented a grave and unchecked threat to the
security of the Persian Gulf states. It forced an American
reappraisal of the detente process, and provided additional support to
those who wanted a bigger defense budget to offset alleged Soviet
military superiority.
As early as August 1979, the Carter Administration had warned the
USSR against intervention in Afghanistan. Zbizniew Brzezinski, the
National Security Advisor said: "We expect others... to abstain from
intervention and from efforts to impose alien doctrines on deeply
religious and nationally conscious peoples". [6] His statement was
evidently intended as a warning against deeper Soviet involvement.
According to Washington, the airlift of Soviet troops to
Afghanistan had begun in early December 1979, but the Soviet press
said nothing about it. Only on December 23, the Communist Party
Daily, "Pravda", calling the movement of Soviet combat troops into
Afghanistan as "inspired rumours", dismissed them as "pure invention"
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^-isned, u 3aia, to cover up American involva.ent 1„
.f,,.„,3ta„ on
the maurgenta. al.e.[7] When the Sovleta atarte. roun.-tne-oloo.
airlift Of ita troopa to Afghaniatan, the State Department oaUed
upon the world oo-unlty to "condemn auch blatant
.uitary
interferanoe into the internal affaira of an independent aovereign
State". [8]
Despite its Knowledge of Soviet troop
.ove.ent in early December
1979, the reaction of the American government to the invasion itself
strongly suggests that it was caught off-guard. President Carter's
assessment of the invasion ranged from sober to the extravagant: "It
would severely and adversely affect US-Soviet relations", and "it's
only now dawning on the world the magnitude of the action that the
Soviets undertook in invading Afghanistan. This is a circumstance
that I think is now causing even former close friends and allies of
the Soviet Union to re-examine their opinion of what the Soviets might
have in mind". [9] President Carter condemned the Soviet military
intervention in Afghanistan and said it was "grave threat to the
peace" and blatantly violated international rules of behavior. Seeing
it as "a major matter of concern", he conferred by phone with foreign
leaders on December 28, 1979, and sent Deputy Secretary of State,
Warren Christopher to Europe to discuss with allies how to respond.
He also sent a message to Leonid Brezhnev to complain about the
intervention. [ 10]
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Hi. re.ar.a provided the f.a.e„o.U for sub.eMuent American
aotiona. 1,33 than a week the President announced the following
actions to be taken:
a)
,
seventeen
.illion metric ton. Of American gram ordered by
the Soviet Union will not be delivered.
b)
.
A cutoff Of aales of high technology, such as advanced
computers and oil-drilling equipment, until further notice.
= ). A "severe curtailment., of Soviet fishing prlviledges In
American waters. This would deprive the Soviets of about 350,000
tons of fish that year (1980).
d)
.
An indefinite delay in the scheduled opening of new American
and Soviet consular facilities.
e)
.
A deferral of any new cultural and economic exchanges
.[ 1 1
]
The President advised the US Senate to delay ratification of the SALT
II treaty. These steps were quickly followed by the announcement of
the American intention to boycott the summer Olympic Games to be held
in USSR.
These actions signalled that the United States took a serious
view of the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan. But Washington
was careful not to issue any ultimatums for the withdrawal of Soviet
troops or to threaten breaking relations or even imposing a total
trade embargo. Carter's speech against the Soviet invasion was a
carefully balanced response; it sounded tougher than it actually was.
His proposed punishment would not fit the crime or repair the damage.
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The Soviets could have gotten high technology fro. other
—ie., they oould have fished in other waters, and there waa no
guarantee that they could not obtain elsewhere the seventeen
.,Uion
tons Of grain denied them by the US. The SALT II was of course,
already deadlocked because of Soviet combat troops in Cuba and by the
Iranian crisis.
Even so, the Russians were put on notice that they could not use
their power as they did in Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen
without arousing the opposition of the US and provoking another round
in the military arms race. These limited sanctions were not
necessarily permanent. The way was left open for a thaw. It seemed
that America was asking for assurances that Soviet troops would not go
beyond the Afghan borders.
In his speech to the nation, Mr. Carter encouraged the notion
that the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan was just the beginning
of a much wider and more dangerous move to dominate the oil of the
Middle East:
A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran andPakistan... and is a stepping-stone to possible control over much
of the world's oil supplies.
. .if the Soviets are encouraged inthis invasion by eventual success, and if they maintain theirdominance over Afghanistan and then extend their control to
adjacent countries, the stable, strategic and peaceful balance of
the entire world will be changed. This would threaten the
security of all nations, including, of course, the United States,
our allies and friends. [12]
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were
There were no military forGe<=! in i-k^t-ciiy l rces the immediate area that
oolleotivel,,
„uoh less Indivi.uall,, capable of deterring the Soviet
union, considering it in the abstract, assuming that the Americana
and their allies did nothing, Russian forces could
.a.e further
.oves
into Iran and Pakistan and command entrance and exit to the Persian
Gulf.[13] The united states started to think whether to arm the
rebels, to arm Pakistan, or to make arms transfer to Chlna.[14: Which
would be the best policy option for discouraging further Soviet moves
in Southwest Asia?[15]
Some American military analysts thought that a reasonable
military policy would be to supply Pakistan with modern fighter
aircraft, tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, and armoured
personnel carriers. The chief political drawback of this approach,
according to some officials in Washington, was that it would annoy
India and possibly move it closer to the Soviet Union, thus shifting
the power balance in Asia even more toward Russia. [16]
However, in order to tell the Russians not to make further
advances, the American government publicly reaffirmed on December 30,
1979, its binding commitment to Pakistan, under a 1959 defence
agreement. In a television interview, the President's National
Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, produced the text of the
relevant clause of the agreement and read it out. It states:
In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the
United States in accordance with its constitutional procedures,
will take such appropriate actions, including the use of armed
forces, as may be mutually agreed and is envisaged in the joint
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'to^^°:::Lr^i.en"^'^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^-^^
request. [17] Government of Pakistan, at its
Then in February 198O, President Carter sent BrezezinsKi to
Pakistan to confer with President Zia on the Afghan situation.
Brezezinski.s Visit did not produce close cooperation as some .ad
anticipated, despite the two countries' common perception of the
Afghan Situation. Pakistan rejected the American offer of aid worth
400 million dollars. Moreover, Pakistan also expressed its
dissatisfaction with the status of the 1959 American commitment, in
View Of the fact that the United States had not come to Pakistan's aid
during its wars with India in 1965 and 1971. It now wanted
full-fledged treaty. Only then would congressional backing be
available to support US assistance to Pakistan. Since the United
States was not prepared to go that far, Pakistan was effectively
neutralized by Soviet warnings against aligning with Washington.
Pakistani officials were not sure what to make of the fact that the
American President who would not take much notice of Afghanistan's
transformation into a Soviet satellite between April 1978 and November
1979, was now ready to call the Soviet invasion the greatest challenge
facing the Free World since World War II. Moreover, if the invasion
was laden with such significance, Pakistanis were puzzled why the
United States did not get beyond rhetoric to take significant
substantive action. As General Zia said: "on such occasions,
practical steps are more significant than mere statements"
.[ 18
]
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Of an the
.oves the United States
.ade in response to the Soviet
invasion, the only one of so.e practical value was the President's
express determination to defend US vital interests in the oil-rich
Middle East. The "Carter Doctrine" was declared in the President's
State Of the Union Address on January 23, I98O: "Let our position be
absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of
the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests of the United States of America. It will be repelled by use
of any means necessary including military force". [19]
President Carter committed his government to a sharp rise in
military funding and to the creation of a military force capable of
countering the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf. Actually, an
American military build-up in the Middle East had begun following the
seizing of American hostages in Iran on November 4, 1979. The
American fleet in the Arabian Sea would now be further reinforced to
maintain a "permanent presence". Requests for the use of port
facilities in or near the Middle East were made in early January 198O.
A "Rapid Deployment Force" would be developed for action in locations
far distant from American bases. Registration, a first step toward
the reimposition of a military draft, was initiated by presidential
order. m January 198O, Secretary of Defence, Harold Brown visited
China to discuss economic and military cooperation. [20] Kenya,
Somalia, and Oman were willing to discuss the leasing of bases which
could service naval and air units. [21]
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But there were problems that would make the implementation of a
Vigorous American response to the Soviet challenge difficult, to say
the least. The Arab-Israeli deadlock had left Syria and Palestine
Liberation Organization committed to pro-Soviet positions. The United
States had had no diplomatic relations with Iraq since 1967. A
Virtual state of war existed with Iran. India refused to condemn the
invasion and was concentrating much of its diplomatic energy on
remaining friendly with Moscow. The ASEAN governments were only
capable of offering moral support. The dictates of geography and past
history had forced Washington to focus on Pakistan. But Zia turned to
Muslim neighbours to build a common front against the Soviet Union.
In mid-January 198O, President Carter and his Secretary of State,
Cyrus Vance, spoke of a "Framework for Regional Co-operation" for the
Middle East and South Asia. The political realities forced them to
drop the phrase within a day. Efforts to create a credible system of
regional defence were frustrated because of lack of political trust
and cooperation among the nations concerned. So the Americans turned
to the alternative of unilaterally building military presence,
expecting that Saudi Arabia and the small Gulf states would accept an
American defence umbrella.
Given the limited nature of punitive measures adopted by the US
government in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
question arises, did Afghanistan by itself have any weight in the
scale of the American national interest. The answer is no, and the
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ronowin, elements in t.e sUuaUon s.ouia pe.Haps
„enUo„e..
First, t.e
-Sional altuatlon u a
...ero-au. ga.e... Any Soviet gain
.3 aeen aa A.e.,oan loaa. Soviet
.nita.y p.eaenoe in Afgnaniatan.
and t^ougnts or now it .ignt
.e uae. fu.theP, were
.iatuPMng.
second, the area,
.eoauae of ita oil
.eaouroea, ia indiapenaable to
the economic health of the induatrlalized Weat. While the US dependa
for only a fPaotion of ita oil conaumption on the area, Weatern Europe
and Japan are far .ore dependent. Third, in Ught of US eati^ates
that the Sovleta „iu need to import oil by the mid- 1980' a, the fear
13 that the Sovieta will be tempted to move atill further in Southweat
Aaia. Fourth, another fear ia that the Sovieta aeek a port in the
Indian Ooean froo, which they could poasibly diarupt Weatern ahipping
lanea. Since Afghanlatan in itaelf ia not a sufficient prize for the
USSR to riak wiping out yeara of diplomatic progreaa in Eaat-Weat
relationa, the Soviet ihvaalon of Afghanlatan may have been a atep
toward this goal. [22]
From the above we come to the concluaion that not the Soviet
invaalon of Afghanlatan aa auoh, but the move by any outalde power to
gain control of the Persian Gulf region would trigger a atrong US
responae. It waa clearly outlined in the Carter "doctrine". Thua
have the Sovieta been warned against using their position In
Afghanlatan aa a way atatlon to other targets in the region.
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While
.oat Of the countries around the world condemned the Soviet
military Intervention In Afghanistan, India did not do so. Mrs.
Gandhi, India.
s
Pri.e Minister said: "We did not want to condemn the
Soviets on this Issue because we feel sl.ilar actions by other
countries in other parts of the world have not been condemned". [23]
But this is not to say that India supported the Soviet military move
into Afghanistan, nor does It mean that India likes to see the Soviets
permanently stay m Afghanistan. On the contrary, India would be
happy if the Soviets moved out.
India's initial reaction was quite positive and in line with
policy Of "genuine non-alignment". Charan Singh, Prime Minister at
the time, criticized the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, and
demanded that Soviet troops should withdraw from Afghan soil as their
continued presence would have far-reaching adverse consequences for
the entire region. On December 31, 1979, he conveyed to the Soviet
ambassador "India's deep concern at the substantial involvement of
Soviet military forces in Afghanistan". He told the ambassador that
India "cherishes its traditional and close relationship with
Afghanistan and would like its independence and non-alignment to be
strengthened". This position remained unchanged until Indira Gandhi
assumed India's Prime Ministership in the middle of January 1980.[24]
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Even before she took the oath of office, she said: "l a. strongly
against interference. But in Afghanistan the Soviet interference is
not one-sided. Other interferences are going on there". [25] Pro. her
public statements and from the Indian position in the UN, it was
obvious that she had restored India's "till-" mxau lt towards Moscow, which the
previous regime had been attempting to correct.
After the Soviet Union vetoed an American move in the UN Security
Council censuring the Soviet intervention, the US and its friends took
the issue to the General Assembly, where a 17-nation resolution,
moved, among others, by Pakistan and Bangladesh, asked for immediate
and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.
Without approving or supporting the Soviet intervention, the Indian
delegate at the UN, Mr. Mishra, told the General Assembly that India
had received "assurances" from Moscow that the intervention had been
at the specific request of Afghanistan and that Soviet troops would be
Withdrawn whenever Kabul asked for it; India, he added, had no reason
to disbelieve the assurances of a "friendly country"
. [26 ] He added
that "India hopes that the Soviet Union will not violate the
independence of Afghanistan and that Soviet forces will not remain
there a day longer than necessary".
Significantly the Indian envoy did not press for the withdrawal
of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Moreover, the tenor of his speech
appeared to be to accord tacit approval to the Soviet action in
Afghanistan and to imply that the current presence of the Soviet
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troops in Afghanistan was necessarv t h-y. India abstained when the
resolution was put to vote.
India waa one of the few natlona outaide the g.oup of Soviet
-tellltes to accept the position that the Soviet Union had aent Ita
troopa at the Invitation of President A.l„ of Afghaniatan. Left to
^.erself, mdlra Gandhi „ight have aided with the Soviet Union even
-re explicitly. However, she was constrained by developments at home
and abroad. Public opinion in India was strongly opposed to the line
She had initially adopted. This became evident when the Lo. Sabha
(Lower House of Indian Parliament) debated the question. A large
majority of apea.era, including even those who belonged to Indira
Gandhi.
s
party, demanded withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
Elsewhere, not including the Communists, moat leaders of public
opinion in India
-
the press, intelligentsia, etc. - expressed
themselves in favour of the freedom of Afghanistan. [27] Added to this
was the united demand for withdrawal of Soviet troops by thirty-six
Islamic countries participating in the Islamic Conference held m
neighbouring Pakistan towards the end of January 1980. Moreover, a
majority of the non-aligned countries, including all the neighbours of
India like Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and of course Pakistan,
Clearly and unequivocally denounced Soviet military presence m
Afghanistan. These considerations may have induced Indira Gandhi to
change her Initial line and adopt a line seemingly favourable to the
withdrawal of Soviet troops. Sometimes it looked as if she followed a
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^lS-.ag, even Incoherent, approach. Such an impression was
irreaiauhle from what she sal.
.urln, the visits of Lor. Carrl„,ton,
Glscard E-stalng and Andrle Gromyko In January-February 1980.
Mrs. Gandhi.
s official position on the Afghan crisis began to
emerge when President Valery Giscard d.Estalng of Prance visited India
ih January
,980, and when they issued a Joint declaration. The
document Without identifying any country, said: "the use of force in
international relations Is inadmissable". m similar oblique
language, it urged all nations to refrain from actions that would
"intensify great-power rivalry". The Indian position, as understood
by Western and Asian diplomats, was that both the Soviet military
presence In Afghanistan, and the United States' response in preparing
to rearm Pakistan were dangerous.
India seemed anxious about increased tensions in the area, and
the potentially sapping costs of an arms race with Pakistan. Earlier
Mrs. Gandhi's emphasis had been on what she called American
responsibility for destabilising the region, which had invited Soviet
intervention. After some time she became somewhat less ambiguous in
expressing disapproval of the presence of Soviet troops in
Afghanistan. She admitted that the situation increased tensions in
the region and posed a danger to India. [28] But Mrs. Gandhi would
still not ask the Soviets to withdraw. Anyhow, the Soviet Union,
which had had a long and close relationship with India was eager to
appear accommodating. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrie Gromyko visited
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India in February 198O to confer with Mrs. Gandhi on the Afghan
3ituation...[29] It is ,uite possible that India was hoping to get
some assurances fro. the Soviet Union that it would move back fro.
Afghanistan, and that it had no designs on either Pakistan or Iran.
Mrs. Gandhi took a regional view of the Afghan crisis rather
than the global view which prevailed in the United States and China,
and then shared by Pakistan. Seen fro. the purely regional angle, the
strategic divide in South Asia has been between Pakistan and India:
Pakistan's tradit ional allies were the United States and China,
India's the USSR. In the interest of regional stability and balance
Of power, what was needed, according to India, was to contain the
Afghan crisis, not to aggravate it and enlarge its content and scope.
To conclude about the Indian initial reaction, we can say that
Mrs. Gandhi's response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was
more ambivalent immediately after the Indian elections. She was
careful not to assess publicly the geo-political implications of the
Soviet move for the security of the subcontinent. She tried to
explain her low-keyed response by making the plea that she was only
trying not to escalate the crisis and to Keep the cold war away from
the region. However, no government in India could have ignored the
grave implications inherent in the Afghan crisis for South Asia. With
Afghanistan having disappeared as a buffer state, no government in New
Delhi would cherish the idea of a southwards extension of a
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super-power influence In the proximity of the Indian border. Furthe,
details are given in the next chapter.
Muslim world
^^^^^.^^ Af.h.ni.t.n
Afghanistan's immediate neighbours Pakistan and Iran were the
most vexed of all. Refugees in large numbers were pouring into both
countries. Neither had the means of countering a serious military
thrust from the Russians. Both suffered from serious internal
divisions. Both were further distracted by chronically bad relations
With other neighbours. Iran was isolated from its neighbours as well
as from non-Muslim states. Muslim states of the Middle East were
angered by the Soviet invasion. But while unanimous in condemning the
Soviet intervention, Muslim leaders were unable to take joint actions
which could effectively pressure Moscow to withdraw.
Immediately following the invasion, most Muslim countries issued
statements asking for Soviet withdrawal and for preserving the
non-aligned status of Afghanistan. For example, Bangladesh government
expressed that foreign troops' involvement in the country's internal
affairs posed a serious threat to peace and stability in the region;
and that it was a violation of the fundamental principles of
sovereignty and territorial integrity of another nation. Similarly,
the government of Saudi Arabia condemned Soviet military action as
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as a
nated intervention In the Internal affairs of Afghanistan, an.
violation cf International laws ana conventions. The Saudi statement
added that the Intervention ns an aggression against the sovereignty
Of an independent state and violation of the rights of the Afghan
people". [30]
individual Musli. leaders of various Musli. organizations across
the world also showed their oonoern. For example the Secretary
General Of the organization Of the Islamic Conference (QIC), Habib
Chatti, said that the QIC should take appropriate steps to stop
foreign military presence in Afghanistan. He said, "The Islamic
Conference Organization which, as a rule respects domestic affairs of
all the states, particularly of its members, but has also a
responsibility to defend the principles of freedom for all the peoples
and independence of all states, cannot remain indifferent to the armed
intervention of a foreign power in an Islamic country"
.[ 31
]
In the same vein, the Secretary General of Rabita Alam-i-Islami
,
Mohammad Ali al-Harkan, denounced Russian move. He said the
Organization of Rabita Alam-i-Islami was the representative of all the
Islamic peoples on the globe and in that capacity it strongly
condemned this action against the Muslim nation in Afghanistan. He
sent a telegram to King Khalid of Saudi Arabia showing the
organization's concern. [32]
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such reaction was not limited to the Middle East. The Central
Board Of Indonesian Isla.lo Organization.
..3,,,^,,,
the soviet intervention in Afghanistan urged the Indonesian Parliament
to voice strong protest against the Soviet aggression. The
organization called for appropriate measures by the Indonesian
government, especially through the Association of South East Asian
Nations, to secure the withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan. [33]
But most Significant of all was the reaction of the Organization
Of islamic Conference. [34] Bangladesh proposed an emergency meeting
Of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) to examine the
implications and possible consequences of the Soviet action for the
Islamic countries geographically close to Afghanistan, for the power
equilibrium of the region, and for the peace of the world. It was to
see how the consequences of the Afghan developments could be
contained, and how the security of the Islamic countries could be
guaranteed, since the Soviet move may be interpreted as an early
warning of a southward thrust of Soviet power leading to the central
region of the Islamic world - the area in which the Arabian peninsula
is situated. [35] It was expected that the Foreign Ministers could
meet and work together since there was a clear identity of interests
among a large majority of Muslim countries on this issue.
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However, that was not to be. The P.ont for Steadfastness and
confrontation (formed in December 1979 as a response to Sadafs visit
to Jerusalem) consisting of Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen (PDRY),
and the Palestine Liberation Organization was faced with a dilemml
Since each member was a recipient of Soviet aid and support. [36]
The first glimpse of varying responses by the Muslim countries to
the Soviet invasion was seen in the United Nations General Assembly,
Which voted on January 14, 198O, to condemn the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and to call for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet armed
forces. Of the five Steadfastness Front members, Syria, Algeria and
Libya abstained on the vote; South Yemen voted against the resolution;
and the FLO Observer in the General Assembly delivered a strongly
pro-Soviet speech. Of the other Muslim countries, Sudan and North
Yemen (YAR) abstained.
Of the three abstainers among the Steadfastness Front, Syria was
the most concerned with the growing anti-Soviet sentiment in the
region. Its aim was to deflect the growing Arab and Islamic consensus
against the Soviet invasion, and to mobilize other Steadfastness Front
members in support of Syria's position. So the Syrians on January 16,
1980, convened a one-day conference of the Foreign Ministers of the
Steadfastness Front in Damascus, and after deliberations, sent a cable
to the Secretary General of OIC asking for a change of both the date
and venue of the scheduled emergency session of the ICFM.
Ill
This pPe-confere„=e maneuvering
^^^^^
.centu. t.wa.d convening the emergency session on sone.ule an. in
isiamaba., Pakistan. By January 2,, 1980, twenty-nine states, «re
than t„o-tnirds of the forty-one active members, ha. already notified
the Pakistani Government Of tnelr intention to attend. A„ong the
Steadfastness Front members, the Algerians were the first to break the
ranks, announcing their participation on January 23, 1980; and PLO
decided to participate as an observer; Libya decided to send a
low-level delegation to Islamabad led by its ambassador to Bahrain;
and While South Yemen's non-participation was considered certain!
owing to its status as a virtual Soviet satellite, Syria too decided
not to participate. [37]
The "Extraordinary" session of the Islamic Conference Foreign
Ministers met on January 27 (till January 29), 1980. President Zia,
addressing the Conference, linked the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
to the "alien occupation" of Jerusalem, and urged "unity and
collective defense" by the Umma. Resolutions were adopted condemning
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, calling for the withdrawal of
Russian forces, and asserting Afghanistan's freedom to choose its own
government. The ICFM also declared its "complete solidarity" with the
countries neighbouring Afghanistan against any threat to their
security, and urged member states to "extend all possible cooperation"
to them. It also called upon member states to withhold all economic
assistance from the present regime in Afghanistan, and urged all
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states and peoples to suppon and to provide assistance to t.e Af,.an
-rusees. i.e Conference expressed solidarity „it. the Afghan
freedo.-fighters in tnein Ji,ad and decided tc extend material and
moral support to the Afghan people. [383
Except for strong-worded resolutions, and a hint of financial
aupport for the resistance, nothing substantive ca.e out of this
meeting. I„ the
.eantl.e, a stalemate seemed to have been reached in
Afghanistan, and no major diplomatic moves «ere in the offing. It was
expected that the next ICFM would decide upon measures to be adopted
and initiatives to be taken so that the status quo did not achieve
tacit acceptance.
The Eleventh session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign
Ministers met in Islamabad on May 17, 198O. Foreign Ministers of 39
Muslim countries participated (the 40th member, Chad was in a state of
Civil war, and the membership of Afghanistan and Egypt had been
suspended). This meeting essentially reaffirmed the positions taken
earlier at the "extraordinary" session, and provided Pakistan with
another opportunity to warn against super-power machinations against
the Muslim world and the dangers of a Russian-controlled Afghanistan.
President Zia in his inaugural speech said that Pakistan
"vehemently opposes the Soviet-military presence in Afghanistan", and
that it will "support any international effort which may lead to the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the restoration of
the non-aligned status of that country". He asked the Conference to
113
con3i.e. the
..,..n,3ta„ p.o.le.
.n its aspects, an. s.^seste.
constitution of a permanent oo^ittee w.oae sole objective would
.e to
^eep constant watch on the developments in Afghanistan, and explore
ways and means to i™pie.ent the decisions which had been taXen.[39]
President Zia also proposed the idea of collective security for
the Muslim world. it did not envisage Joint defense forces, but it
did urge Muslim countries not to allow either of the super-powers to
interfere in the affairs of the Islamic world, and to resist
collectively the pressures outside forces were bringing to bear on
some members of the conference.
on May 22, 198O, the Conference constituted a three-member
committee, comprising the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan, Iran, and the
OIC Secretary General to search for "peaceful" and "political-
solution to the Afghan crisis. [40] Mr. Agha Shahi, Pakistan's
External Affairs Advisor, and Chairman of the Conference, said that
the three-member committee might establish contact with the Kabul
regime, but that would not amount to conferring recognition or
legitimacy on it. [41]
It is significant that the committee was authorized to establish
contact With the Kabul government. But a qualification to the
enabling resolution was added that the committee would have to work
within the constraints of the major resolutions adopted at the January
1980 "extrordinary" ICFM session, namely, that Soviet forces must be
withdrawn from Afghanistan. In other words the committee would be
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f-ee to ta.a any step toward co.p.o.l3a, 30 long as t.e Soviets
Withdrew fro. Afghanistan and the Afghan, were free to choose their
own government.
Pakistan especially insisted on this qualification. The Zia
regime appeared to be trying to get the best of both worlds, evincing
a Willingness to find a "political" solution to the Afghan problem
(despite Zla.s earlier declaration that no Pakistan dialogue with the
Kar^al regime could take place unless Soviet forces had been withdrawn
from Afghan soil), while at the same time affirming as unacceptable
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan - and thus keeping alive the idea
that soviet presence was a continuing threat to Pakistan's own
security. [42]
The hint of financial support for the resistance included in the
January resolution was replaced in May by a provision for negotiations
between Iran, Pakistan, the Karmal government, and resistance
spokesman. At its meeting at Taif, Saudi Arabia, in January 198I, the
Conference did not even issue a public statement supporting the
resistance. Instead it called for further negotiations through the
Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations. [43] A year of
condemnation had not budged the Soviet troops.
To conclude we can say that the Muslim world reacted strongly by
condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Moscow's explanation
that Soviet forces were in Afghanistan at the request of the Kabul
regime[44] was repudiated by most countries with the partial exception
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Of Syria, Libya, and the PLO. But none or the Musli. countries gave
un.ualiried enforcement and each called Tor so.e Tonn or withdrawal.
However, as it appeared at the May 198O ICPM session, Moscow still had
see friends, notably Libya and South Ye.en. The delegates of these
countries urged
- 30.eti.es vociferously - that the Kar.al
government be recognized as legitimate by the Conference, and defended
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Largely because of this
polarisation between pro- and anti-Soviet sentiment, the committee set
up the previous year at Islamabad did not become operative.
The Muslim countries were not able to take any concrete actions
jointly Which could move the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Some of
them, especially Iraq, Iran, and Syria did not even like American
efforts to counter an increased Soviet threat. They considered such
efforts just as unwelcome as the presence of Russian troops in
Afghanistan. We may then say that the Afghan crisis and the ensuing
Islamabad Conference brought to the fore an element of disunity in the
Muslim world and, even more so, the fact of its political, economic,
and military underdevelopment. Even if most were incensed at the
Soviet invasion, what could they do to force the Soviet Union out of
Afghanistan? They did not have the requisite military capability.
Some of the more prosperous among them were already allied with the
United States and therefore without any political or diplomatic
leverage with the Soviet Union. Some of them were already clients of
the Soviet Union and depended upon it for maintaining their military
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r
am was
capability to wage the struggles to whinhi c they were committed in thei
own
„el«hbo-hood3. For the., an. for ao.e others, the .on. of Isl
not
.uoh Of a hond and Afghanistan seeded re.ote fro. their own ur.ent
concerns. Moreover, the rise of a oo»unlst re.i.e in Afghanistan
.ay
even have appeared to the. a progressive development.
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Lhe Limitations of intern.m pnal OpDo.,ihs„n
Even though the world reacted loudly to the Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan, no credible means of expelling It from Afghanistan were
fashioned. American response to supply oertaln economic and
technological sanctions against the USSR were not enough to make the
Russians pull out of Afghanistan. The option of using American
military power to force the Russians out of Afghanistan was not even
aerlously considered. Afghanistan was not worth a military
confrontation between the two great nuclear powers. In fact US
Officials repeatedly said that they were extremely skeptical of a
Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan in the foreseeable future, and
would much rather Sit back and watch the outcome of the diplomatic
moves being launched by others Th^.,, c,^-;^ 4.uu n . iney said they would prefer the
Muslim countries to take the lead. [45] Some American official and
non-official commentators even welcomed the prospect of the Russians
being Pinned down in a long, bloody, and exhausting conflict with the
Afghan freedom fighers. Afghanistan would be the Soviets' Vietnam.
Similarly, while overwhelming majorities in the General Assembly
gave sharp rebuke to the Soviet Union, no enforcement provision was
included, apparently in the belief that the Russians could not be
ousted. The Islamic Conference too proved incapable of doing much
beyond condemning the Soviet invasion. As Soviet determination to
stay in Afghanistan became apparently unshakeable
,
[ 46] governments
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which had earlier taken hostile stands h«began to respond to hints that
negotiations might be productive. The r.i..- . .in Islamic Conference's Taif
meeting in January 1981 exemplifies thi-,Pi r is state of mind. [4?] It also
shows that the Islamic Conference nof ^.u i is not altogether united. [48]
The Foreign Ministers of NATO and FvrHiU EEC not only remained cool
towards the American oaiic ll for economic santions against the Soviet
union, but also were careful not to express themselves in favor of
calling Off an East-West negotiations on disarmament and European
security. While in the final analysis, only the super-powers were
able to create detente, the West Europeans, especially the West
Germans, were its main consumers. They felt thatxnc l x n It was now being
snatched away rro. the., and In view of the geographical Irrelevance
Of Afghanistan, at least fro. a narrow European point of view, they
were reluctant to cooperate with the Americans.
If anything was done by anyone to make it difficult for the
Soviets to stay in Afghanistan, It was being done by the Afghans
themselves. Their reaction has been the most significant of all.
Given their long standing tradition of national independence, it is
not at all surprising that the Afghans should have refused to submit
to Soviet military domination. The Soviet-backed Karmal regime
continued to face increasing resistance from the guerrillas. Their
struggle frustrated the client regime's bid to consolidate its hold on
the country.
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invasion. Afghan resistance may persist nnnh^K-,, probably sporadically, but
it cannot expel Soviet forces a . ^ .r . A long and dangerous impasse threatens
the stability of a chronically fragile region.
CHAPTER V
PAKISTAN'S REACTION CONSIDERING THE IMPLICATIONS OF
THE AFGHAN CRISIS
Aa mentioned earlier, before the Co^uniat takeover of
Afghanistan in April ,„8, President Daou. ha. improve. Afghanistan's
relations with Pakistan. Iran an. Sau.i Arahia persua.e. the Afghan
auhsecuent visits between Afghanistan's an. Pakistan's leaders greatly
reduced the tension between the two countries. [,] Towards the end of
Daoud's era in ,978, when acute food shortages led to widespread
discontent and disturbances in Afghanistan, Pakistan responded in a
friendly
.anner by allowing Indian lorries to carry food supplies
along its Grand Trunk Road. However, the situation m Afghanistan
continued to deteriorate, and young and radical elements in the ar.y
and airforce were able to .uster sufficient support to strike
successfully at President Daoud's regime.
Pakistan was not happy about the Communist take over in
Afghanistan. It had its own fears and apprehensions, and these
dwelled primarily around the question of its own security and
integration. Long before the Soviets actually sent their forces into
Afghanistan, the general feeling in Pakistan was, as one of its
spokesman put it: "But now its as if the Soviet Union is on our
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border". [2]
.Pakistan's Initial Rf^^nfi^n
Pakistan was understandably apprehensive about the change in
Kabul: was the new government markedly
.ore pro-Soviet than its
predecessor. Will it abandon its traditional neutrality. Might its
success give added thrusts to the secessionist tendencies or the
revolutionary left in Pakistan?[3]
Pakistan's initial anxiety was to see how far the new government
Of Taraki will uphold its country's traditional neutrality.
Afghanistan's neutrality was recognized by the Soviet Union in the
1931 Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-aggression, and
in the new treaty signed in December of 1975. Neighbouring Pakistan
feared that if the new regime ended its neutrality, that would mean an
unmistakable shift in the regional balance of power.
Pakistan was also concerned that the Communist takeover might
have a "spill-over" effect in Pakistan. It could not have come at a
more awkward moment for the right-wing military regime of Zia-ul-Haq.
After reaching some understanding with the National Awami Party [4],
General Zia ordered the withdrawal of the bulk of Pakistani troops
from politically sensitive areas close to Afghanistan in Baluchistan
and North West Frontier Province. Several of the Baluch leaders were
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freed from prison. [5] These leaders h..ad often been accused of
oon=e.„.
.at U oo-„„.3.
....
.o.e. . 3uppo. 3ece33.„.3.
moven,e„ta In Baluohl3tan and the North-West Fr„n. „K n w 3 o tier Province, the
Pakistani army win be hard put to counter It.
Pa.i3tan.3 ar^ed rorce3 were poorly deployed and eduipped. and
-.Pered hy the tradUional strategic pre-oocupatlon „Uh the eastern
(Indian, frontier. « that tl.e only
.our army diviaions. equipped
With
,950-vintase weapons, and aided ty ao.e ,8.000 U«htly.ar.ed
Border Scouts in the Pathan autonomous trihai areas, were available to
"defend the
,,800 mile border along Pakistan-s North West Frontier
Province and Baluchistan, facing Afghanistan. Some ,5 divisions were
concentrated in the eastern section of the country facing India.[7]
The government of Pakistan felt that if its own indigenous left
or nationalistic minorities decided to raise their voice, seeing the
example of Afghanistan, and if the new «f»h=„
,
=iiiu II n A g an government decided to
support them, Pakistan would be faced „ifhe t with confrontation with
Afghanistan, for which the Zia regime neither had the capability
(military or economic) nor the support (for his government).
The first public comment by a Pakistani politician on the
developments in Afghanistan came from Maulana Mufti Mahmud, the leader
Of the Pakistan National Alliance. After a meeting with General
Zia-ul-Haq, he spoke of possibly grave repercussions on Pakistan of
the events in Afghanistan and called for close surveillance of secular
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anti-national elements in Paki^t^n v> , •s a . Pakistani newspapers, commenting
on the Afghan revolution, emphasized the necessity of resolving the
country's economic and political nr-nhiproblems which often lend to
revolutions in un.e.-.evelcpe.
^tatea. They aXac expressed Hope t.at
t^e new
.e.,.e ,n Ka.ul „ou.. maintain r.ien.ly relations wun
Pakistan. There was fea. that Afghanistan
„ight
.evlve the
Pukhtoonistan issue. [8]
in .uly
,978. shah „oha«ad Dost, fi.st deputy minister i„ the
Afghan Foreign Ministry visited Pakistan,
.et with Zia, delivered
TaraKi.s message, and invited hi. and Agha Shahi, the Pakistani
Foreign Minister, to pay an official visit to Afghanistan.[9] On
September 9, ,978, General Zia on his way to Tehran, stopped over
Kabul for an unofficial visit and .et with Taraki. [ ,0] The Afghan
Official media reported that "on the only political difference
existing between the two countries, desire was voiced that solution to
this only difference be found through friendly talks, and political
peaceful negotiations between the two countries. [, 1 ] The "political
difference" referred to had been explained earlier by Haflzullah Amln,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
(DRA), at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned countries
held in Havana:
fMenZ-n"^^^'^'^
neighbours our foreign policy shall be one ofriendship and cooperation, and we entertain every hope that
founT foT'l"'
dialogue With Pakistan, a Just solution Sli be
wM^h .-fT^ political problem between the two countrieshic IS the realization of rights and true aspirations of ^hePashtun and Baluch people based on their own free will and upon
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historical background. [ 12]
The Ka.ui
.e.i.e oele..ate.
.usust 3,. ,,78, National Pay
Of Pa3.tuni3ta„
.a.in, u 3 pu.Uo hoU.a, t..ou..out t.e oo.t...
orricial p.ea3 oeie..ate. Pa.i3ta„i Pat.an an. Baluo.
.ea.e.s once
^«ion,l„« to the National A„a.i Pa.t.
...ui OHarra. K.an, WaU
Khan, AJ.ai K.ata., ohaus Ba..a. Bezanjo, SaMa. AttauUa. Mental.
KhaiP Ba..3H Ma.Pi, 3i.an.aP Khan KHaiii .. 33 Pu.Htoon an.
Baluch Freedom Fighters. [ 1 3]
again ta.en up the i33ua of Pu.htoo„i3tan; an iaaue which the Zia
re.i.e certainly
.i. not ll.e to tal. about, an isaua which aee.ingly
had been 3et a3i.e by Ita ^reat proponant, Daoud, when he .eache. an
Pakl3tan.3 anxiety when it fiP3t heard of the Co™uni3t take-over in
Kabul. waa Taraki de^onatrating hostility towards Pakistan by
reviving the issue, or was he projecting himself as a great Pukhtoon
nationalist to strengthen his own Pukhtoon support at home, not to
speak of the politician-s well known practice of raising a foreign
policy issue to divert their people's attention fro» intractable
domestic problems. The Taraki regime had repeatedly professed a
policy of non-alignment; said that it wanted friendship and
cooperation with its neighbours; and declared that it would be
friendly towards any country which supported it economically (probably
referring to the US and the West)
.
These statements would indicate
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that Taraki was not necessarily hostile .i towards Pakistan. Being
himself of the Pukhtoon lot he mav hav^ p«t ^n y e felt sympathetic towards the
Pu..too„. ,n Pakistan, u ,,30 .0
.eoaUe. t.at Ta.aKi Ha.
trxed to
.each a personal un.ePstanding with the varloua ethnic
"inontie. in hia own country, „any or who. were deeply resentful or
the overbearing treatment In the past fro. the Pu.htoon majority. So
Tara.l
.ay have desire, appearing sympathetic towards minorities.
Whatever his motives, there is little doubt that he appeared
..hostile"
in the eyes or the Pakistani regime. His posture conrirmed the
initial Pakistani apprehension about the change of regime in Kabul.
Afghanistan Blames Paki shan
As said earlier, by late summer and early fall of 1978, many
Afghans started resisting the new government, and by the end of that
year many of them had already crossed the Durand Line to seek refuge
in Pakistan. By incremental stages, local defiance blossomed into
insurrection and approached civil war. Rebellion flared in province
after province. As violence intensified, the Afghan government became
more and more repressive; several thousand political prisoners were
killed and thousands were taken prisoners. [ 14] For all this turmoil
inside the country, the Afghan regime started accusing foreign powers,
particularly Pakistan, of interference.
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were ^.nUr.Un, ao.oss
......
^^^^^^
Pakistan of dire consequences, saying:
iTtnn..zz wuL:t"e"onsiM?r'
the relations like an rnte^n\. Iff "^i" "^^"^international issue. It shoSd nnJ f ' ^^^^ ^= ^ 8>-e"
affairs and should not oJke a" con,„ ""'^ i"'^™"dangerous act to interfere ir'oS aff!"""'' T--^""'' 'effect, a play with fir^ °f"e" airs and it is, in
region'but ^ts'f^^es Sli sp^e^d thrr"h"°J "I!'^ ^"^wixx r a oughout the world"
.[ 16
]
The Afghan government charged that the rebels were trained in
Military ca^ps in Pakistan and then sent to Afghanistan to carry
subversive acts.ClT] "We demand fro„ the government of Pakistan to
immediately inquire into these facts and stop the sabotage against the
DRA".[18]
Aside fro. the above Charges, the government-controlled Afghan
media reported some of the fighting inside the country as fighting
between Afghan and Pakistan forces. For example on June 12, 1979, the
Kabul Times reported: "Fierce fighting is continuing between forces of
Afghan and Pakistani militias in the Mohmand areas of Nangarhar"
.
[ 19]
.
The Afghan government beleived that Pakistan was fomenting
internal strife in Afghanistan because "the reactionary circles of
Pakistan are worried that the toiling people of their country may soon
stand against the despotic and exploitative people of their country
and behave with them in the same way which our toiling people did in
Afghanistan". [20]
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WMle an or t.ese aUesationa an. acousations we.e .e.„, 3He. on
Pakistan, Ta.a., ,n
.ep.Ua. a.ao t,.eaten..
.o support oppoau.on
Sroup3 wUMn Pa.,..an, espeoUU. t,e P.Kntoon an. BalueH
nationaUsta.UU The PaantunUtan Oay in ,979 waa celebrate. w,.h
stronger statements of support for the Pu.htoon an. Baluon people of
Pakistan:
The Pashtunistan Day signifies reaf f i r.m=<.,-
of the people of Affh.n. !^ ""^^i^^^^^tion
of unreserved support
brethern.
g a istan for their Pashtoon and Baluchi
sh^adint fo^°^™\?Ln1f\1^
'^t
^^'^
and Baluch brethern Tul lll I
na ional issue of Pashtoon
embarked on a campaign to .nte^f ''"^'"^ °^ ^^^^^^^^ -l^oi terfere m our internal affairs.
br:th:::irven°'th:':igrtoi:i'f ''^'^ ^^^-^
their own dIJtiny![22] ^^l^-^^^termination so that they decide
Meanwhile the Afghan official press started reporting that some
of the banned political parties of Pakistan and their political
activists were sympathetic to the Afghan revolution and scorned the
posture of the Pakistani regime. For instance, reports such as the
following appeared in the Afghan official press:
Pakistan National Democratic Party scorn critics of AfghanRevolution saying that it is their internal matter and nobody hasthe right to interfere in it. [23]
""" u n
ITtl Tr^T""
Organization has promised to stand alongwi h the Afghan revolution. [24] ^
Mahmoud Achackzai, the leader of Pashtoonkhwa met with leaders ofAwami Party, National Party, Tehrik-i-Istieglal
,
Peoples Party andMasawat...to support the revolution of Afghanistan and insist on
consolidation of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
128
Meraj Mohammad Khan, leadPr ^
or imperialism are'firsfn'ofto^M°?.e^°'' ^'^^ ^^^i-get consolidated and second to .nnf- ^^^^^l^tion of Afghanistan
Afghanistan. [25] ° within the borders of
Meraj Mohammad Khan said we stron^iv . w
military government of Pakistan T.T "'^^^ the
rulers of Pakistan embark o^ a war^aL^
Afghanistan, m case the
With assurance that this war Zld'le'd to "i"''"'
'
Pakistan. [26] "^^^^ ° the disintegration of
profound and useful reS™ hav. h"' ^^^f^- • -Since April ,978
haa to learn fro™ iLt™d of h ^°'Pl='°^'"^«<' "hioh Pakistan
Afghanistan. [27]
^n^^a showing hostility towards
It is apparent that the Taraki regime got upset when it realized
that the insurgents increasingly posed a serious challenge to the
consolidation Of its power. it .ia.ed Pakistan for being partly
responsible for having thrown the Afghan revolution into disarray. It
wanted Pakistan to abstain f.o. assisting subversive activities Inside
Afghanistan, otherwise it threatened it would do the sa-e, for
Pakistan iself was not Without leftist or secessionist tendencies.
That was the story on the Afghan side. Now lets turn to what Pakistan
was doing or saying and how it felt about all this.
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Pakistan Floats In Tnc^.K^
i
,•
A
-ief glanoe at Pakistan at tHe ti.e t.e
.eru.ees sta.te.
o-33ln. eve. the
.o..e. la enc^. to aus^eat t.at polUicaUy t.e
country was somewhat unsettled. Zia had h^Pn •^l n bee m power for a year, and
he himself admitted i-haf v,-:,,that his government had not been able to achieve
What it haa intended to do fo. the welfare of the people. [28] The
»aJor proble.3 facing Zia included how to strengthen the economy, what
to do With the former Prime Minister Bhutto, then in Jail under death
3entenoe,[a9] and how and when to return the country to civilian rule
after having postponed the elections. [ 30].
This is not the place to review the turbulent course of
Pakistan's domestic politics since independence in 1947.[31] Suffice
it to say that Pakistan seemed further away than ever from a broadly
based national consensus on the structure and philosophy of government
that is indispensable for national security. After little more than a
decade of parliamentary government ( 1 947-1958)
,
Pakistan tended to
adopt increasingly military-authoritarian regimes, seemingly made all
the more necessary by its three wars with India in the past three
decades, and by the wrenching loss of its eastern wing, which in 1971
became the independent state of Bangladesh. Even Bhutto's
parliamentary government, following the East Pakistani secession and
the military's humiliating defeat at the hands of India, soon became
harshly authoritarian. The government of President Zia banned
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3eve.e.. u».te. r.ee.o„ or
.p.eas.on or an
..„.3.
..e.
restrictions mado aiin segments of the society discontent - student
.roup., conservative Musii.
.eXigious ieade.s, ethnic secessionist
«3sidents
-
aii continousiy hu.Min. unde. the surface of poiiticai
lire. [32] Many people in Pakistan went through a traumatic shoe. i„
,979 When the government executed Pri.e Minister Bhutto.
Despite his conviction on a charge of complicity in .urder, and the
earlier charges of electoral rigging. Bhutto had a great following m
the country. His execution anguished and alienated a lot of people
secondly. Zia-ul-Ha, had canceled the elections he had promised for
October
,977. This caused disappointment among politicians, including
those Who were opposed to Bhutto, like NDP. Tehrik-l-isteqlal. etc.
Thirdly, his talk of Islamizatlon, and his declarations that it was
his mission to Islamite, alienated the liberals and the leftists In
the country. By that time. Pakistani authorities asserted that more
than 40.000 Afghan refugees had sought refuge in the country.[33] The
government of Pakistan felt it was time to review Its policies. Its
relations with its two neighbours. Afghanistan and Iran, had been
thrown into confusion by the violent changes that they had experienced
in the past year. In addition there was another problem: Pakistan
found itself at odds with the United States, and fearful of the Soviet
Union.
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in
..„ua.,
,979, the Ca.te. AC^lni^t.atlon tu^e.
.own an al.
P-Po.a.
.o. an ex.ns.v. „nUa.,
.o.e.n..aUon p.o..a„
.a.e
.ne
Zia
.egi.e, 1„ Pe.™ary
,979, Pa.i.tan
„ith..e„ rro. the vl.tuaUy
development aid to Pakistan, xne „s wnioH the Pa.iatanU u=e. to
conalder aa an ally had now become an "uncertain frlend-.tj^]
Starting m early ,950.3, the United Statea- program of aid to
PaWatan, one of Ita largest anywhere In the world totalled about «
hUllon hy
,979.[35J At Its height, fifteen year ago (eld SCs),
there were several hundred Americans In Pakistan, administering
projects in almost every conceivahle area of third-world development
-
roads and dams, well-drllUng, agriculture, family planning,
health, education etc. The United States also maintained a direct
military presence In the country. [36] Pakistan had a mutual security
agreement (,959) with the US and was a member of SEATO and CEWO, and
the US maintained the electronic surveillance facility at Bada Ber
near Peshawar, from which Francis Gary Powers took off on his
ill-fated espionage mission over the Soviet Union in ,960.
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At the ti.e t.e oo^un.sts too. powe. ,n A.^.anistan, see
-ve expeote. t.at Pakistan woul.
.eco.e
.o.e
.epen.ent on CENTO, m
fact Pakistan was canvassing the advantages of i. •^luvdnta leaving CENTO and
moving instead towards a wonwell-armed non-alignment. This change in
Pakistan's foreign policy thinking reflected a .row-6 l ij-ec a g ing recognition
that CENTO was irrelevant to PaWatan-s defence. CENTO ha. not .one
to help Pakistan m Ua wars wltH India in ,955 an. a«ain in
197,. Moreover, Iran, which under the Shah ha. offered support to
Pakistan, had by now denounced CENTO. Thus, Agha Shahi, the Foreign
Affairs Adviser of Oeneral Zia said: "People in Pakistan increasingly
wonder if CENTO is relevant to their security needs and feel that in
the new situation created there could be a new look at
non-alig„„ent...[37] Pakistan felt that CENTO did not have the "teeth"
With Which to resist the Soviet pressure, and that leaving it .ight
therefore ease relations With MOSCOW. The decision to withdraw fro.
CENTO (Which coincided with a similar „ove by the new government In
Iran), came after Pakistan had been convinced after the pro-Soviet
doup in Afghanistan, that the US was not planning a big new program of
aid to Shore up Pakistan defenses against a Soviet threat. Pakistanis
argued, "if the US is not going to treat us as an ally, then we might
as well not suffer the disadvantages that this supposed alliance
caused us with other states we want to have as friends". [38]
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Even before the
.ecialon to leave CENTO, Pakistan
.ad, ove. the
previous eo.ple of years. consolouaX, atan.one. the role of .eln.
toerloa-3 only real ally in South Asia P,i,s=^cn . Pakistanis saw a pro-Indian
Mas in American attitude. They felt that the US attached greater
importance to huUdlng relations with India than
.alntalnln. a genuine
alliance relationship with Pakistan. [39] The US had stopped ar.s sale
to Pakistan after the Indian-Pakistani war of ,965. Several years ago
Paklsan asked for pe™ission to huy
.ore than a ,00 A-7 Jet fighters,
and Washington refused.t40J A principal reason for the rejection was
the concern that such a sale would annoy Indians. The Pakistanis
thought that since the supposed advantage (ar.s and aid) were not
forthcoming, they need not continue to hear, in non-aligned circles,
the identification of being aligned with the United States.
The US-Paklstanl relationship plunged to its lowest point, when
in March 1979, the us decided to halt development aid to
Pakistan.[4,] The decision was based on the American understanding
that Pakistan was acquiring the ability to build nuclear weapons.
American officials referred to Prime Minister Zulfikar All Bhutto's
statement, several years ago, that his country, which had fought four
wars With India since 1947, "will never surrender to any nuclear
blackmail by India. The people of Pakistan are ready to offer any
sacrifices and even eat grass to ensure nuclear parity with
India". [1.2] In ,971. Senator Stuart Symington presided over a Senate
subcommittee dealing with proliferation of nuclear weapons. The
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report of that subcommittee, along with int.n •xu I elligence reports, led to
t.e Sy„l„,.on ^e„..e„t to
.op..,„
..3,3ta„ce
.et (SacUon 66, of
-
.o..«„
..3.3.„ee
.0.,. „..o. 6a..ea a. . a ooun.,
.,at aee.e.
to .e
.eveIop,„,
„.o..a. weapons. Pa.utan was t.e n.a. count..
a.ai„3t
„,,cn tne new
.ule was
.nvo.e.=
..„e Have
.eUa61e
,nfo™ation
that Pakistan has been acquiring abroaH fh^q d the components of a uranium
ennc^^ent
.aoUU,. an. we Have oone.u.e. t.at t.e 3...n.ton
a.end.e„t
.e.ui.e. ua to te^inate ou. existing assistance p.og.a.s In
an orderly manner". [43]
Pakistan repeatedly denied any intention to develop nuclear
weapons, but said that it would not 6e cowed down f.o„ developing its
atomic research program for peaceful purposes. tM] Yet, It is
possible that the Zia regime wanted to gather the capaMlity of
building a nuclear device, not so .uch to offset India. s demonstrated
nuclear capability, but to recoup its standing a^ong Arab and Islamic
states, which at the time had been oritit-ai „rc eii c tic l of the execution of former
Prime Minister Bhutto.
Why did the US demonstrate such indifference towards Pakistan,
its traditional friend, when that friend clearly felt the need for its
support? Obviously the answer lies In the differing perceptions held
by the two countries about the changing situation In the region.
Pakistan perceived Itself as a "front line State", [45] its security
and integrity threatened by the communist take over In Kabul. There
was concern that Afghan communism might spill over Into Pakistan, that
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Pakistan dissidents might get encouraged from th. hicigea t e c ange in Kabul, and
that Pakistan might havp
'° Rusalan-baoKed Afghanistan.
Pakistan also •a „aoor ^hift in the regional balance of power
An.erloa did not perceive a major threat to Paklatan.,r icista 's security, but
only took a low-keyed view that d ,the Pukhtoonistan issue might be
-ived: »Pa.l3tan and othera m the region are deepl, eoneerned. as
i3 the united states, ty the appearance of a pro-Soviet government In
Afghanistan and the accretion of Soviet Influence there. Pa.lstan.s
P^i^ary concern, however, revolves not around the Ideology of its
neighbor but the revival of Afghan claims on Pa.lstan-s border areas
and the possibility of Afghan support of an Irredentist ™nt In
Pakistan's Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier provinces". [ 46]
America believed that the problems in the region were primarily
internal in nature, which the nations must work out themselves. While
assuring Pakistan that the United States accepted the Durand Line as
the internationally recognized border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, the Americans made It clear that .'within^xcdi n "with our overall
policy regarding arms restraint in the region.
. .we are prepared to
sen military equipment to Pakistan and India on a non-discriminatory
basis and in a way that would not contribute to tension in the
region". [47] America seemed more concerned about Pakistan's problems
on the eastern side, which Pakistan at the time did not see as
pressing as its problems on the western side. To the Americans not
arousing Indian dismay was more important than relieving Pakistan's
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fears about the change in Kabul.
Why
.i. the us 3ee. to accept the cc^uniat takeover in
Ar,ha„i3ta„ „Uh such e,uah..«„ when n ha., oven the
.eans,
..e a
=o„3i.enah.e e„ont to pnevent such a
.eve.op.ent,
„e.nettin« the
reorientation m Afghanistan's foreign nm •l policy away from its
traditional genuine non-an.„„eht, the A.enlcans said that
..the us
Sove.n.ent aee.a no special position In Afghanistan... On the US
Uat Of priorities, Afghanistan Itself dl. not loo. large. it „ight
have been argued that, being In such close proxl.lty with the Soviets,
it was already in their sphere of influence. Previous American aid to
Afghanistan, poor and land-loc.ed, could be Justified in humanitarian
ter.s. Arming Pakistan on a passive scale because Afghanistan
government had turned conimunist did not seem essential.
The government of Pakistan made a different assessment of the
American strategic Interests in and around the Indian Ocean area. In
View Of the steady deterioration Of the American position that tooK
Place m southwest Asia and the Middle East resulting from the Islamic
revolution In Iran, and the growing Soviet Influence In Afghanistan
and south Yemen, the Zla regime Judged the suspension of financial and
military credits to have been an American policy mistake, and
calculated that sooner or later Washington, in its own Interests,
would have to be more amenable to Pakistani requests. It hoped also
that the United States would cease Its harrassment of Pakistan in the
matter of the latter's nuclear development program.
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eo»u„u,
.0 .e.p Pa..3U„=
... ,eUe.
... 3.a.e3 .3 a ..p
numanitarlan interp^ii- nr, •
-t est
.n seexng that the world co^unlty does
everything possible to assist fh« .t e government of Pakistan in caring"
for the refugees. [49]
The unue. State3
.ove.^ent acte. on t.. ,a3l3 or the Cante.
A..iniat.ation.3 pe.oepUo„ or t.e national i„te.e3t. T.e.e „e.e
numerous oo^.at
.ovarn.ent3 1„ the worM an. one .o.e in a
.e.ote
States oould not act direotl v „„ha ly to undo thi3 government. Nor oould
Pakistan aooompUsn such a result by military means. Any efforts
along those lines would l.edlately Invite Soviet retaliatory action.
An insurrection against the new Afghan government had surfaced. Some
Of the rebels had taken refuge m Pakistan and were making raids on
the Afghan government forces and Installations from the security of
their locations on Pakistani territory, it would be best to wait and
3ee how all this fared Instead of taking any large steps
precipitously. The memory of America's involvement In Vietnam was
atlll painfully fresh in many American minds. President Carter was
getting ready for a re-election campaign. He already had one crisis
-
that of American hostages in Tehran - to deal with, and his
handling of it had as yet produced no positive results. His
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with no
administration's mood was on^ ofe of caution, even ambivalence,
disposition to plunge into something that mi.h^n zg t go wrong. A quick and
ai.. or „M0H t.e pu.p0.e3 an. eff.otivene.s
„e.e not yet =,ea. an.
WMO.
.,,.t anno.
.„..a, „ou.. not ,u3tme.
.„ t.U s.tuat.on.
-n wou.. u .e app.opn.ate to „.t...aw t.e
.on.-.tan«ns *.e..oan
o.Jeot.on to „Hat ,a. Peen
.ntenpnete. as a Pakistan, pno.na. or
buiX^n. nuolean weapons. But once t.e Soviets entere.
.r..a„.stan in
force (Deoe..er
,979), President Carter too. care to oaU for
e.ergenoy legislation to iin the Pan on military an. eoono^io
assistance to Pakistan. t 50] Then neither the "nuclear proliferation"
nor the displeasure of India rated high in American calculations.
Pakistan has gro«n in security significance for the United States
-ince
,979. In April ,98,, the Reagan Administration offered Pakistan
a *3.2 billion military and economic assistance.[5,] Behind the US
Change in attitude was the belief that Pakistan's strategic value may
be .ore important than efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
The Reagan Administration won the support of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee for a modification of the aid restrictions imposed
Oh Pakistan because of its nuclear program. The Senate panel approved
legislation permitting President Reagan to waive the
restrictions. [52] In June following the visit to Islamabad by Under
Secretary of state James C. Buckley, the US and Pakistan reached
agreement on «.2 billion 6 year package of economic assistance and
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arms credits for Pakistan. [531 Thoan.LbJJ The concern that the Soviets
presented a threat on Pakistan h hborder dominated Pakistan's
relationship with the US. it has caused the Zi. .=iut,ea n a government, while
holding to Its „onali,„e. status, to see. assistance r.o„ t.e US. The
US, fo. its part, sees Its interest as inns with a stahie Pakistan
that acts to oroteotp c Itself as an independent, nonaligned nation,
rather than as an outright ally. The v,-ty. in us also hopes that Pakistan
might serve as a moderate influence in the Muslim world. The US
generally sees the Zia government as having provided hoth political
and economic stability to the country.
The dimensions of American Interests in Pakistan are modest. [54]
The US will not send its men and weapons to protect Pakistan in the
event of aggression. The aid from America for military modernization
does not secure P-'^l3tan againt the full range of potential threats
either from the Soviet Union or from India. It does not provide for
the sort of overt military cooperation with the US, nor does it
Significantly shift the existing balance of power in the subcontinent.
"Even With the acquisition of forty F-16s, the Indian Air Force will
still outnumber its Pakistani counterpart by a 5.8:1 ratio in first
line aircraft by ,986. [55] With this aid the most that Pakistan can
do is to Slow a determined full-scale attack by either Moscow or by
India. Politically, it gives Islamabad the self-confidence to
withstand Soviet pressure for an accommodation with Kabul.
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Pakistan and the
_
Sovlet Union .h.
Communist T«l,eover In tr.h^n,-
Since the
,978 coup 1„ Afghanistan, and especially since the ,979
invasion, the Soviet Union.
s
desi.e to consolidate its position has
led to a major deterioration in its relations with Pakistan.
Pakistan, in spite of its fears has resisted accommodating the Soviet
Union.
As stated in the first chapter, Soviet-Pakistani relations have
traditionally been less than cordial. Pakistan's membership i„
western alliances and Its Close relations with China have been a
source of concern to the Soviet Union. Pursuing a policy of pressure
toward Pakistan, the Soviet Union has supported India and Afghanistan
m their hostility toward Pakistan. Depending on these factors,
soviet-Pakistani relations have gone through phases from mutual
distrust and bitterness to finding ways of accommodation and
cooperation. The change from one phase to the other in
Pakistan-Soviet relations occurred depending on how these factors
gained or lost in Intensity or relevance. [56]
Pakistan has led the international denunciation of the Soviet
move into Afghanistan. To gain Pakistani cooperation on the Afghan
crisis, Soviet leaders have applied considerable pressure, both
positive and negative, on Islamabad. On the positive side, they
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reportedly have offered
"seourlty" th»p i
,
e recognition of the Durand
Line, and even nuoiear power pianta in exohange for oooperation.
The.e have heen aceo.panied hy
.any threats and Soviet and
.f.han
aircraft have frequently violated Pakistani ai.spaoe.
Even hefore the Soviets
.oved in, Pakistan had taken a chilly
of the Change i„ Afghanistan. When Taraki visited Moscow in
December 1Q78 => a^- ^yi^t a Joint-communique urspH t-w^gea the resolution of
Afghan-Pakistani differences through f.lendly negotiationa. It asked
nations in the region to respect each other-s sovereignty and borders
and to honour each party's right to choose its own political and
social syste.. [57] That was probahly to reassure Pakistan. Then
again, defending their
.ove into Afghanistan, Brezhnev, then Soviet
president, once again tried to reassure Pakistan. He said: "For its
part, the government of Afghanistan has, as is known, clearly stated
Its intention to maintain relations of peace and friendship with all
its neighbours, particularly Iran and Pakistan, feedless to say, we
welcome this position taken by Afghanistan. "[58]
Even though the Soviets tried to tell Pakistan that it should not
feel threatened, Pakistan was not to be calmed. Because alongside
these reassurances, the Soviet Union's public posture on Pakistan had
at times been very threatening. The toughest of series of warnings
came in June 1979, when the Soviet Union said that a war between
Pakistan and Afghanistan appeared to be taking shape, and warned that
Moscow would not stand by indifferently: "Violations of Afghanistan's
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a common
sovereignty, incursions of arm^nO ed gangs into its territory from
Pakistan and attempts to creai-P « • .ate a crisis situation in the area cannot
leave the Soviet Union indifferent v .Q it ... Events are evolving toward
conflict in the immediate vicinitv of .^ i'^i y our country. At issue is
actual aggression against a state wii-h ut which USSR has
border". [59]
The worst that ccul. Happen the use of Afghanistan hy the
Soviets as a
.sp.i„,.oar.. ror Soviet eiiitary action against
Pakistan. The Soviet oo^an. or ol. an. new ai.
.ases in Afghanistan
has given the«
-tended capahilitv to strike Pakistani targets. In
this oonneotion, it .ay be or so.e interest to note that while
Karachi. Pakistan's largest city and port on the Arabian Sea, is ,,595
Kilometers from AshKabad (Soviet Turkmenistan), it is merely 770
kilometers from the Soviet air base in Kandahar (Afghanistan). [60]
Karachi and several other Pakistani Cities would thus be within the
easy combat radii of advanced Soviet MIG's. The Soviets have often
Violated Pakistan's airspace and strafed refugee villages inside
Pakistan. These could be escalated to military forays into Pakistani
territory, including air strikes, commando raids, or even airborne
operations justified on the principle of
-hot pursuit'. The Soviets
have several times warned of such a threat. For example, it stated
that the DRA government has exercised restraint out of concern that
the crisis not spread, "it does not avail itself of the legitimate
right of pursuit of bandits formations when they are returning to
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their foreign operational bases". [61]
The Soviet Union also warned P»n,f
°" =««''al occasions not to
allow Afghan insurgents to use It, ^s territory as a "base for the
preparation of Imperialist aggression" •
.against Afghanistan. They
charged that rebels were being trained mm in special camps in NWFP and
Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan h„ aby American and Chinese Instructors
-
Pakistani A^y officers. warning Pakistan against
"aggression" organised on Pakistani soil, they said:
"Participation
.n such adventures is by no means in accord with the interests of the
Pakistani people or the principles of good-neighborly relations". [62]
soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko warned that if Pakistan continues to
aerve as a puppet of imperialism in the future, it will Jeopardise its
existence and its integrity as an independent state". [63]
in spite Of this pressure from the Soviet Union. Pakistan hal not
abandoned its position on the Afghan crisis. It has refused to
recognize the Karmal regime which came to power when the Soviets moved
their forces into Afghanistan. So far. it seems to be persisting in
its demand for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan as a
prerequisite for finding a "political solution" to the Afghan crisis.
Pakistan is fearful of having a super-power at its doorsteps,
especially when it knows that the super-power has strategic interests
ih the region. Pakistani fears are two-fold: Firstly, it fears
Soviet-Afghan occupation of Pakistani territory, especially
Baluchistan; and secondly, Pakistan's leadership is worried that a
U4
stronger Russian presence in u •x Afghanistan will be used to intimidate
Islamabad into policies preferred bvt y Moscow. Therefore it has refused
to accept Soviet presence in flf•„^, • .m Afghanistan which it would rather see as
a buffer between itself and the super-power.
Pa.i3tan.s fears ma. be legitimate, but it stands apparently
-aunted. it is aware of the critical role it plays in determining
t.e fate of the Afghan resistance. it has provided sanctuary for
about three million Afghan refugees, and it has allowed several Afghan
resistance groups to operate in the country. By providing increased
support for the groups fighting the Soviets, Pakistan can ma.e
climculties for MoscoWs pacification strategy. On the other hand,
Pakistan could help Moscow's cause if i.o I It recognized the
Soviet-installed government in Kabul ^nc^ ™ .^ DU a d moved against the
rebels. [64]
Recognizing thia, while Soviet statements have been heavy-handed,
Soviet policy toward Pakistan has been cautious and prudent. Th!
Soviet military has not attacked any major targets In Pakistan; and
there Is no evidence of major training and Infiltration of the
regimes political and ethnic opponents. The Soviet Union Is aware of
the critical role that Pakistan plays: "It should be emphasized that
prospects Of normalizing the situation largely depend on Pakistan's
Stand". [65]
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...u
^^^^^^^
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situation ,o Pipen
.efo.e t.e, „,u act
.eo.si.ely. Thei.
invasion or
.rg.anlatan earne. condemnation f.o. „uo. or t.e „o.i.
inoiuCin, „ota.i, r.o. tne A.aWl3la.io
„o.i.. ... soviet Union „oui^
time to .iunt t.e aHa.p e..e or tnis „o.i. reaction ana „o.i. not
to aggravate that reaction ta.ing military action againat
P-istan. The Soviets „oui. have to
.epioy tweive o. mone division,
to invade Pakistan in addition tn fho •aa o the eight divisions they now
maintain in Afghanistan
. [66] Besides, analysts have pointed out that
south west Asia present Soviet armed forces with severe geographic and
technical obstacles, and these are especially rormidable i„
Baluchistan. [67] In the rorseeahle ruture, the Soviets will probably
see no need to launch a ruU-scale invasion or Pakistan. „ would not
only be expensive but unnecessary, u should also be noted that such
action would also be greatly resented by India which regards Pakistan
as a part of the subcontinent. This inspite or the fact that India
has not been vocal in disapproving or either the initial communist
coup in Kabul or even of the Soviet invasion in December 1979. The
Soviet union has been criticized by many western countries for the
Polish government's political repression in that country. The Polish
problem remains unresolved and, understandably, the Soviet Union does
not Wish to be burdened with numerous embarassing problems at the same
1^*6
K.e.U„
.a. a.
...3 po.n. a p.a.e o.
..„..e.
.o.„3e..,
.a.i„, a
— aa one or us.n,
.nua..
.o.oe a.a.„at Pa..3ta„.
U.el, to e„3ue. « t.e sa.. u.e. u ia not inoonceiva.,e that the
a».3pon30.e. negotiations between Pakistan an. Afghanistan, which have
gone through several rounds,
.ay ultimately sucoeed.
The communist take-over in Afehani <,far, v,tgn ist n has affected relations
between Pa.i3ta„ and India. While India and Afghanistan have heen
friends sinoe the former's independence in ,9^, Pakistan sandwiched
between the two, has suffered the squeeze of their friendship. India
has quietly encouraged Afghanistan to keep raising the PuUhtoonistan
isaue, and Afghanistan has supported India on the Kashmir issue
agaisnt Pakistan. But of the two, Pakistan has had the worst
relations with India. Now, with the Russians sitting on the doorway
to the subcontinent, both Pakistan and India seen, to be eyeing each
other through a different lens. Pakistan has proposed a no-war pact
to India, and India In return has proposed a treaty of friendship.
The stage is set for a much-desired "genuine" normalization between
the two.
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Background
India and Pakistan have been hitter, f
" b ter foes ever since they achieved
independence in Aucu-^i- 10217gust
,947. When the British annouhoed their
intention to withdraw from th<. t ^o« the Indian subcontinent, the Indian
National Congress, whichW later assumed power in India, insisted on
maintaining the territorial Integrity or the suhcontinent, whereas the
separate, sovereign Muall. state. The co^unal warfare Pefore and
after the division of British India hardened the animosity between
India and Pakistan, and conflict over Kashmir reinforced their
deeply-held fears and suspicions Th*. 1-,.^ . •x . e two countries have gone to war
three times, in 1948 iQftc;>'iia, 1965, and then in 1971 which ended in the
dismemberment of Pakistan. India was perceived as wining to use any
means to destroy Pakistan and bring the Whole of subcontinent under
Its dominion. PaWstan, in turn, was seen as deliberately exploiting
Musllm-Hlndu Cleavages in Indian society, thereby undermining the
fragile unity of that nation. Each country prophesied the continuing
bellicosity Of the other, and even declared the other to be Its
principal enemy. [68]
However, the December 1971 war between the two countries, which
brought about the emergence of East Pakistan as independent
Bangladesh, changed the power structure of the subcontinent, and put
Indo-Paklstan relations in a new perspective. Pakistan felt weak and
broken in the face of India riding rough and high as the dominant
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power in South Asia. With the loss of it.n s eastern half, Pakistan
considered itself as part of West a.-i.w Asia and therefore looked for
frian.. an. 3uppo.t
^^^^^^^^^^ ^
3erie3 of p.olon^e. negotiations t.at ha. a fundamental transforation
Of their relationship as the objeotive Thi, ."" c . s oonmenoed with the
Simla Agreement of
.une 19Ta. which aimed at modifying certain
confXiotual aspects of their past relations. India gradually reduced
its support of dissident and Mivisive" forces in the Northwest
Frontier Province (^pp, Pa.istan.[6,] Pakistan hegan to refrain
from pushing the Kashmir issue in international forums (although it
«d occasionally refer to Kas,™ir as an issue in dispute to India's
irritation).
Both the regional and the international environment had changed.
Whereas the Soviet Union had mediated between India and Pakistan at
Tashkent after the 1965 war, the Simla Agreement following the ,971
war was purely a bilateral arrangement. [70] Both governments resolved
to "put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto
marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and
harmonious relationship and the establishment of a durable peace in
the subcontinent so that both countries may henceforth devote their
resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare
Of their peoples". Pakistan and India declared that they would eschew
the use of force in resolving disputes and end the era of conflict and
confrontation. They agreed to settle their differences by peaceful
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means through bilateral negotiations or "by anv oth.Po y er peaceful means
mutually agreed upon between them".
firstly,
.
non-aggre.3io„ guarantee rPo„ Pakistan; and secondly, that
the subcontinent ccul.
.e assured of a durable peace only if the
Kashmir dispute was resolved at that su«lt
.eetlng. Pakistan would
not agree to a
..no-war pact or a non-aggression pacf. because It was
aware that tbe Indian proposals would freeze the Kashmir issue in
indla.s favour. Instead it advocated a gradual progra^e towards
nonnalization of relations that would not require Pakistan to abandon
its stand on Kash.ir.[711 Now ten years later, Pakistan is pressing
for a
..no-war pact.., and India like before is jumping one step ahead
and instead proposing a treaty Of friendship. Could this .ean that
Pakistan sees the threat on its western border so great that it has no
Choice but to accommodate India? A no-war pact or a treaty of
friendship n,ight involve a virtual shelving of the Kashmir Issue by
Pakistan and perhaps even its acceptance of the Indian claims to
"preponderence..[72] in the subcontinent. But all of this is not
Without some complioationa. India has a treaty of friendship with the
soviet union that was invoked against Pakistan in 1971 and is directed
against Pakistan and Phina m-un . At the same time, India cannot be
altogether unconcerned about the Soviet military presence in
Afghanistan next door to the subcontinent.
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As mentioned elsewhere i-v.^ •
invited by the Kabul regime and i-h.., that they would leave as soon as
outside interference in Afeham- 4.g nistan stopped. And since then, that has
^-ained its p.blic posture. in all the UN resolutions on
Afghanistan, they have abstained from voting.
..ey have not
outrightly condemned the qovi«i-o kS ets, but on various occasions they have
stated that they wouirf ni,^ *.y uld Uke to see the Soviet troops out from
Afghanistan. [73]
The issue of arms
Whenever Pakistan has sought to augment Its military strength,
Pakistan accepted US offer of a six-year *3.2 hiUlon eoonomlo and
military package, tension
.egan to build up between Pakistan and
India. Predictably, the Indian Government Issued strongly-worded
statements protesting against the Proposed a^s sales to Pakistan.
The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi said that India was faced with
a new external danger by the rearmament of Pakistan by the US. In the
past the arms supplied to Pakistan had always been used by it against
India. "We do not want Pakistan to be a weak state but who can tell
against whom it will use these arm3".[7i(]
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Addressing the Indian Parlian^ent, she said:
for XT^TeT^^^^^ ^--hed in see countries
Pakistan which is beinf alleLdr'''"' °' nUitarisation of
such justifications are ^idieuC' '"''^'^ ^-^S--
Pakistan has already doubled ?ts*;;T.
^^'^
actions to enhance its mUitarv iLl """^^ l^^^^tChanges to the existing situation qualitative
responsibility, and ParliLpnJ ''^^^ ^^^^^ °f our
respond to any 'develo^^irrf
^^^JltS^^^^f
"^^^
- ^^-11 ^uly
in a message to President Zia, she expressed serious concern over the
deliveries of modern US arms to Pakistan Th.r K . e message stressed that
new arms purchases by Pakistan ^or. .i-aicista , especially the us F-16
fighter-bombers, would lead to p r.i^i-t,^^xa a further worsening of tension in South
Asia. [76]
Pakistan at the beginning of igSO-s was very weak and felt very
insecure. [77] It could not afford to aggravate further its relations
With India. Explaining the arms purchase deal, the Pakistani Foreign
Minister pointed out that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan
and Pakistan's present state of relations with India could bring his
country to the brink of a "two front situation". [78] To avoid any
such Situation, Pakistan proposed to hold "immediate talks" with India
to work out guarantees for "non-aggression and non-use of force"
between the two countries
. [79]
By proposing a no-war pact, Pakistan wanted to reassure India
that Islamabad's move to build up its defence capability would pose no
threat to New Delhi. [80] At the time when this offer was made public
(Sept. 1981), the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi had dismissed
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it as a senseless one with the remark, "v.. "You cannot prepare for war andtalk of peace at the same time th... There could not be two
contradictory movements at the same fim..t e: one leading to augmentation
of military might and the ath^r^o her suggesting peace". [8l] She was
referring to Pakistan's acceotance nr riQp of US economic and military aid.
This talk about a no-war pact is neither new to Pakistan
India. It was first proposed by Indian Ministry of External Affai
as "No-war Declaration" in November 1949 to M. Ismail, the Pakistani
High commissioner in India at the time.C82] The proposal was renewed
by Mehru, the Indian Prime Minister in his correspondence in January
1950 With the Pakistani Prime Minister Lia.uat Ali Khan. The latter
welcomed it and suggested a procedure to settle the Indo-Pakistan
disputes involving a time-table that allowed two months for
negotiations; two months of mediation if negotiations failed; and
arbitration by a method agreed to in advance in case of failure of
mediation. India was not willing to consider any definite procedure
or a time-table for the settlement of outstanding disputes, and in
particular it would not commit itself to arbitration on an issue like
Kashmir. A Pakistani writer maintained that it was not enough to
declare in "general terms that the two states should settle all their
disputes through negotiations, mediation or arbitration. They must be
actually settled and for that a definite and binding procedure laid
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<iown".[83] SiMlarly, • another writer ^ •maintained that Pakistan
welcomed the idea provided the slogan of nnS o-war was given real meaning
by adding to it an agreed formula which wouldn n ensure the fair
settlement of the main ^-m disputes between the two countries. [84]
However, Indian statesmen and publicists haveH ui always maintained that
Pa.i3ta„
.a. contemptuously
..jeotea In.ia-a nume.oua offers of a
no-wa. paot. Bhutto thought such a pact
.eant
..acceptance of status
OUO" an. he caUea u a
..fascist tecHnicue..
. t85] In .une ,963 he
3a«,
..let I„.ia arPlve at an e,uUahle an. honourable settlement with
Pakistan over Kashmir, „e can then have not one hut a thousand no-„ar
pacts". President Ayuh Khan of Pakistan
.alntalne. that two
pre-re,uisites were essential hefcre a no-war declaration was sl^ed:
first, an agreement about
..maintenance of forces at a specified
level.., and second, a reasonable machinery for an honourable
settlement of all disputes. [86] President Ayub Khan of Pakistan too
had wanted a settlement Of Kashmir dispute first. And President Zia
Of Pakistan in an interview to an Indian journalist had said clearly:
"No-war pacts, non-aggression pacts were not worth the paper on which
they were written. History tells us that a number of no-war pacts,
non-aggression pacts and peace treaties have proved good for
nothing... [87] The offer as originally made by India was intended to
freeze the Kashmir issue, and Pakistan would not accept anything of
the sort, hence it rejected whenever India renewed the proposal.
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In 1981 India defined its offioi;,!O icial response to the Pakistani
proposal of a no-war pact as positive it. v .. I s External Affairs Minister,
"Wit. no e.=epUo„3. no =on..Uo„3 an. no va..aUo„»,
,,,,
t.e two co.nt..e3 3e.u an „u.ua: p.o.e„3
.ua..a.
..3cu33.on
WU.OU.
.„,olv.„, tn,.. p..,,.3 (tM3 na. aX3o
.een spene. out ,n t.e
3i.la aooon.).
„e
.ea33u.e. Pa.i3tan
.epeatin« „nat ne na. 3al. i„
,98, „Hen .e n.U.. Pa.i3tan t.at u ia In m.,.,
,„,,.,3t to
3ee a ata.ie an. p.o3pe.ou3 Pa.l3tan. He aai. tnat m.ia waa
=o™.tte. to no™aU.atlon of
.elation3 „n. Pa.,3tan aa lai. .own
.n
the Si.la A«™t.[88: Ihia „a3 the om=lal Indian Peaponae to the
Pakistani ofre.. But not navln« a apeoino a.aft, I„.,a waa
3uapiciou3 on two accounta: fir3t It wanted to Know if the Kaah^i.
laaue waa included in the no-„ar pact. i„di.a Gandhi repeatedly aaid
that If the Kaahmlr proble. ia ra.ed up, the purpoae of the exerciae
would he defeated. Secondly, India „aa .een to .now if any stringa
were attached to the offer which violated the proviaiona of the Simla
Agreement of ,972. To get thinga rolling, Indira Oandhi aent a aecret
letter to Preaidant Zla-ul-Ha, i„ which ahe expresaed the belief that
a atable aub-continent linked by understanding and cooperation could
be a factor for peace in the world. She also noted that the security
Of each country of the region should be taken as an integrated factor
of sub-continental security. Mrs. Gandhi said in the letter that it
was "utter nonsense" that ahe had not accepted the fact of
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Pakistan. [89]
It was in India's interest to show a soirif .
^ p t of accommodation with
Pa.i3.a„
.e.3U3e, n.su.. u nee.e. . eaae Us own
.e.aUonaMp
- u
^^^^^^^^^^^
_
^^^^^^^^^
t.«.„aUon or aooo.. on u.an.u. s.ppUes to Ta.apu. po„e. p.ant.
3eco„.x„ an. ao.uUcn or Xn... p.o..e„3 „u. Pa..3tan eou..
.a.e
some contribution to oreann, ,c ati g a more congenial atmosphere for border
negotlatlona
„lt. CHlna. But tbe
.ost Important political imperative
was tbe presence or Soviet troops 1„ ArgHanlstan. M an Indian
scholar wrote:
.-Tbe positioning or armed rorces b, external powers on
our maritime threshold in the southwest and Inside our mountain
doorway In the northwest cannot be acquiesced m without peril to the
entire region... Any battling on the subcontinent today Is mely to
advantage an outsider rather than a combatant power". [90]
m January
,982, Foreign Minister or Pakistan went to India to
hold exploratory talks over the no-war pact with his counterpart,
Naraslmha Rao, and the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Oandhi. Even though
no breakthrough emerged from the three-day talks, the Joint Statement
issued on February 1, ,982, at the conclusion of the talks did express
the View that such a pact would be a "positive contribution to peace
and stability In the region". [9,] The tangible outcome of these talks
was that both sides agreed to set up a joint commission to review and
promote bilateral relations periodically. it was felt that a
permanent standing body of this kind would be able to take care of
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bilateral issues relating .x to trade, travel
» , economic and
people-to-people and government 1-0g e^nment-to-governent problems. [92] They also
agreed to continue talks at the level ofO secretaries on the question
Of a no-war pact. On his return home, Agha Shahi tmn> H n bn old newsmen that
the joint commission would provide ^ m=.H-a machinery
"to bridge the
communication gap" betwPf^n ^o wee the two countries. [93]
But gap stui
.e.ai„3 between the positions or t.e t„o counties.
lnd.a
.3 Of the opinion that the Sl„la Agreement somehow precludes
PaKlatan rro. urging a settlement of the Kaah.!. aiapute at any
international foru„. Pa^iatan-s Interpretation U that It oo«lt3
Pakistan to a peaceful solution of the dispute "without prejudice to
the recognised position of either side". The recognised position of
Pakistan I3 that Kashmir Is a disputed territory whose final
disposition IS yet to be determined. Pakistan says the dispute will
have to he resolved one day bilaterally or through the agency of the
m according to relevant UN resolutions. [94] Referring to Kashmir.
Agha Shahl had said at New Delhi, that the no-war pact would neither
"add to nor subtract from the Simla Agreement", and that It would not
Change Pakistan's position on Kashmir which was already covered by the
Simla Agreement. [95]
Because of these varied positions, the scheduled secretaries
level talks received a set-back, m February 1982, immediately after
the Shahi-Rao talks in New Delhi, Pakistan's representative at the UN
Human Rights Commission made a reference to the Kashmir dispute. By
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ta..3
.etwee„ t.e two eou„..,e.. whenever Pa.,3.a„
.a.sea t.e Kaa^,.
-3ue in i„te.natio„a. XnC.a o.Jecta on the spoun. tnat u i3
a violation or t.e Sl.la Asnee.ent. i„
.p.n ,,3., :„.ia o.Jecte. to
the inolaslon of th.ee rep.eaentatlves f.o. Pa.l3ta„.3 Northern A.ea3
in Pa.i3tan.3 MaJUa-l-SHoora (Conaultatlve ho.,) on the
..oun. that
GUglt, Hunza and S.ar.u. onoe va33al3 of the rule- of Kaah^iP, ,1,
not
.l«htfully helong to Pa.l3tan heoauae all of Kaah.!., i„olu.l„«
these areas,
.elonge. to In.la. Thla waa In.ia.a way of tunning the
Kaah^m dispute around to show that far fro„ ceding the Indian part of
Kashmir to Pakistan, India oould lay olal. to Pakistani part of
Kashmir. Pakistan rejected Indla.s objections and Ya,uh Khan.
Pakistan's new foreign minister, said that "India can whip up this
matter for Its own ends but we should not give too much importance to
the Indian claim". [96]
Now let us turn to the treaty of peace and friendship proposed by
India to Pakistan. The Idea of such a treaty was mentioned In passing
by Indira Gandhi to Pakistani Journalists in January ,982. The
Pakistani press played it down, describing It as a ruse meant to
neutralise Pakistan's
"diplomatic victory" in being first with the
offer of a non-war pact. The new Pakistani foreign minister, Yaqub
Khan, said that "the principal objective of the non-aggression pact
was to create the necessary atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence
in the context of which alone could such a treaty acquire
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was not pursued "a<3 ,as
.t was realized that such a treaty
„as
P.e„at.e...:,8, i„ the
.iio.„,
..^..^^
tal.3 between the two countries were stalled. Then 1„ order to hrea.
the ice, Indira Gandhi spnt- a t^*.*.ent a letter to Zia through Natwar Singh, the
Indian Secretary
.or External
.„alrs, who arrived In Pakistan on May
31, 198^. in the letter, Mrs. Oandhl reiterated Indla-s desire to
have good relations with Pakistan, reoalUng her oft-repeated
atate^ent that a stahle, sovereign and Independent Pakistan was In the
interest of India. The next day It was announced that the tal.s were
to be resumed. „r. Matwar Singh tried to allay a Pakistani feeling
that by suggesting a friendship treaty, India was trying to put
3o.ethi„g atop a pyramid as, in PaKlstan-s view, the proposed no-„ar
pact was itself a substantial departure fro» its own earlier position.
India suggested that the two sides beg.n tal.s on Indla.s proposal of
a Joint oo^ission which m turn could lead to talks on a no-war pact
proposed by Pakistan and the friendship treaty suggested by
India. [99]
A major develop„,ent which had a bearing on Indo-Paklstan
relations was the agreement reached between Islamabad and Kabul to
open indirect talks on the Afghan question in June 1982 in Geneva.
Given the differences in the approach adopted towards Afghanistan by
Islamabad and New Delhi, any move to ease tension in south-west Asia
was to make a favourable impact on South Asian politics. Similarly,
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-ten. 3u.oo„u„e„.
.3 to
...
,
^^^^^^^
nesoU«.on3 oeneva.
^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^
de Cueller that Pakistan had received a "nn,.-.-
'positive communication" from
Mrs. Gandhi which indicated India's willingness toxxi resume the talks
that had been suspended.
Arte. „at„a. Sin.. ,ave Zia OanOhi-s Utta., Zia .ave M„ a
*an Of tne PaKlatani
„o-„ar proposal. But India found t.at the
Pa.i.tani draft would nave to undergo oonside.a.ie
..a.end.ent.
.edifications, and additions", before it could be acceptable. India
wanted to bring the draft in line with the "se.lnal principle, which
Should guide both the countries in evolving a relationship of peace,
friendship and cooperation".[
,00] However, these "se-inal principles-
were not publicly spelled out. it seeded that India, which wanted its
proposals of a Joint cc«ission and a friendship treaty also to fc™
part Of the dialogue on the no-war pact, was worried that Islamabad,
through the device of a no-war pact, mght dilute the Simla Agreement,
especially the idea of bilateralism to which India attached
considerable importance. Bilateralism means that disputes are to be
settled by mutual negotiations. By this India means that they
(disputes) are net to be aired in international forums. Also that
disputes are not to be referred to mediation or arbitration by third
parties. Nor submitted to the World Court. Pakistan does not like
the Indians version of bilateralism because cf the implication that if
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a dispute cannot be resolvon k
-solved by negotiations, because India is
—onaue.. tben it
»-tain positions advantageous to Itse. and detrimental to Pakistan,
unless it wants, on its own volition, to c.ange Its stance. But it
not be open to Pakistan to b.ing tbe ro.ce or International law
and public opinion op
.ipic.atlo pressure to bear on India. since
India IS by
.ar t.e larger power, bllateralis. tnus „eans tbat
Indian-Pakistani relations ui 1 1 «Will n,ove as India wants them to move. it
makes India, not Just In words but In fact th, h- ki t , e big brother and makes
Pakistan clearly subordinate <, it is understandable that Pakistan is
reluctant to accept this version of bilateralism.
The draft of the Indian treaty of peace and friendship was
submitted to the Pakistan government In August 1982 by „. k. „asgotra,
the Indian Porelgn Secretary when he came to Islamabad. oipicm,,,,
sources from Islamabad said that it aimed at achieving too much too
soon in
..cne great leap forward", as against Paklstan-s own
"step-by-step.. approach. The sources also said that the draft
contained
..certain elements which might provoke controversy and thus
jeopardise even what is immediately attainable... but they did not say
«hat exactly the controversial elements were. Pakistan, however, did
not reject the Indian draff rinn t*.a tt.LlOIJ it seems that while India was
trying to assure Pakistan that the draft treatv ninux i u y a d not supersede the
proposals for a no-war nani- • • ^pact and a joint commission, Pakistan was
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trying to assure India thai- t-w^at tha no-war pact would not dilute the Sl„laAgreement (the drafi- in f^^^.aft xn fact mentions the Simla Agreement).
On November 1, iga? whiio
'
^" '°
-"theast Asia, zia „et
oo-l3.o„. Both the leaders also decided to consider the Pakistani
^rart or a no„-a.sresslon pact and the Indian dran of the treaty or
peace, friendship and cooperation, m this context. Zla too. the
atand that hy whatever na„e It he called, it would amount to a no-war
asree.e„t. The Joint press statement was silent on Kashmir, which
suggested that hoth sides wanted to concentrate on l^provlns relations
instead of harping on problems that were difficult to resolve. Cloa]
Kashmir regains a prohle. and a hottleneo. m this process of
no^alUatlon. It can he argued that the .ost ll.el. solution would
be acceptance hy hoth India and Pakistan of the status ,uo - the line
Of control becoming the International boundary. But there la
reluctance on both the sides. When In August 1982 PaKlstan signed a
protocol with China on the opening of Khunjerab pass on the Kara.ora.
Highway in the Pakistani part of Kashmir. India protested to both
countries. It questioned their right to have an agreement concerning
an area, which India claims to be its own and regards as being under
"Illegal.. Pakistani occupation. In the past India has been willing to
settle the Kashmir dispute on the basis of formalizing the status quo.
Indian claims to the Pakistani side of Kashmir and to Pakistan.
s
northern areas may be intended to discourage Pakistan from pressing
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the l33ue. Govarnmenta m PaW.tan refer to th. .i e desirability of
solving the Kashmir disDute net h-Imp o because they seriously expect India to
-ive it on their te^s.
.,ey do so because they do not want the
-sue to be entirely dead. They do not want friends abroad - forinsunoe, china to thin, that they bave abandoned their stand on
Kashmir, while they may in effcot h«.y ec be reconciled to the status quo,
they do not want to focalize it because of the fear that such a move
.Ight arouse very conalderble opposition at home. The opponents of
the regime that mak-P<? fh-;^kes this move can be counted upon to call it a
betrayal of the national Interest. Ibe li.elibood therefore is that
the dispute Will remain unresolved for the forseeable future.
India has made no suggestion for resolving the Afghan crisis that
would be persuasive for Afghanistan
• s nelgbbours or to the Afghan
dissidents. [,03] " has exercised no restraint in denouncing the US
arms deal with Pakisi-an Tiniiist , [lOK] and its own military buildup has
alarmed Pakistan. One can argue that the arms race m the
subcontinent is not triggered by Pakistan but by India if we are to
consider the Indian eight billion dollar five-year defence program
initiated in May
,980, before Pakistan and the US entered Into any
arms negotiations. Russia is known to be building a strategic
infrastructure in Afghanistan which can be used to dominate the entire
region in some years' time. [105] In the meantime, the Indian
Government, by refusing to accept the Hed Army garrison in Afghanistan
as invaders, may be doing Russia's propaganda Job. This not only
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ions tal. X have eve.
.a. „nh he. (x„.,.a Gan.hO
. waa when „e „et a.
SaZishur, ro. the ^i„,ah„e Independence oeXeh.ations
, and at the end
She assured „e that a st.on, and independent Pakistan was ve.y „uoh in
indla.s interest. And of oou.se, on the do.ino p.lnoipXe. u ..st be.
So why then play the Russian game?" [106]
Many observers advise Pakistan and India to bury their old
dispute and start a relationship of cooperation and understanding.
But the te«s on which this cooperation Is to be had vary as we go
fro. one commentator to the next. Pakistani writers advocate
resolution of disputes and e,uallty, rather than Indian hegemony, as
necessary accompaniments of cooperation. [ 107] An Indian writer Is
concerned that In the absence of cooperation, Pakistan may seek
accomodation with Moscow at so.e stage. [,08] Writing m an Indian
journal, Lawrence Zirlng postulates that the "threats posed to their
independence and integrity are now greater from without than from
within the subcontinent... The perpetuation of hostile relationship
is not in the Interest of either state". But then he goes on to
advise Pakistan to recognize Indians sovereignty over Kashmir to
"remove the flashpoint for another Indo-Pakistani conflict", and "to
emphasize cooperation and mutual assistance" between the
countries. [,09] Needless to say, Professor Ziring's advice could not
be welcome in Pakistan for reasons already mentioned above. Another
western writer suggests that the maintenance of Pakistan's territorial
164
--.-t.
.3 n.3t
^^^^^^
-anoe.
...3 wouX. ~e a e.an.e
.n
-.ew .e.M. pe.eepUon or
the geopolitical situation 30 as to face up the h^ danger threatening
India itself because of the re]^,i-ivolative weakness of Pakistan vis-a-vis
potential Sov.ee a«..e33.o„...
„e a.n.s
.o.p.ete
.econc.UaUon
Wit, Pa.,3ta„ along „Uh guarantees as to Ua territorial integrity..
The Kashmir problem,
.e adda, „ight usefully be shelve, and
..left to
the next generation to sort out". M 10] Leo Hose thinks that
..while
the pri^aoy of India-s position in South Asia is still generally
aecepte.,
,,e„ celhi cannot
.iotate to its sensitive neighbors nor
unilaterally
.eoide the tenns upon which external powers become
involved in the subcontinent". He warns l-h,fthat the situation may
eventually become considerably more difflcif huioits a iiioult and dangerous for India
"If Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan reached a level that
seriously threatened PaXistan.s viability; or the US-Pa.istan security
relationship expanded from sale of arms (at high world market prices)
to include security commitments or the provision of base facilities".
He goes on to say that there is some optimism in New Delhi that it has
sufficient leverage on the powers involved to prevent this from
happening.mi] This optimism in New Delhi is reflected by OnXar
Marwah, who says:
..In terms of conventional defense and security the
country (India) is likely to move to a position of virtual
independence in the use of force within and on the borders of the
subcontinent. This situation will exist despite the facility of any
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state within the subcontinem- •
'° "'^^
""itary help i„ „hat
could be described as "reasonphi^£ ao e amount" » d-,i • ^<=^«u te.g. Pakistan's arms dealWU. the H.a.a„
...i„,3t.aUo„, o.
.e.pUe a.uu. or
....
on
.He 3u.oo„„„e„.
.o apply 3„o.
.o.oe. a. „oul.
.e
P033l.le ror
.,e.. ,iyen
.Hel.
.oeal . ou.Uy „ee.3 <e... i.a„ an.
Afghanistan), neither of which are in =.W a position to threaten Indian
security". [ 112]
Fro. the above vie„3, an. r.o„ what inaia an. Pa.l3tan have heen
d=.n« a3
.entione. earlier. „e 3ee the a„arne33 of a 3l.niaoa„t
Change in the strategic environment or the 3u.-oo„tlnent heoau3e of
the soviet intervention In Afghanistan. There I3 „l.e3prea. agreement
that ln.la an. Pa.l3tan nee. to
.evelop a oooperatlve reXatlonahlo.
But the ter.3 of thl3 cooperation are far fro. aettle.. Both nations
have to rise above the legaoy of their long-stan.lng mutual
.istrust
an. even hatre.. m a.dltlon, Pakistan has to develop sufficient
internal unity an. cohesion 30 as to feel secure that close ties with
ln.la Will not threaten its
.Isaolutlon through subversion. In.ia has
to rise above the
.eslre. which many of its people entertain, to
.ake Pakistan into a "little brother". it has also to reevaluate an.
perhaps a.Just Its ties to the Soviet Union so as to be able to resist
Soviet pressure on any part of the subcontinent should it be mounted.
Whether the leadership in India and Pakistan Is capable of building a
new cooperative relationship remains to be seen.
CHAPTER VI
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS
It h.3
.een Soviet strategy to encourage acceptance of the
invaalon by justifying it, by treating it a. a close. Issue an.
.y
proMng fo. openings towards re-esta.Iishing no^al relations between
Kabul and other countries. An atte.pt was .ada to ta.e the initiative
m the spring of ,980. Surrogates, such as Cuba, were used to test
Third world reactions to overtures for opening relations with the
Kabul government. [,] m May ,980, Babra. Kar.al announced a
"seven-point- plan for settlement of the Afghan crisis. The Soviet
leaders were themselves actively pushing a peace offensive. Brezhnev
»et With Giscard
-
Warsaw and later was host to Schmidt in Moscow.
The first high-level Soviet-American talks since the invasion were
held in May 198O between Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and Andrei
Oromyko. The primary Soviet theme throughout was that detente could
hot be allowed to end, especially because of the urgency of strategic
arms control and the issue of nuclear weapons planned for deployment
in Western Europe. The Afghan crisis was treated as if already
settled.
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The Soviet Union portrayed its ..-t.a I military intervention in
Afghanistan as 3 k.^.,^a response to th.
"provocations of external
ene.ie3".[2] The Ruaaians Justified their airlift of .i troops into
Afghanistan by sayine thai- fv,^,mg at they responded to an urgent request from
the Kabul Government for helo T^l Thn-.n ip.LSJ This same position was also stated
by the newly-installed Karmal resrirr,^ a u •g me of Aghanistan, saying that it had
asgreasive actions of the ene.ies of Afghanistan... ",3 soon as the
threat is over, there will no longer
,y any need for such
cooperation.
"[4]
While the world around condemned Soviet intervention, the Soviets
themselves continued to clai. that there had heen no Russian
"intervention., in Afghanistan. Mr. Brezhnev said:
..The USSR acted on
the basis Of the soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty. Three successive
Afghan governments urgently requested that „e help defend their
country against Invasion from outside by counterrevolutionary forces...
He blamed Americans, the Chinese, and
.-others..
..who are directing
this intervention, which has created a serious threat to the Afghan
revolution and to the security of our southern border'.. [5J
Babrak Karmal, in his very first extended Interview for the
Western press, confirmed the Soviet position. He said!
P^esen? lfl?^^=;- f
'"^ ""'"^'^ military contingent atpr t in Afghanistan, it is there on the basis of our 20-vear
o7Z:,iJA"s'' cooperation. Sli d
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This contingent is in Af h
and above aU, to
'^ef/n.TsTrVlZllT.^'''' ^"'-"^^tOf President Brezhnev was In direct ™^ l "^^^"' ™^ =tatementsituation here and the threatJ '^=1""" to the Internaloo^on sen.e and capable of ana^JslS wcuir' ""hSoviet presence as a pretext t^ i that the us uses
aggression against A?gha:i3Ln![6" ^o fo::"
TM3 explanation did not convince the world. There „as almost
universal demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, as demonstrated
individual statements issued b, individual countries, and by the
resolutions passed in the m General Assembly. The Soviets felt they
As early as March 198O. thpv lo-i^ ^you, ey laid down the conditions for their
withdrawal. Mr. Brezhnev said:
Lzzii T\:r,zir:'j izi ^^^^ ^^^^^ - ^^^^^interference directed LatLt- ^n ^^'^'"^ °"tside
Afghanistan comjle^ely cease LeT ?r'""""' ^^^^^^
Afghanistan's neighbours ^u^rantL .h ^^^^Soviet military assistance Ju T.T "^^^y dtosista will no longer exist. [7]
This same stance was reiterated by Babrak Karmal. He said: "We
have only one position which is crystal clear. The condition is the
disappearance of all signs of provocation, of intervention in our
internal affairs, and of aggression. At the present time an
undeclared war is being waged against our country. This must
Stop. "[8]
Ever Since Babrak Karmal came to power, he said that his regime
would like to have friendly relations with Afghanistan's neighbours.
He declared that Afghanistan was ready to normalize and swiftly
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the
e
strengthen friendly tlea ufci, d , •with Pakxatan and Iran provided these ties
were based on absolute reKard t-r.,.g for each other's independence and
sovereignty. [9] m April 1980 th« t k ,S , e Kabul regln,e offered a five-point
Plan, for What was described as
-peace and security m southwest
As.a. It called for working out bilateral agreements to normalize
relations.
...hese agreements would contain generally accepted
provisions concerning the prevention of armed and all other forms of
-stile activity from the territory of one party against
other.coj According to the Afghan plan, these accords would b
supported by
..political guarantees" from the US and the USSR. This
Implied that the guarantors would themselves respect, and by their
authority reinforce, Afghanistan.s bilateral accords with Pakistan and
Iran. As far as guarantees from the US were concerned, they were to
include a clear commitment not to carry on any kind of subversive
activity against Afghanistan, including activity from the territory of
third countries.
The Plan suggested that once armed incursion and all other forms
Of interference in Afghanistan had ceased, and guarantees given that
such activity would not be resumed, then the reasons that had
compelled Afghanistan to invite the Soviet forces would be removed.
Among other things, this meant that Pakistan and Iran should accept
the Karmal regime as the legitimate government in Kabul. However,
Pakistan was not yet ready to do 30. President Zia ruled out talks
with the Karmal regime, but said that doors for dialogue with the
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soviet union on the Afghan question were op.n.ni]
-
-V
-980. Bah.. Ka™a. anno.noe. a
.even poinf p.an that
was .o.
.a...eaehi„. in it.
.e.a„.3. Se.on.
.ecc.nition o. hia
^e.i.e an. a„oe3 o. non-inte..e.enee
... aii oonoe^ne.. Ka™ai
oane. fo. non-a«..ea3ion pacta hetween A.ghaniatan on the one ha„.
an. Iran an. Pa.i3tan on the othe., an. „iuta.,
.et.eat
the Pe.aian Cuif an. m.ian Ocean, as oon.itiona fo. Soviet
troops
„ith..a„a..t,.3 In Octohe. „S0 ,eoni. B.ezhniv an. Bah.a.
Ka™a. si^ne. a joint declaration which a.ain
.eciane. that the
"ith..a„ai or soviet troops r.o. Afghanistan coui. not he
.iscusse.
until
.foreign aggression against that country ha. cease, an. the
Kabul regime had been recognized by Its neighbours. [, 3]
soviet leaders an. Babra. Kareal wanted Pakistan's recognition of
the government i„ Kabul Prior to discussing the question of Soviet
withdrawal. Pakistan took the position that since the regime in Kabul
had been installed by the Soviets, Pakistan would not consider
recognizing It until after the Soviets ha. withdrawn their troops. On
September 30, ,980, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. Agha Shahl. met
"1th his Soviet counterpart Andrei Gromyko at the UN. Gromyko told
Agha Shahi that there must be direct talks between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and even held out "several assurances" m regard to the
Soviet policy towards Pakistan. [U] Agha Shahl replied that not only
«as it a matter of principle (as Pakistan had not recognized the
Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrln-s regime in Kampuchea) not to recognise
171
foreign-installed regioea, but that Pakistan h,.
"^'^ °^«>- one million
Afghan refugees then and it had f„to consider the repercussions of
talks with the Kahul authorities. He said:
..„e have offered a
way Of promoting an Indirect dialogue f„. a Peaceful settlement hased
on the p.i„cipies enunciated m the resolution of the islamic
conference calling for an Independent, non-aligned Afghanistan, Soviet
own government and creation of right conditions for the return of the
-fu.ees.:,33 He added that Pakistan could also consider accepting
certain proposals In the May U declaration of the Kahul regime,
including guarantees of non-interference.
in December
,980, Bre.hnev visited India and In a major speech
outlined a
..peace plan., for the Persian Gulf region. He pledged
Soviet support for an international security guarantee based on the
prohibition Of all military bases supported by powers outside of the
region, pledges of all outside parties not to use force or to
interfere in the domestic affairs of states within the region or to
interfere in its international trade or shipping. [ 16]
Soviet diplomacy had concentrated heavily on India as its
diplomatic bridge to the non-aligned nations for acceptance of the
soviet position on the Afghan crisis. Yet, while India accepted a new
complement of Soviet military assistance and Its spokesman
occasionally repeated soviet propaganda, Indira Gandhi's government
made it clear to Brezhnev during his December visit that Soviet troops
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must be Withdrawn from Afghanistan. [ 17]
Throughout 1980, initiatives launched by Karmal re.iu> f^arm i g me and theSoviet Union to encourage acceptance of the Karmal •' n regime as
legitimate won little positive response Th». The regime had no legitimacy
even in the eyes of tho ir^y.,e Afghan people. It existed with Soviet
support, and was seen merelvy as an appendage of Moscow. Soviet
personnel directed virtually all departments of its administration.
including the Ministries of foreign Affairs, Oefense, Interior,
information and Culture, Justice, and Economic Planning, since ,979
soviet personnel had also commanded the Afghan Army at the brigade
level and sometimes down to the company level.
The Soviets had iusti fieri ft,.j d the presence of their troops in
Afghanistan on the ha^si^ ^^^ub s s that they had been invited by Kabul. But
neither the Soviet Union nor the Kabul regime was able to produce any
evidence to prove that auch an invitation was ever issued. Babrak
Karmal took the line that the invitation was issued by the Afghan
communist Party, which actually was seen as an admission that the
invitation was not issued by any government. [ 18] Soviet participation
m the Afghan oivll war could not be Justified under any meaningful
interpretation of international law or Article 51 of the UN Charter,
Which permits the use of force in the event of an armed aggression,'
because not even the Soviet Union Itself had suggested that it had
been the victim of an armed attack.
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The Soviet argument that it sent if. fIts forces because the security
=ou.. Have pose, a tH.eat
.0 t.e Sov.et Un.on.
.rs.an.s.an waa a
-..e. or t.e «onali«ne. Movement an. „a3 not involve.
,n any
reXation3hip3 that «o3oo„
„i,ht have Xoo.e. upon „Uh conce™. The
soviet anion
.i,ht have felt that the tu^oU in Afghanistan
„ight
3Pin ove. into its own Cent.ai Asian
.epu.iics whoae people „e.e also
except for student riots fomented by Babrak Ka™al an. his followers
in 1965, an. a brief perio. of unrest following the bloo.less coup of
Daou. in
,973. The real turmoil starte. after April ^7, ,978 when the
Co„u„i3t3 Violently seize, power an. with the help of growin. numbers
Of soviet
..a.visers", began forcibly imposing upon the people of
Afghanistan a foreign i.eology an. a totalitarian system. So the
soviet Union was seen aa responsible for the turmoil in Afghanistan,
an. for breaking the equilibrium of the region, an. Soviet withdrawal
was therefore lai. .own as a prerequisite for any peace settlement of
the Afghan crisis.
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Soon after the Soviet invasion fv,, the postures of major NATO
governments became quickly set inCKi . While West Germany and France
appeared ambivalent, Britain's conservative government identified
itself closely with US policv Hi^h iy. High-level contacts with Soviet
but not enrorce.. z„ „3, and .uly ,980, CanoeUo. Hel.u. So..i« of
Woat ae™any an. P.aai.ent Valery Gi.eard Kstalng of K.anoe visite.
MOSCOW to find a solution for the Afghan oonfuct. «I0 aUies
.ade
It Clear that their Initiative offered alternatives fro. a European
"center of deoisinn"c o
.
In other words, taerloan allies were acting
independently of the US. while the US canceled grain sales and
industrial contracts worth « billion, the Europeans rushed to do „ore
business with the Soviet Union. m March
,980, the Soviet Union
announced a *„8 .iHion deal with the French for offshore
Oil-drilling rigs to be used in the Caspian Sea. Afghanistan created
a view in Europe that detente is divisible. [ 19]
The earliest EEC initiative for resolving the Afghan crisis
proposed internationally guaranteed neutrality for Afghanistan in
exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The
British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrlngton, undertook a tour of the
conservative Arab states, Pakistan and India within two weeks of the
invasion In an attempt to persuade their governments to develops a
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oo-o„ 3.a„. a.a.n3t
..e Soviet p03U.cn
..,..„.3.a„. Uo,
littl. 03.. out or tM3, t.e
,ov..„e„t p.opo3e. neutnaUty
ror
.r..a„,3tan
.ea«n« to Sov.et wU..a„a..Un Neut.a.U, p.o.aM,
meant that Afghanistan would revert to if. ^ ....-eve Its traditional non-alignment
neoe33,tate,
,y ,.p,,..,,„„,
„..a„-Sov.et
Treaty Of Pne„.3Hip. XM3 i.ea „a3 en.o.3a.
.y the
.BC ro.ei.n
"ini3ter3 i„ late Pe..uary
„80. an. ,i.en ,uaune. 3uppont p, t.e
Carter Administration. By mid-March th^ ir uo a , e Kremlin had made clear its
objection on the eronnri -,•g und that in,po3xtion of neutrality would impair the
sovereignty of the Kabul Government. [22]
This proposal did not enviaage any detailed plan3 on how
Afghanistan's neutral 3tatus would he Implemented and how Soviets
troops would be withdrawn. It sPPm^ t-ho<-i ee s that the proposal was put forward
to promote a climate of awarenp<,<, ir. rareness in favour of the concept of
Afghanistan's neutral and non-aligned status.
Coinciding With the Islamic Summit in Talf m January 198I, the
French President Valery Glscard D'Estaing proposed to have an
international summit on the Afghan issue. This would Include Iran,
Pakistan, the five permanent members of UN Security Council, India,
and "some Islamic countries" to be identified later. Regarding
Afghanistan, President Glscard said there was no need for the current
government in Kabul to participate in the conference since the plan
)t a matter of defining a new status for Afghanistan but one of
was nol
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ending interference. [23]
While Babrak Karmal reiectPd fho ir
' '"^ ^^^"^^ Proposal outright, [24]Pakistan too was not very keen about it For-.i m-o I . re gn Minister Agha Shahi
admitted that the "time and the substance" of thPe proposed conference
- ^ -^Priae.. M.,
..3 a count., vUaU, oo„.e.„e.
in A...a„UU„, p.io. conauUaUona Pa.,3ta„ «ouW Have been ,„
order".
lndla.3 inclusion 1„ the propose, conference
.ay also have been
ir.30.e to Pakistan. alon. Pakistan ha. wante. to
.Ucusa an.
flnany settle the Ar.han p.chle. through an Islamic foru. „hUe
ln.xa saw it in regional ter^s, thus in Pakistani opinion depriving
it Of its religio-ideologloal content an. eventually
.onopolizlng it
Consi.ering its sheer power an. size in the region. Pakistan „ay have
felt that any In.ian involvement woul. help m.ia expan. its influence
at the expense of Pakistan despite the enormous impact the Afghan
Situation ha. on it. Pakistan
.i. „ct like to he
.iplo.atically
re.uce. while physically involve.. However, on February 8, ,981,
Pakistani Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, while atten.ing the
non-allgne. countries conference in New Delhi sal. that the French an.
Pakistani proposals coul. be "dovetaile." if like the latter, the
former is also accepted by Moscow an. Kabul.
The French proposal ha. been conceived largely m terms of
European and western peace an. the protection of detente. Glscard
linked the Afghan problem to the entire framework of east-west
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relations, which he would
"like i-oK to see stabilized". The French
proposal did not show any concern with the facts of a.. •I ggression or
continued occupation. Neither did ifn t make any mention of the refugee
problem. [25]
Oo^unxt. 3e„t B.,u.n.3 Lo.. Ca..,„«.o„. t.ei. =Hai™a„ at t.e ti„a
to „o3co„ ,o p.opo3e a p,a„
^
3ettU„e„t.[26] in the n.st, the nve pe^anent ^eehers of the M
security council
.. Bntain,
..anoe, China, USA. and USSR -
„oul<.
Join With Pakistan, i.an and India to negotiate safeguards against
outside interference in Afghanistan, and would atte.pt to wor. out
guarantees for Afghanistan's independence and noh-align.ent. m the
aecond stage,
..representatives of the Afghan people-, would participate
to consider other issues,
.ainly the composition of the government.
The Soviets rejected the approach in advance even before Lord
Carrington met with Gromy.o. lass declared that it was
..absolutely
Clear., that the plan could not serve as a basis for discussion. [27]
The Soviets denounced these proposals as an attempt to exclude the
Afghan Governinent from any search for a solution and to decide the
country.s destiny behind its haC:
..The interests of Afghanistan
cannot be discussed, let alone decided, without the participation of
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan or without
its knowledge... The Soviets said that they were ready to discuss the
Situation
..around Afghanistan":
..Qnly the international aspects of the
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Afghan problem could be discussed noi- ., t internal Afghan affairs". [28]
Gromyko said, "We do not consider that .hia t s proposal is realistic...
as to internal matters, everybody must
.eep their hands off.-US] The
Soviets not only insisted that the Karn,.in rma 1 regime be accepted as
le.U,.ate.
.ut aUo eo^pla.ne. t.at t.e Plan ,ave „o ,„a.a„tee
.Hat
the Ka^al
.egl.e woul.
.e the
..representative of the Afghan people"
at the seoon. stage or the oonre.enoe. The European proposal was
designed to exclude the Kar„al regime fro. the first stage so as to
keep the thorny issue of who ulti^tely would rule in KaPul out of the
way until progress was .ade on the international aspects.
The Soviets insisted that their forces in Afghanistan not to be
oonsidered as part of the foreign intervention that the West European
Plan sought to end. Thev said th^t fho-iv,in y a their troops could be withdrawn
only on the basis of the proposals put forward by Kabul in May 198O,
Which specified the inclusion of Karmal regime in any internationai
settlement talks
- a ploy to gain formal recognition for the
Soviet-installed Karmal regime.
Lastly, the Soviets also objected to the composition of the group
Of nations that would be involved in the first stage, feeling that the
group was weighted against Moscow.
Soviet rejection of the European plan was not unexpected. The
West did not have much of a leverage with Moscow. It had allowed many
Of the sanctions imposed after the Soviet invasion to wither away.
President Reagan had lifted the grain embargo. The European Community
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-.a,„e. 30„e
.e3t.,oUo„3 on .a.e an. o.e.U3,
.ut .uon or tne 3t.n«
Ha. t.e„ ,one out of t.e We3te™
.eaotlon. So at t.at 3ta«e t.e.e
int..a3t. xne European p.opo3al3, an.
.o.. Ca..i„,to„.3
.Us.on to
M03C0W, 3e.ve. to 3Ko„ onl. that the We3t European sove.„.ent3 „e.e
not unoonoerne. „un the Af.nan 3ituatio„, an. that tnay „e.e not
.noapatle or 3o.e
.ipio.atio initiative. One .i,Ht say that the.
wante. to go on record a3 having 3ho„„ oonoern and „a.e a move.
Organization of Islam^,^ Conferenoe Rrfr,r.^,
Wegotiatlng a Settlement of the Afghan T.,.
A3 mentioned earlier, the Eleventh session of the Islamic
Conference of Foreign Ministers, in its May ,980 session at Islamabad
created a Standing Committee on Afghanistan. The creation of this
committee was seen as a more practical approach to initiating
diplomatic moves to end the stalemate and bring about a political
settlement of the crisis. The committee consisted of the Foreign
Minister of Pakistan, Agha Shahi, the Foreign Minister of Iran, Sadeq
Qotbzadeh, and the Secretary General of QIC, Habib Chatti. Its aim
was to "seek ways and means, including appropriate consultations as
well as the convening of an international conference under the
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auspices Of the united Nations or otherwise foru n , a comprehensive
solution of the grave crisis".
At ita n.3t 3e3..on at Te..a„ on .une
,580, t.e eo^utee
Moscow to discuss the AfffhanHign issue with ii- t*-n It. It reiterated its
=o-U.e„.
.0 ro.. p..„.,,,.3 U..
.own
.ne OXC. na.e.,.
.0..
u„oo„.u.o„a.
„...._X or ro.e.,„
..oop3 r.o.
...nan.s.n,
-apect ror U3 l„.ep«„.en=e,
..oo^nUion of ..e national
.^nt or t.e
Arshana to .ete™i„e tnel. To™ or ,ove.n.ent. an. tne oneatlon or
conditions favorahio Pr.^ble for the return of the refugees to their
homeland. [30]
When the committee met saain -^^ nag at Geneva on June 20 and 21, 1980 a
six
.e.her freedo. rightars delegation was at hand to present Its
case, While no orflolal representative fro» Afghanistan was Invited to
attend the meeting. The =o„lttee "noted" the freedo. fighters- need
for "humane" assistance, and reiterated that Its mandate was to see. a
aolutlon on the haals of the four principles. In the absence of
representatives fro„ Kabul, the co^ittee oould not produce any
positive results. Later In July ,980, the committee's efforts were
further handicapped when the Iranian foreign minister did not show up
at New York where the other two members tried to arrange talks between
Kabul and Islamabad. [ 31 ] Although an emergency meeting of the
committee decided in October ,980 to expand the commlttee-a
membership, and Hablb Chatti co-opted the foreign mlnlaters of Guinea
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and Tunisia to become the members it n.o , ever really succeeded infunctioning as an effective body.
The committee's efforts proved to be fui-ii. ha tile because both Moscow
an.
.3. 3tate.
,,,, ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^
aia.osue between Pakistan an.
.r..a„,3ta„.[3.I Late, a ro^uia „a.
revise, to save Pakistan the e..a..a3a.ent of negotiating
.l.ectly
«it. the Ar.Ha„l3tan government. T.e oo^utee was as.e. to invite an
-voy rro. Ar,nanlstan, not
.ep.esentin. the Oovernment,
..t
representing the People. Ce.oo.atlo Party or
.f.Hanlstan. ^na Shah.
-Id that the proposal to tal. to the Kareal regime as one of the
several political parties In Afghanistan offered an honourable way
out. [33] Hahlh Chatti also disclosed that efforts had been .ade to
reach a solution acceptable to people of ..all trends'. In the country
However, nothing ca„e of this because by that tl„e certain
developments had moved the Afghan issue to the United Nations. i„
fact, the commlttee.s demise was signalled at the Talf Summit (25-29
January, 1981 ), when Its resolution on Afghanistan recommended that
the committee cooperate with the United Nations Secretary General and
his representative in finding a Just solution. [3^] l,an had not
participated In the Taif Conference, and remained irreconcilably
opposed to the government of Kabul and would have nothing to do with
it m any form or manner until the last Soviet soldier had withdrawn
from Afghanistan. Pakistan insisted on trilateral talks, and
Afghanistan on bilateral. With such contradictory demands on the
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-™ an. .o.aU.. or ne.oUaUon.,
....e
„„o.
......
3ueoe3..
.He oo.utee o..e
.„to an. „a<.e tHe errc.
.Hat U
,„ tHe Hope or
.esolnn. tHe
.r«Han ensla tH.ou^n an i3,a.ic
forum.
United Nation.^ Rffprt^
^
Soon after the Soviet invasion Of Afghanistan on Deceb^ber 27,
1979, the issue was raised at the United Nations Security
Council.[35] on January 8. ,980, the Soviet Union, easting its „3tH
veto, blooded a draft resolution caUins for the
..i^ediate and
unconditional withdrawal" of the Soviet troops fro» Afghanistan. The
draft resolution had been „oved by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Niger.
Philippines, Tunisia and Zambia. Thirteen
.embers of the Security
Council voted in favour, and the remaining two. East Germany and the
Soviet union voted against the move. [36] Blocked by the Soviet veto,
the issue was then taken to the UN General Assembly, which on January
15, 1980. adopted a 2i.-nation resolution calling for the withdrawal of
"foreign troops from Afghanistan" with lOH votes in favor. 18 against,
and 18 abstentions. South Yemen, a member of the Organization of
Islamic Conference voted against the resolution, while India was among
those abstaining.
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Denouncing the armed intervpni-n ^« • »^ervention in Afghanistan as
"inconsistent
with the principles of respect for i-kthe sovereignty, territorial
oaue.
.0. ...espeo. ro. t.ese p..„.,p,.3 an. t.e non.aU.ne. ona.a.e.
Of Afghanistan", and urged all to "refrain from • . .i interference in the
.nte.na. ar.a^.s of
..at oount.,-.
.He
.3ae„My a.30 aa.e. ror
"enaUins the people of Afghanistan to
.ete^ine thel. own fo™ of
government and choose their r.v,nown economic, political, and social
systems, free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or
constraints of any
.ind whatsoever", and urged all parties to hring
about speedily the necessary conditions for the Afghan refugees-
return to their homes.
A Similar resolution on the Afghan situation was again adopted on
November 20, ,980, by the General Assembly. The voting was 1 1 , i„
favour, 22 against, and ,2 abstentions.C37] There was a new element
in this second resolution
- a call to the Secretary General to
appoint
..a special representative" to promote a peaceful settlement of
the crisis". It resulted largely from the efforts of Pakistan.
Seeing that the Afghan issue was becoming a stalemate, Pakistan had
persuaded the Islamic group at the UN in the last week of August ,980
to take this initiative. [38] Forty Islamic and Non-aligned countries
sponsored the resolution. It contained eight points, but it is the
Sixth which merits consideration:
TnT^Ttl ''h fP'^^^i^ti^" °f the efforts of the Secretary Generalm the searc for a solution to the problem and hopes that he wiU
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continue to extend ass'
special repreaentatlve, wlth^T'v, i!!''^;?''^'^ """^ appointment of a
solution in aooordanoe with S!" ^ political
resolution and the exploration of seourdnl
"" °^ P''"™'
for non-use of force aL?Lf * appropriate guarantees
sovereignty, territorial int^rffv
P°"tloal independence,
neighbouring states, on the basf^o?'
security of all
non-interferenoe In ;ach o?her'rin?er:al ^fff"""""'"'"regard for the principles of the ZtlTr^fllYlnT. «a1i^s""
This covered the first and foremost demand of the Kabul program for a
political settlement (May », ,580, mutual guarantees of security
and non-interference. The call on the Secretary General to appoint a
special representative showed that Pakistan had started inching
towards bilateral negotiations with the Kabul regime, having seen the
islamic conference Committees inaction and lac. of significant
support from the West.
Both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union rejected the resolution as
constituting interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. It was
Obvious that the Soviet Union still insisted that no third party
Should either mediate or arbitrate the dispute between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, but that they must settle it through bilateral negotiations.
The Soviet intervention, in their view, was Afghanistan's internal
affair and could not be an item on the agenda of negotiations.
The third resolution of the UN General Assembly on Afghanistan
was adopted on November 18, ,981. It was passed by 116 votes in
favour, 23 against, with 12 absentions. The resolution similar to the
previous one, additionally called upon the UN Secretary General to
"continue his efforts" aimed at promoting a political settlement.
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-i3 was a.ae.
.ecau.e on
.e..a..
„. ,,8,. K..t Wal.He...
..e
.Hen
UN Seceta,. o.ne.al Ha. na.e. ,av,a. Pe.ez
.e CueUa. as nu SpecUX
Bep.e.entau,e
. oontae. .He pa.Uea
.onoe.ne. . see. a poUt.oa.
3oXut.on.
.e CueUa. pa.. H.s nrs.
.3.. to P,.,3.an an.
.r.Han.stan
Government
.efuae. to Have tal.a until aften tHe wUH.Pawal or Soviet
-oop3.t39: This „a3 .o.e o. iess an expio.ato.. visit to .in. some
basis fo. a
.ialogue. He iearne. or AfgHanistan-s
.e„an. for
bilateral negotiations witH Pakistan an. Iran. an. mutual guarantees
Of non-interferenoe Hac.e. by international guarantees. He learne.
also Of Pakistan.
3 insistenoe on tHe four principles lai.
.own first
by tne islamic Conference in early ,980, i.e.: a) I^e.iate an. total
Withdrawal of Soviet troops fr« AfgHanlstan, 5) Respect for tHe
non-aligne. an. Islamic nature of AfgHanistan; c) The rigHt of
self-determination for the Afghan people; an.
.) Return of refugees to
Afghanistan in safety and Honour.
Pakistan Had already made another move. Early in January ,98,,
While still avoiding recognition of the Karmal regime, Pakistan
Offered to talk with a representative of the People's Democratic Party
Of Afghanistan. [W] Seeing some conciliatory signals from Moscow,
Agha SHahi announce, "new phase" in which "favourable conditions" Had
been created for talks to be arranged between Afghanistan, Pakistan
and Iran. [HI] He was hopeful that talks could be arranged and implied
that the four principles comprising Pakistan's position could be
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subject to negotiation. On February 7, I981 Shah m hy If 'yoi, Mohammad, Foreign
oo„re.e„oe, o„e.e. to .o.. an
..u„eo„..Uo„a. a.a.o.ue..
.epe.ate.,WU. Pa..3U„ an.
..an
.n t.e
.n.Un oapUa..U,3 However,
.,.a S.aM
.ai„ta.„e. t.at ta..3 „.t. t.e Ka™a.
.e,l„e s.oul.
.e t.Uate.al-
between t.e ofneial an. t.e representatives or Pakistan an. Iran
on one han., an. between M„ an. t.e representatives or P.P. on t.e
Other. [43]
After de Cuellar's visit to ho<-w ^-uboth the capitals, the Afghan
Government, on Mav 1^ iq«iy 13, 1981 issued an offer. it stated that
Afghanistan would agree to a .lalogue wuh no preliminary oon.Ulons,
and would he wining to .eet with offlolal delegates fro. Pakistan and
Iran m the presence Of a UN offlolal. [M] This was apparently a
concession to Pakistan which ha. heen reluctant to engage in .Irect
talks lest these be construed as amounting to a recognition of the
Karmal regime. So they agree, to indirect talks through the UN
representative. At the same time, Kabul accused Pakistan of having
abandone. its policy of seeking a resolution of the Afghan crisis due
to outside pressure. [45]
Simultaneously with this new Afghan initiative came the Soviet
Offer on the withdrawal of its troops. In May I98I, Brezhnev stated:
"An agreement on a political settlement would make it possible to
establish, With the concurrence of the Afghan side, a time schedule
and procedure for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, A
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-
.eUaMe an. guarantee.. Troop, cou.. „UM.a„„ as aoco... t,at
have been reached are implemented" [461 Tn ^v,ii^ea .L bj In other words, first there
-3t .e a poutioal settlement
„nioh „ouM guarantee that „o
intervention against Afghanistan re,l„e „oul. he rested, an. then
When the Kahul regime sets a tl.e schedule for the troops to withdraw,
t^ay „oul. he „lth.ra„„. Ohvlously, MosooWs al. was to „a.e sure
that the Karmal regime staye. m power, because any
..i^edlate ana
total" withdrawal of Its troops would have „eant death (literally, for
the tempers of KannaLs Government
- and that Mosoow would not allow
to happen. It also suggested that both Mosoow and Kabul agreed to m
Playing a mediator role, in contrast to their earlier demand that
negotiations must be direct and bilateral without any third party.
But Bussia was not very optimistic about the UN initiative, saying
that it had little chance of success if Pakistan did not change its
entire attitude to Afghanistan. [i|7]
In August 1981, de Cuellar again visited Islamabad and Kabul.
His efforts were directed towards bringing the two sides to the
negotiating table.[.8] it was a difficult task, because the concerned
parties with their differenop«? haHu ii rences d first to agree on the modalities of
the talks and the framework within which the dialogue was to take
Place. In fact, Iran which also had a locus standi in the crisis
refused even to discuss the matter with the UN representative, which
made the prospects of trilateral negotiations bleak. [49] However,
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both the Foreign Ministers of P«i.-!c^O Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to
indirect talks through the Secretary General of IIM hu UN, when they went in
'''' " — -3e„... 3e3.o„.t303 Oe CueUa.lan „,th the
,.p.e33lo„ that totH Af«Ha„.3ta„ an. PaUstan woul.,
unde. =e«a,n oon.iuons, asree to an a,en.a t.at wou..
.nclu.e
«30u.3.on on t.e
„,t...a„al or ro.el^n troops rro.
...hanlstan, on
oo^it^ents or non-.nte.vention
.ac.e. international guarantees,
and on bringing the refugees back home.
In the last weeK of August, the MA government put out a
statement i„ „nioh It made a number of oonoesslons. It „as timed to
ooinolde With Deput. Foreign Minister of USSR, Nikolai Piryubm-s
Visit to Pakistan. In this statement, Afghanistan government, for the
first time, expressed its readiness to hold a Joint oonferenoe of all
three oountrles if that was what its neighbours wanted. Talks oould
begin With either Iran or Pakistan and the absent oountry oould Join
in later at any time if it wanted. The statement oontinued: "the
Government Of DRA does not objeot to the participation of the UN
Secretary General or his representative in its talks with Governments
of Pakistan and Iran".
The statement said that any agreement had to include assurances
Of mutual respect of sovereignty and specific promises that neither
Iran nor Pakistan would allow its territory to be used for any hostile
activity against Afghanistan. Such promises would be endorsed by the
guarantor states which would adopt a document setting forth
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3tata. Hovave.,
„o «ua.a„te.3 ooul.
..a„„ up wu.out t.e
participation of Babrak Karmal's Oovernment =a iiovernm
— a reminder that Kabul
would not oountenanoe any plan auoh a3 that put forward by Lord
Carri„,ton,
„hioh had left Kabul out of the negotiationa. But the
drafting of international guarantee3 could be di3cu33ed 3eparately
rro. the main talka with Iran and Pakiatan. and unofficial
consultations could hf» Hoihbe held at any appropriate forum (a hint that if
the talks proceeded satisfactorily for Kahm d •"^ij-x I Dul, the Russians would be
willing to sit down in private wii-h t-h« at the Americans and discuss the
issue Without insisting on having the Afghans present)
. [51
]
The statement said that though Pakistan had to stop all armed
interference, Kabul was not proposing to seal the border. Nomads and
tribesmen would be free to move between the two countries in
traditional seasonal migration. Afghans living in Pakistan had to be
allowed to return home, but talks should be held to reach agreement on
the status of those not wishing to do so. [52]
Soon after the new Afghan proposal, the Soviet Union promised
(Pravda, August 30,) that it would withdraw its troops from
Afghanistan if Iran and Pakistan accepted the new settlement proposals
put forward by Kabul. It said that this proposal could lead to a full
political solution of the Afghan crisis if Iran and Pakistan accepted
Kabul's demand that they end "armed interference in Afghan affairs" (a
reference to anti-government guerillas based largely in Pakistan, this
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.a.
.een
.no.u.e. Ka.u..
... set or p.opoaa.s on Ma. U
1980), ...en t.e reasons wMe. eo.peUe. . (....an.stan) .
..ues^
our country for the introduction of a li.i. h .01 m ted Soviet military
contingent would have disappeared"
. [53]
President Zia confirmed that the "new Kabul fo .rmula showed
Mo.a..a. Oo3t, t.e *r.ha„ Ko.ai.n
„.ni3te., oaUe. upon Pa.i.tan an.
Iran to oo.e to the negotiating taMe to nnd a poutioal settlement.
He emp.a3i.ea that Ka.ul waa .ea.y for taXKs „itn the Pa.iatani
Government any ti.e. at any level acceptable to toth sl.es an. at any
Place...[55] Thia new move came at a time Ju3t before the forthcoming
General Asaemhly aeaaion. ao one could have interpreted it aa a
tactical move deaigned to water down any reaolution that might be
Offered there. But we muat alao note that twenty montha had paaaed
and the civil „ar waa atill on. By modifying their earlier propoaal,
their aim may have been to bring an end to the civil war - aomething
they had plainly been unable to achieve militarily.
In September
,981, the Foreign Miniatera of Pakiatan and
Afghanistan met with Waldheim, the UN Secretary General. But they
made no progreaa in the indirect negotiationa through Waldheim as
intermediary, and they did not meet face to face. Each aide held faat
to its public poaition. They were atill quarelling over how to talk
aa well aa over what to talk about. Pakistan had said that it would
not meet with Afghanistan directly until Iran also Joined the
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bargaining table. Afghanistan in its late.^I st (August 24, 1981)
with
ers'
proposal had dropped its P«rn«v, • .PP I ea lier insistence on separate talks
both nations, hut Iran wanted the presence or Afghan f.eedo. fight
-legates and this was unacceptable to the Afghan Oovern^en;.
Regarding the political issue, Afghanistan insisted that it could not
consider departure of Soviet forces untill it received a pledge of
no„-i„tePfere„oe rro. Pa.l.tan,
..o.e. by the
.ajo. powers - a
Prciae that Pa.iatan „ouX. not se.ve aa a oon.uit ro. a^a to
f-e.o„ n«hte.3 3ee.i„, to overthrow the Kareal re,l„e. PaUatan
oonten.e. that a Soviet withdrawal
.ust go hand In hand with any other
agreements. t56] Beoauae of the stalemate on the oentral Issue, de
Cuellar held separate talks with both the foreign ministers on the
question Of refugaea. Pakistan wanted aasuranoes that the refugees
would auffer no reprisals if they returned home. Afghanistan was not
making any promises beyond its stated position of August 24, ,981,
Which said:
Rivoi^itio^Lyioi-Si Tr TC'^sf IT '--^
:fn1ns\re"?un1?eedo" ''T' ---- -:%o:;:iLen? o^\.TlZ
tempo a-ri-iriliinr?:- ^tti^onf tr^rrri^ryPakistan and other neighbouring countries when they return home
I? the°lr™"f °' '"^ guarantees security, freedol orohoioe"Of he do-iOile and equal participation in the solution of "he
prSvided":iih"ai?\^'' '^''^ °' '"^ ^^^y ""1o ed with all the necessary conditions for living, fruitfullabour and social activities for the welfare of the homeland
The nomada, tribea and cattle-breeders will be provided, not only
^hft the trL??™"^? ""^ " i= ^1^° understoodt a aditional aeaaonal migration of the nomada from
The Government of DRA expresses
practical aspects of the problem wtS .f^^"""^^"^ t° discuss the
some Afghans do not want ?o return to
^'^^^^^^hbours
.
However, if
pertaining to their further stav shan I"
homeland, questions
course of negotiations so as L discussed in theto achieve necessary agreement. [57]
The tal.s made no significant progress. Nevertheless, Waldheim
-ported to the General Assembly that the parties desired the "present
diplomatio process" to continue Th= »v,- ^. The third resolution of the UN
General Assembly on Afghanistan was adopted on November
,8, ,98,. The
voting was 1,6 in favour. 23 against, and ,2 abstentions. Similar to
the one of the previous year, the resolution additionally called upon
the UN Secretary General to "continue his efforts" aimed at promoting
a political settlement. This was a reference to the appointment of
the special Representative, de Cuellar, whom Waldheim had appointed on
February
,,, ,98,. However, in December ,981, de Cuellar became the
new secretary General of the UN, and announced that he would soon
dispatch a special Representative to renew contacts on the problem of
Afghanistan. [58]
The year 1982 did not begin well. Soon after the failure of the
September 1981 talks, Kabul had sent a letter to the Secretary General
accusing Pakistan for the turmoil in Afghanistan and for not
responding positively to its recent proposals for a peaceful
settlement. Pakistan replied that the proposals failed to address the
fundamental issues of continued foreign military presence and the
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^e..«e.
,3 „„,,^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^
Pakistan was aUowin, Us te..Uo.y
.o Pe use. as a .ase or operations
by the Ar,.a„ MuJaM.ee„ o. as a oonauU for a™s. u sa.. that
Pa.istan.s ternto.y
.aa Peen frequently violate. Py
.eUcopteP
SunsMps and a^e.
.en.
..tms cannot Put increase tension an.
threaten regional peace, the entire responsiPility for which
.ust Pe
borne by those in power in Afghanistan". [59]
Speaking in a similar vein, the Pakistani delegate told the UN
Co..ission on Hu„an Rights that so„e refugee ca.ps in Pakistan had
been bo.Ped and strafed fro. the air, adding "Pakistan has shown
patience 30 far, but cur patience is not unlimited". He denounced
"hat he called a colonial style takeover in Afghanistan, and called on
the Soviet Union to change course and take its troops out, saying, "It
would not lose face. It would gain the friendship of a friendly
neighbour, which it professes to be seeking". [60]
Even When such was the attitude of both the countries, the UN
Secretary General was not without hope. On February 22, 1982, he
nominated Diego Cordovez as his Special Representative to promote an
Afghan settlement. The immediate task of Cordovez was to work out an
agenda which would deal with two issues critical for an overall
settlement
- complete withdrawal of Soviet occupying troops, and a
guarantee of Afghanistan's sovereignty.[ 61 ] Cordovez visited
Islamabad and Kabul m March I982, and held separate talks with
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Foreign Minister of Pakisfan q u ut , Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, and Foreign
Minister of Afghanistan, Shah Mohanunad Dost in Gen.v. • t"u u u u , m e a in June 1982
for nine days. Iran did not take oari- in ni:ak p rt m the Geneva talks but was
kept informed by Cordovez of the progress Th. r« . e four-point agenda of
t.e Cneva tal.a was: ,)
„^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
Arsha„.3ta„;
„o„-in.e.rere„ce i„ t.e internal a^airs of oonoe.ne.
states; 3) international guarantees for non-interferenoe; and
voluntary return or t.e three
.iiiion Afghan refugees fro„ Pakistan
and Iran.C62] Cordovez found "oonslderable flexibility" at Geneva,
resulting in a ..paoXage of understandings". The rough blue-print of
the Geneva tal.s was to oontinue on the general oodel of the
tripartite peaoe process in which step-by-step Soviet withdrawals
would be orchestrated with reciprocal steps to bring back the refugees
and seal off the Pakistani and Iranian borders with Afghanistan. [63]
But for this to take place, key issues - which side
.akes the first
move. Who „ans the border Inspection forces, how long Soviet
Withdrawals will stretch out, and above all, whether Moscow agreed to
the complete withdrawal of combat forces by a definite date -
remained to be resolved.
Because of the faint glimmerings of a peaceful solution to the
Afghan crisis, the fourth UN General Assembly resolution on the
"situation in Afghanistan" was couched in a mild praseology.
Affirmative vote dropped from 116 as of the previous year (198I) to
114; negative vote also slumped from 23 to 21, while the abstentions
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inohe. up rro. to ,3. Once again, the
.evolution oaX.e. for the
l-e«ate „lth..a„al of Soviet troops rro. Afghaniatan, u^ge. all
parties to create the necessary conditions for the return of Afghan
refugees to their homeland in
-safety an. honour", an. reiterate,
"that the preservation of sovereignty, territorial integrity,
political independence and nonallgned character of Afghanistan is
essential for a peaceful solution of the prohle.". Pakistan showed a
low-keyed stance at the debate. Iran .ade certain reservations,
stressing that the Mujahideen
.ust be associated with the process of
a political settlement, but it voted r^n tk. , ^.> ^11, for the resolution. Soviet
Ambassador called it "Movni/^ ^-n-...xi a I devoid of political realism" and India called it
"biased" and "counter-productive"
. [64]
In January 1983, Diego Cordovez again went to Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and met with President Zia of Pakistan and his foreign
minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, and also met with President Karmal of
Afghanistan and his foreign minister Shah Mohammad Dost. [65] The
negotiations took place from January 21 to February 7, I983. The
mediator won approval from Afghanistan and Pakistan to consult Afghan
refugees about their conditions for a safe return home. [66] At the
same time, Pakistan asked the Soviet Union to close the Pak-Afghan
border, but it also reiterated its long-standing position that it
would never recognise the Karmal regime because it did not "represent"
the people of Afghanistan. [67] Pakistan's foreign minister Sahabzada
Yaqoob Khan also said that Soviet troops withdrawal, when it took
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Place, „ou..
.e p.opU.ous ro. a p.oe.u. 3etU.„.„e t.e
.enent oran in t.e
.e.,o„.[683 «hat w.a 3i™.„,
^^^^
the ri.3t t.„e since t.e Sovleta intervene. ,„
...Hanutan t..ee
--3 .ac, .He Ka^al
..«,„e accepted
,„«.ect ta..3 „u. tne
..,.a„
refugees, an. tne Pakistani government no longer demanded the Hotal
and immediate" withdrawal of the Soviet troops. [69]
in March
,983, the UN Secretary General de CueUar went to Moscow
to tal. wllth Andropov and GromyKo ahout Afghanistan. He said that he
felt encouraged because the Soviet Onion had expressed "real interest-
In helping his efforts to resolve the Afghan question. He also
Clarified that the Soviets had never put on the negotiating tahle the
recognition of the Karmal regime as a pre-condition for the withdrawal
Of their troops.[70] (Soviet ambassador to Pakistan Vilaly s.
Smirnov, however, had said earlier that the key to the Afghan problem
did not lie With MOSCOW, Kabul or Islambad, "Instead it lies in direct
talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan")
. [71
]
The UN initiative could be profitably pursued in the hope that
the soviet Union would eventually accept a change of regime in Kabul.
In his eventual talks with the refugees- leaders, Cordovez was
expected to tell them that they could return home under a full
amnesty. However, they might say that they would not go home until
the Soviets had moved out. [72] This might open the way for contacts
between PDPA/Moscow and leading Afghan political figures among the
freedom fighters, who could facilitate a UN-supervised and
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Sovlet-Wea3.d transition to a new negl^e. Unae. tMa m plan,
.oo„
would then ,e foun. In the Ka^al government for the f.eedo. fighters.
The UN Plan ,oes not provide for free elections, although It does not
rule the. out. Afghanistan would he required to sign a tl.e-ta.le for
the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops. Pakistan would be required
to give assurances that It would not Interfere in Afghanistan's
internal affairs, an assurance Pakistan has said it is ready to
".ake.[T3] Iran, where about one million refugees or iMnlgrant Afghan
workers live, Is a complioatlng factor. Iranian officials have
denounced the m as usurping the rights of the Afghan people. Teheran
is said to seek a Muslim fundamentalist, anti-Soviet regime In Kabul.
As for the Russians, they might be willing to withdraw their forces,
entirely or partially, from Afghanistan. [74] They might be content
with having Afghanistan, after the guns are silent, not as a strict
puppet but as a client state within the Russian sphere of Influence,
as It had been for decades. After World War II, the Soviets did
Withdraw from Iran and out of their zone In Austria and their bases on
the coast of Finland. But this was done after the adversary powers
gave them a chance to save face. In the current crisis, the
face-saving device that Russia looks for is the recognition of the
Karmal regime and the sealing of Afghanistan's frontiers with Pakistan
and Iran through multinational guarantees
. [75] Pakistan should not
have any objection to a communist regime in Kabul friendly to the
Soviet Union. After all, Tarakl and Amin, who were confirmed
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...
^„ ^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^
P-ene, P,.,3ta„.3 a„.,ee. ,s
.a.n.. ove. t.e BussUn t.oops sUUn.
on It. borders and to a lesser extent over the refugees.
Looking at the future, it should te reoognUed that a genuinely
non-allg„ed Afghanistan Is not a realistic ohjeotlve.
,s a t.-produot
or P0S31.1, even a condition of a Soviet withdrawal, the Afghans
.Ight
wen he asued to swallow a Finland-style solution, [76] combining full
internal autonomy with security guarantees to Moscow patterned after
the
,9.8 Sovlet-Plnnish treaty. Moscow withdrew Its forces fro.
rmiand only after Helsinki agreed to a treaty proviso pe™ittlng the
soviet troops to return "In the event of Finland, or the Soviet Union
through the territory of Finland, becoming the object of military
aggression". Strlotlv inaair^,^^c ic y speaking, the experience of Finland Is not
comparable to the tragedy Of Afghanistan, because the Finns had a
degree of political and military unity that the Afghans lack. But the
parallel does suggest the type of security relationship with
Afghanistan that the Russians are likely to expect as part of a
settlement.
Table 7
UN General Assemblv VotP On
The Afghan Rf^.solution
Date Affirmative Negative Abstention
Jan 1980 104 18 18
Nov 1980 111 22 12
Nov 1981 116 23 12
Nov 1982 114 21 13
Nov 1983 116 20 17
Nov 1984 119 20 14
CHAPTER VII
AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN
The Refugees
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan has caused one of the largest
refugee crises of our ti.es. « present there are ,0.3 Milion
refugees all over the world. Of these, three
.iUlon alone are the
Afghans Who have ta.en refuge fro„ conflict at ho.e in Pakistan,
oonstituting the largest single concentration in the world. Another
one million are in Iran.[1]
Technically, for Pakistan this problem is almost ten years old.
A few hundred political dissidents crossed into Pakistan when in 1973,
Sardar Daoud Khan overthrew the monarchy and assumed power. But this
was insignificant as compared to what would happen a few years hence.
A refugee influx of staggering dimensions started when Taraki staged
the bloody coup of April ,978. I„ just a year and a half, the number
of Afghan refugees in Pakistan rose to 192.907.[2] After Amin's coup
m September
,979, new waves of Afghan refugees swept across the
mountains to seek shelter in Pakistan, and their number doubled during
Amin's three-month rule. The avalanche started when Soviet forces
entered Afghanistan in December 1979. One year later, at the
beginning of 198, and after a year of Soviet presence, that number
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grew to I.U million.m Th=,° -[3] Thair number continued to a„eii ,thousand entePin, Pakistan every
„ee.. Wi,,
'
""^^^
".illlon head3 of cattle H- k, Which had their own r^uirements.
In 1951, the Office of the United Nation. Hi.h .
R<.c„„ ,
'an g Commissioner for
vention
—
of 1.1. and the .S. » .otocol on Refugees,define a refugee as "every person whn •y , o, owing to well-founded fear ofbeing persecuted for reasons of race r.T •, religion, nationality,
--ahip Of a particular social
.roup or political opinion, is
o^tside the country of his nationality and is unahle or. owing to such
^ear. is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country...
.he essential requirement in this definition was that the
individual seeding refugee status he ahle to show that he personally
ha. a well-founded fear of heing persecuted.
..Persecution., as used
-Plies an intentional injurious action or threat directed against a
particular person or group of perscns.t.J The Afghans fled the
communist ta.e-over, seeing it as a threat to their way of life, and
the ensuing civil „ar provides enough evidence of persecution.
Therefore they qualify for refugee status as defined above.
However, upon arrival in Pakistan, in order to be designated as
refugees, which ma.es them eligible for assistance, they have to go
through a formal process of registration. When they enter Pakistan,
each refugee family is assigned to a camp, preferably one in which
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n-. a.e.
.3 ..e.3
... .3
.,,...3
..,,.„,3.„.
- 0.
^^^^
^^^^^
--n. ane.
.e
.3 .,ven t,e ra^Uy pa33.oo. r.o. State3 an.
Frontier Regions Division of the Pakist;.n rn ista Government (SAFRON). This
passbook records the det;,ii«ails Of assistance received by the
refugees. [5]
Ever 3i„oe th. Afghan crisis e.a..e., the Kabul authorities,
alOh. with the Soviets have aoouse. Pakistan or helping the f.ee.o.
fx^hters in carrying out their resistance providing refuge to the.
on Its soil. Pakistan has refuted these charges, saying that it has
only provided shelter to the fleeing Afghan refugees for humanitarian
reasons. The Afghan refugees who come to Pakistan are not only the
fr-eedo. fighters. They co„e from all wal.s of life. They are
teachers, religious scholars, doctors, engineers, students, ex-a™y
men, fanners, laborers, etc. The bulk nf hh=„in D o them are women, children,
and the aged. Out of the total, 48» are children, 28% aduU women,
and 24% adult males. (For tribal breakdown see Tables-, 13-18)
. They do
not belong only to the border districts or one particular region.
They come from eastern Afghanistan, central Afghanistan, and areas
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bordering the Soviet Central Asia a
,
'he. are Pushto-apeaklng and
Darl-speaklng, and other mmtl-Unauallingual minorities, such as the
Noorlstanls, Turkomans, Uzbeks t=,<„, Tajiks, and others. [6] They arelodged in three hundred and thirty («o) »»r330 Refugee Tentage villages
(HTVs, spread over twenty-three (.3, dlstrleta and agenoles In the two
Baluchistan. However, the bulk of them eighty percent .. are
aettled In the nwpp. p,.,,„,3,,
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^
the interior of Pakistan because they would not move on account of
their affinity of language and culture with the Pakistanis living m
the border districts of these provinces, but now due to over
population, the Pakistan Government has reached an agreement with the
UNHCR to provide relief facilities in Mlanwali district of the Punjab
province. [7]
UNHCR Policy of Finding PPPn..n.n. solutions
The UNHCR was established to protect refugees, ensure their human
rights and to provide emergency relief. But the central thrust of
UNHCR
-s efforts is to promote lasting solutions to the refugees'
problems. Till recently, there were three ways of doing so: 1)
encouraging the refugeea's voluntary return home when conditions
permitted; 2) working towards their Integration in the society of
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neighboring countries where the way of lif.O e resembled theirs; 3)seeking opportunities for the refugees' permanent resettlement in a
more distant country. Currently, a fourth^y, approach is developing
which links assistance programs ho,to development planning in countries
of first asylum. Because of lar^^ o^.-i ^•O ge-scale displacement that has occured
and continues to occur in ho„^ideveloping countries, this approach I3 seen
aa
.enenolal not only to the refugeea hut to the receiving countr, as
wen. It concentrates on schemes of assistance to non-lndustrlallzed
locations where large nu„hers of refugees have heen receive.. it
means
:
Tr .^S^^JZ:^^,^ - ^~t to a
-°-Triu---.-ir£f 1asylum, and development programs as a pJe] ,^d» °f "'•atIn asylum countries or Z, I 1 ^ P'^f ""^ ^° f^™ resettlement
solutions allowing r:pa?rlaUon?[8]"'''"''"^ '°
All these four approaches (repatriation, integration, resettlement,
and development) while offering opportunities also present special
problems.
There is wide concensus that voluntary repatriation is the best
solution. In I98O, at the 31st session of the Executive Committee of
the High commissioner's Program, it was recognized that "voluntary
repatriation constitutes generally
... the most appropriate solution for
refugee problems". It was also decided that UNHCR would take up
additional activities to promote voluntary repatriation. Previously
its activities stopped at the border of the country of origin; the
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When taz,i„, „f
<=-i-usees, the essential
aspect IS its voluntary nature. The UNHCR in • .in sists that the refugees
given the opportunity to express or
, .
^ ^' '^^^^ free Will, their
TT ^^-^^^ ~e. is expeete.to nn. out un.er what conditions the
..,han refugees woul.
.e willing
to go back home. Reearriintr i-v,-ga d ng this, he has already „et with the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees m Geneva ,„rtu , and received approval from
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Creating conditions conducive to voluntary
repatriation involves extensive consultations and painstaking
198,. The country of origin must he ready to accept the returning
refugees; arrangements may he necessary to meet the social and
economic consequences of the sudden and simultaneous repatriation of
large numhers of nationals, the country of asylum must also he a
"illlng partner to assist in working out the modalities of a
repatriation program, finally the refugees themselves must he
convinced that conditions in their home country are favorahle to their
return.
Repatriation is not only difficult, for many refugees, it is also
the least likely solution. People who, in opposition to their
government have felt compelled to flee, would be very reluctant to
return to conditions they consider oppressive. "As long as rulers who
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-eate. 3upp.e33.0n
.eta.n po„e., 3eno.3 o.3.a.U3
r-epatriatlon as '°the p.„,ip,,
crisis". [101 >. ^ '
lor refugee
^""""^ «very Afghan refugee has th.
leaving his ho.elan..
,,we are f
'
''''
>-Pl- weUve un.er
.he Husslans, u.e slaves.
„e „ui figh.
— - Of .he refugees . n.
- .he Pakistani press
.hln.s o.her.se-
g« ZZ% rol^llll -It in 1.3 own right aparttoday. Although an Integral paS .f ly. AfShanlstan I3presence of Afghan refugees ifthr , ^ situation, thepractical purposes has heoome the orohf^'i"" f""- allremain so as far as one can see rt Pakistan and willthe Afghan refugees „iu eve^ h» """'""^ "^--y -any oftheir homeland for vJrloJs reljons ^^f °/ "''^ '° '•^t"™ totreat Pakistan as good as a home?',' sf"'"'""^ "'^''^ tendency to
The UK High commissioner for Hefugees. Poul Hartling, when askedt- question as to how he saw the future for the Afghan refugees,
-ferred to the same kind of posslhilities, alhelt, less openly:
hat
.""pLis^;:"::
^o^cojrwj^rthe'^"*^ - -be helped to aurvive;!. ?he 3iLtio„"°f'"^p"^?'-
emergency. Today people Irl neith»n h
'^^''"tah is no longer an
13 not enough. It Is no ? r
starving. But that
settlement. I see two Do>.^ih,i7f 1° ^^"^ ^" a <=amp or refugee
the refugees wJu go back ^ne that
Circumstances Parmlt.' If'^fwhen tharwilVh''"
''''
One can only hone Th» .! T "^^^ happen, I cannot say.
become sel?.suf??oient ari:^,^''^'"""^ ^'^^ '•^^"Sees lo
that they have to be«in to I t
'""^ f^afs to say
are doing' sr:ireadyf\"nd more Zl VnT'lr'' *future. But these »r» til , ^^ad in thea e the only possibilities I see and it is
the refugeea ineUgi.i, for reaett,
they entertain t.
--'"--t m a tWr. country
.eoause
y he notion that thev win
ho.elan.. XMa
'°
" -an rostenng falae expectations an. proXon^m.unnecessarily the stay of refuse.,
P^longing
,
* " "hloh could „eandelaying the Identlfloatlor, „
CoMnxss.oner.s reckoning for self-sufficiency.
-en though repatriation Is the hest solution for those „ho can
- -
ho.e an. ayol. the painful transitions that other refugees
-e.
.a.lng use of fa.li, or co^unlty resources upon their return
-
U IS hard to l.agl„e that the Afghans, after haying experience;
-tter struggles,
„oul. elect to go hac.
„hlle a Sovlet-haCe.
communist regime continues to rul^ fh.-e t eir country, (of this more willbe said later).
coding to the other two traditional approaches towards solving
-fugee prohle.s
- integration and resettlement the Covernment of
Pakistan, despite Its generous attitude towards the refugees, has
.ade
olear that It regards the. as temporary guests, whose stay
.ay he
prolonged, hut for who. the principal durahle solution will he
voluntary repatriation. u therefore discourages any
.easures which
tend to create the Impression that the refugees are helng Integrated
in Pakistan. As
-Sards permanent resettlement In a third country,
the Govern.ent of lur.ey has opened the poaslhiuty for ao.e Afghan
refugees of Turkish ethnicity. So.e
.,000 Turkish soea.-i"fK - p king minorities
and were resettle. i„ Turkey during August
,982. [ ,5J
Housing, food and care for ahout 3 .iUlon Afghan refugees is
largest single refugee assistance program m the world at this time
Pakistan claims that it meets ahout forty-five percent («5J) of the
total expenditure, largely from its own resources. A small portion Is
-t by contrlhutlons from friendly governments, and the rest Is
provided for by international agencies.
For nearly two years, from April ,978 till January
,980. Pakistan
bore the main brunt of refugee care. Approaches had been made in ,979
to various international agencies and friendly countries to help with
the care of an un-ending inflow of refugees. But It was not until
after exploratory missions had been conducted by the (JNHCR, that the
aid program was actually formulated. Prior to that, almost everything
was supplied by the Government of Pakistan, assisted by a few private
organizations.
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The UN High Commissioner for Refu...
Pakl,.. to
the Situation an. to hoi.
.ise.ssions wit. the Oovernment as to what
measures should be taken to alleviate .the plight of the Afghan
--.ees. AS a result of these missions, the High Commissioner made
availahe ,.o,000 from the Hmergene.
..n. to meet the most urgent
needs. a subsequently drawn up assistano^ce program for 185,000
refugees (the number ai- i-ho ^o t the time) covering October 1, 1979 to
September 30, 1980, was estimated at $10 3 million .^.luo , which the UNHCR
Executive Committee retroactively approved in October ,979.[,6]
Aa the influx of refugees increaaed prcgreaaively after the
soviet invaaion, the UNHCR aaalatance to Pakistan increaaed. It
amounted tc *83 .illion for 1982, and the prcjectiona for ,983 were in
the neighborhood of m million. [,7] In addition to UNHCR, the World
Food Program play, a .ajor role in aasiating Afghan refugees. The
total value of ita aaalatance had reached ao„e $,92 .iUlon aa of
October
,982. The .ain food aid donara to this organization were
Auatralia, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, UK, USA, and
the EEC, contributing near 400,000
.uetrlo tons of various food items
(mainly wheat, dry skimmed milk, edible oil, sugar, and tea)
representing two-thirds of total food contributions to the
program. [ 18]
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Besides UNHCR and WFP ofh^K,, t er organlzationa such as World Health
Organization, the UN ChlWren's Fund the t.f a, International Labour
Organization, and the World Bank, as well a,
. s some 13 voluntary
asenoles are extending assistance to these r3.ugees. xheir aotivities
oonoentrate on providing
.edioal and educational assistance, as well
aa donating relief ite^s such as tents and guilts to the refugees,
voluntary agencies contrihutiona to U«HCH valued at over
„iii,,„.
Till 1982, the UNHCH had received specific contibuf.,„„t^cv-j.ij.G ibutions m cash and
^ind. valued at „9a
.iUion fro. a total of 26 governments. [ ,9]
The total expenditure on the upkeep of 3 million refugees during
the financial year ,982-83 is expected to reach 555 million dollars
Which means almost
,.5 million a day. Of this Pakistan. s expenditur;
amounts to
*256 million. This is primarily used to provide refugees
With a subsistence allowance, and pays for transportation costs.
When the refugees started to pour in, the Pakistan Government
developed a system to cater to their needs. The refugees became
entitled to relief assistance after registration and if they lived m
tentage villages. Till January
,980, assistance consisted of a cash
payment of Rupees ,20 (approximately $,0) per head per month. Tents
and other forms of shelter were provided in addition to this ration
money. With the start of assistance from UNHCR and WFP, and other
agencies in January
,980, the cash subsidy was reduced in Inverse
proportion to the supply of food provisions. Each refugee received a
cash allowance of Rupees 50 per month. The commodity aid was
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disbursed as under:
-
Each refugee family was furnished with one tent*vxun , or provided
construction material for a mud hut.
-
Each refugee was supplied a blanket or a quilt.
-
Foodstuff consisting of wheat, edlhle oil. dry skimmed milk
--r. tea. and other items of haslc ration i„cludl„;
aupplementar. diet was provided according to the scale fi.ed b,
the World Food Program (theu (the scale on daily basis per head is-
wheat 500 grams, edible oil 30 grams n^M, DS 30 grams, sugar 20
grams, tea 3 grams).
-
Clothing consisted of 8 metres to male.
,3 metres to female
and
,
metres to a child per year. Used clothing was also
provided.
At the time of registration, each family was provided with
cooking utensils, hard crockery, and stoves. From January ,982.
.cerosene oil Is supplied free for cooking and heating purposes at the
scale Of
,8 litres per family per month. In colder Baluchistan,
during the three hard winter months, additional 9 litres a month Is
provided to each family.
other essential services on community basis - such as health
care, water supply, education, and vocational centres - are also made
available. By ,982, there were one hundred and thirty-eight
infirmaries and seventy-one mobile medical units. Due to acute
scarcity Of water outlets in the Refugee Tentage Village (RTV) areas.
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especially in Baluchistan, special n •
'
^P^ projects, such as tube-wells nno
surface well, mono pumps etc ...
^
Huuit'a, , were undertaif^n f« ^
.
^aertake to ensure the supply ofadequate drinking waterS to the refugees. By 1982 fiffv
c„u^ ^ ^ ' fifty-seven suchschemes were completed, twenty el^hi- •
BamoH- .
--ty-exg t m NWFP, and twenty-nine mluchistan, and work on thirty more was underway
. E20]
in the early period of the program, education consisted of the
~ Of two tents, and educational equipment such as hlackhoards
Of the primary schools had turned into permanent mud structures.
nny ,„
^„ 3^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
were enroUea (50,000 in
,,,,, ^„ BaluoM=ta„.[2,]
Vocational centres for caroPi-pet weaving, embroidery and other
tra..tlo„a.
„e.e opene.. By ,98a, t.e.e „e.e twe„.y.t..ee
=arpet-„eavi„g
.entrea, two vocational training oent.ea an. rive
-^.unit, centre.. por t.e t.ree
.iiiion cattle that ca.e wit. t.e
refugees, twenty-three mobile veterinary units (15 in WPP and 8 in
Baluchistan) were provided. Besides, five reafforestation sche.es,
two in NWFP and three in Baluchistan were being implemented. [22]
What does an this
.eanT The refugees first lived in tents; the
tents accumulated and became camps; the camps accumulated and became
refuge tentage villages, each with its own infra-structure of water
storage tante. schools, vocational centers, health clinics, and even
housing dormitories for the staff:
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"The camp of Kacha Gar"
Pakistani life. There are'no lon^'r^"'
"^^^P^^^ely integrated into
only gardens, wells, InT lonlZ '° ^^^^ but
separated by narrow streets wJth ^r'T'"' "^^^tradesmen and artisans". [23] ^^^^^^ bustle of
"During the course of IQ81 t•^^^,,
-king this (Baralcai) refugee ^reT ^Jtti''"^' ^'^'^^managed to erect their own structu;.. ^'''^^ refugees(of Katcha) marking ofri-h! separated by little walls
Within the boundarj Of Us o^n'o?:: ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^ro^p!life Of its own! Now it is ^ '^''^ '"^"^ ^°bazaars, mosques, plots for growing food''Lf'and services have been or-.Jl^ ' community facilities
Character". [24] ' ^'""""^ ^^^^^ ^ 1^^^ temporary
vmages"il\' we7ei::ct!y\tr"'^ H^^^^ ^^^^^^ "^^^^^^ ^-^^^now Slowly giving wav to ^he mass of tents is
"katcha" houses! L Z o^h.r '"^^ structures called
world, most of the ear?f "^^^T^ settlements around the
environment..." [25T ^^^^
^^^d begun to adapt to their
From the above observations, it appears that the Afghan refugee
settlements are moulding into more permanent establishments. Does
this mean integration into the mainstream life of Pakistan? m
September 198I, at the invitation of President Zia, the UN High
commissioner for Refugees visited Pakistan. [26] On a 300-kilometre
flight in a helicopter across the NWFP, he lost count of these refugee
Villages. "What can these refugees do?" he asked the Executive
Committee two weeks later. "A few find wage-earning activities, some
are trained in carpet-weaving or cottage industries, some practice
crafts and small trades, some draw meagre resources from the land.
But for the great majority, the only answer for the time being is to
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rely °n oare and maintenance... UNHCB
— „i...,.,,,
^^^^^
H«anua.un i3
.erore ne .
--ation..
.
UT] «ow, as menUone.
-
-
-3 no. 3..a.o„ a3 an
_.e„o. an.
.ee3
—
-.ene.
. .e onl. 3o..„„.
^^^^^^^^^^^
this problem. Mow let- ,„ .
, ,
" '° "^-e refugees are doingtowards becoming self-sufficient and bow it is affect pc IS ing Pakistan.
WMle awaiting for political and military conditions to permit
tHeir return to
.fgbanistan. tbe
.fgban refugees in Pakistan bave
-i=Played remarkable adaptability to tbeir temporary borne. Tbey
venerate income from private and public activities. Tbey engage in
various activities
- agriculture,
.itcben gardening and otber minor
racing activities, small industries and wor.sbops, livestock rearing
With dairy and leather products, trade and casual labour.
The outlined policy of the Government of Pakistan regarding sucb
activities that enable the Afghan refugees to become self-sufficient
is:
"Self-reliance schemes are nroipof^ •p jects designed to enable refugees to
venerate private income, so that in case of stoppage of relief
assistance tbey can rely on such income". The same guidelines,
however, specify that: "Tbe movement of refugees outside their camps
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Should be controlled without m anv
impression of beinc h«^irt =c •" g neld as prisoners. Afehan noF,rgn refugees are also freeto seek employment on a temporary basi. h
^^^^^^^^ they are located so
not
^^^^^
^^^^
opportunities which exi^i- sr, •"iixv-ii ist m their area" n„ ^i^e
.
On employment in the public
-ceo.
.He Pa..3U„ Oove...„.
,.3 poUo, .
...p.o, «e ....^
nu«... or on p.oj.ta a„eou„.
.e^u^eea
..e.3e.e3» o„
appropriate renumerations. [28]
Opportunities do exi«?t- in ^ «ist in a country of a=yl« u^e Pakistan which
has adopted a liberal annand generous policy towards these refugees
They come to small towns like Mardan or large ones 1-,. .like Peshawar.
THey xoo. ror posaihUUies or settUng ,o„n. „hUe they awaU to
return ho.e. m Haghicha ca.p near Mar.an. and elsewhere, they have
opened shops to sen food, groceries,
.ake clothes, repair things
fro„ watches to shoes. Those who have brought vehicles with the. like
service between the ca.p and Mardan. t29J It is reported that m .any
families at least one
.ale
.e.her works in the local econcy, in
construction or in shops. Those who brought livestock with the. fro.
Afghanistan make so.e money through the animals they own. [30]
In major bazaars and along important routes to and fro.
Afghanistan, refugees set up their shops wherever they can. Shops are
bought or hired within big markets, built under tents or canvas along
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Wherever high concentrations of refugees occur.
The Pu^htoona a„ong these refugees, who for. „ost of the
caseioa., are predominant!, peasants, tradesmen, or s.ilie. workers.
The. have brought their tools with the. and tr, to find e.pio^ent i„
the
.arrets, or have opened their own private workshops in various
»ar.et3 of »„pp. peasants usuaUy do casual iahour for private
local contractors. Some of the. have rented land fro. the local
owners or are share-cropping. But so.e of the. have si.ply occupied
lands (to this we will co.e later) and engage in .itchen farming,
-inly helped hy their „o.en. Wo.en are also engaged i„ 3.all-scale
poultry raising.
The estimated three million cattle -
.ainly sheep, goats, cows,
and buffaloes
- these refugees have brought, provide supplementary
income in the form of dairy products, meat, leather and wool, but they
have depleted the grazing grounds of Pakistan.
Certain groups, generally non-Pukhtoons and frequently
Turkomans, produce traditional Afghan handicrafts in wool (carpets,
mats, karakul), cotton (embroideries), and dwarf-palm leaves
(saddlebags etc). They usually have their own production and
marketing lines and need almost no external financial or technical
help. Having such specialized skills, they engage in their own
professional activities. Some carpet-weaving centres, operated by the
Small Industries Development Board through the UNHCR currently train
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Afghan refuge, boys wisMng to at.rt thl3 tr.ae.
Afghan tradesmen and
.oney-ienders
.ave for .
i-r.=„ n . generations,
Pe.fee.
.„o.ed.e of. and
.ood
_en.a,
.e.a.o„3 «...
goods and manpower markets. They have brought with tK»" n hem an estimatedMOO oommerolalvehlo^es
contemporary admission). Xhe total numher
Of
.eglstered vehloles m
.3 ahout
,00.000, even 1. .
or that numher,
,5,000, are oommerolal, the 4,000
.fghan
vehicles present ,ulte a threat to the local transportation Industry.
As mentioned before PaHai-^^r , Pakistan, in addition to providing cash
subsidies, IS transporting rood and relief requirements to these
refugees. It Is a large logistics operation. The relief Items
xnland transportation costs are borne by the Government of Pakistan.
Transportatoln Is mainly by single track rail, on railways built In
the latter part of the 19th century.
If one takes only the transport of wheat to the Afghan refugees,
the scale of the operation becomes apparent. Every refugee is
supposed to get
,5 kilos of wheat per month. The 3 million refugee
population requires 60,000 metric tons of wheat which must be
transported by rail each month from Karachi to Baluchistan and NWFP.
Furthermore, 450 heavy-duty trucks are required to transport the wheat
from Peshawar and Quetta railroad stations to the refugee areas and
settlements. [31] This is aging at a quicker pace the already aging
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railway system of Pakistan. Pakisf.n
. ^
government launched an appeal tothe international communitv for ^assistance in inland transportation,
Which has been partly met by donation .y of trucks by some
countries. [32]
The refugee influx has strain^H fv,
^°°logy Of Pakistan.
raKistan is one of <«O the forest poor countries of the world, of itstoUi land area, only a.out
..8 percent is forested,
.nd „„pp .3 the
30le supplier of production ti..er to the whole of Pakistan, when the
U^HCH started reporting on their assistance program, the. re.ularl.
co-ented on the amount of visihle physical da.a.e to the scruh land
forests and rangelands in the vicinity of refugee villages.
It was apparent that refuffep<5tug es were uprooting whole clumps of
scrub, cutting branches of trees off.n f, te to a height that left
insufficient foliage for the survival of the plants, and generally
damaging the vegetation. The refugees, needed fuel wood for ooo.ing
and heating their tents, ti„her for construction of „ud-„alled huts
etc. So.e enterprising refugees built up large stocks of firewood and
began selling it in competition With locals. The damage of forests
-on became the greatest potential for. of discord between the
refugees and local Pakistanis who were relying on harvesting the scrub
forests for a meagre living.
In 1981, the Pakistan Government presented a proposal to UNHCR
for funding a project to rehabilitate vegetation damaged by Afghan
refugees and their livestock. The NWFP was allocated funds for two
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separate projects: one for the 12 settled . •
th. r H
districts, and the other fore federally administered 7 asenci.. •
,
'
"'"'^
area. Under thefirst project, funds were allowed fn.or the establishment of 20 acre
nurseries, 7,500 acres of block afforestation h''°^^^ and raising of plants
along 150 linear miles of .O road and canal-Side afforestation. The
second project called for the e.,tahi • ucn establishment of 12 acre^ or ^^ s of nurseries,
and 3,260 acres of block .
'
'''''
38,680,000 (about $3.2 niin„„i ,«. m lUon) for an ongoing period of four years
THe Implementation bod. was tbe Cblef Conservator of Porest.. Punda
for tne second project were delayed tlU mid ,982 so t.at It la stUl
-
its embryo stage. Both projects were to blre unskilled Afghan
refugees. [33]
What does an this mean to the people of Pakistan, most of „nom
live at a subsistence ipv^ai? dv,^le el Press reports from Kabul suggest that
the people of Pakistan are resentful of the refugees:
£o^i:e^„d=^-;-:„l--^^^^^ -rate
: rea L^gTn^the^^rS:^^:'
"^h^^^-
::;ere"^:L';as:s1r%^
residingTcsH] ^ """^^ "' 30-called Afghan mojahldln are
.-rs-d%Th^v?:u-?LeTctuaL"™^^^^
Pakistani LrZft 5 retrogressive elements on
raws ?35]
P'-°te=t the farmers against their
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Islamabad's ooiinv
of) numerous clashes between f I ^ boomerang (because
-oenarles tralne.
.n t^^L^tiHiJl^tU's^^?"™ -
a.roart^^;eX'rXl:^~ a. J
Bxg landlords and feudals^ho have fL^r""* °'' 'lolenoe.hesitate to take hold of thl blst .fT "S'^^-l^^n do notWhich are most valuable in Pakistan'^ Pastures and water sources,presence of basmachi bands if n f ^"^'^ areas. The
Pakistani border areas. ?2e counted'""™,'"' '° economy o?deeply Involved m contraband ? ; ^^^'^^''^ are
caravans on traditional routes M.'nf^ l"'^«'-==Pt »erchantApart from that the Inflow orif^ir^fK'"^ t""^" °' "^^l'" 80ods.force, has sharply aggravated .^^f f "^"^ "^""^ deception or
caused a shortage ^S food and fii"?"""' ^'"^^ andgrowing demands m that co^try that i^ shf^.'' goods ... there areuninvitated
"guests"
. [36] ««'^ of the
exaggerated. But they are not entirely without substance. The
refugees have caused economic, social and political problems for
Pakistan. They have taken over lands. Jobs, and trades from local
Pakistanis. Some might argue that since one and a half miUloh
Pakistani skilled and semi-skilled workers have left for the Middle
East, these Afghans can fill the gap. But this is not ,ulte true, for
Pakistan's own excess Population can fill the gap if any. There is
now one Afghan to every six persons in NWFP. if this addition to the
Pukhtoon population of Pakistan became permanent, it would have some
impact on the country's domestic politics. There are Afghans in
Pakistan who have not registered as refugees and who do not reside In
the camps. They move about freely in the country. Many of them are
armed, and they could resist the policies and measures of the
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government of Paki^i-sn i-v,^*.ista that were not to their i-ii,-likmg. Conceivably
government. ^
The Government of Paki<?t-an -jo
It has taken upon itsf^ir t<- • •x elf. It
.nsxsts that it Will continue to provide
refuge to these Afghans for humanitarian
...reasons. President Zia of
Pakistan said* »»Uq u
^- we are hosts to 2.7 .uUon refugees ourrently fro. a
neighbouring eountr..
„e are
.oo..ng after the„ ungru.g.ng., purei.
the sa.e of humanitarian grounds an. „e continue to .0 so
even if the population increases R„f •. But it is a very large burden". [37]
Despite the inevitable emphasis on relief as,l,f=,u sistance, various new
initiatives have been taken i-„ „to promote self-reliance among the
refugees.[38: The Government of Pakistan Is cooperating with the
WHCR in this regara. The UNHC« provided partial funding for a World
Bank study mission to Pakistan in April ,982 that Identified a project
Which would provide large-scale employment opportunities for refugees
and the local population through public works programs, involving a
large unskilled labour force in the fields of Irrigation,
reafforestation, rangeland Improvement and road construction and
improvement. The World Bank has agreed to provide further assistance
in the preparation, appraisal, and supervision of this project. First
contacts have already been made with governments that might be
interested in contributing towards financing the project. [39] This
UNHCR/World Bank project was scheduled to commence during the second
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^alf or 1983, and woul. cost around
,^o
.niion
The UNHCR and the m^^u ,Netherlands Government financed anInternational Labour OrRanl^^f.-.u g nization mission to Pakist;,n ft^aKista to exploreincome-generating
activities in f
'^^'^^ those undertaken byworld Bank. The ILO presented its initiala I report in December 1982It contains ten project proposals totalling
^^""^
-2 million. Amongthe projects tentatively proposed are- a) thP n • •a . e provision of seeds and
PouU..-.a,3.„«,
„
^^^^_ ^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^
include: a,
..ain.ns a.Ule. wc.e.a
.„ aucH nel.a aa
.e.al „o...„„
construction, electrioihv
> cx c ty, wood-workinc anri 4.vjiKxng, and auto-repair and
.aintenanoa, t.e eataUia>™e„t or unUa of
.uU.e.a an. oa.penta.s
Who arte, training
„oul. eonat.uct oo«u„al
,uil.in.a „UMn
rerugea-arreote. a.aaa; o) axpo.t an. p.o.otion or
.efu,ea
handicrafts; d) development of adul f i.-.y u r t literacy programs; and e)
referral aervioes for„o»an.»,3 This UNHCR/ILO project la .ealgne.
to provide teohnleal and vocational training an. initiate a.ali acaie
income-generating projeota. (For UNHCR assistance see Tables 8-11).
The Objective Of theae development-oriented and aelf-relianoe
Projecta ia to inculcate a.llla that the rafugeea can capitalize on.
such projects Will create opportunitiea Which Will benefit not only
the refugees but their place of refuge as well. Refugees currently
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working in construction, road-buiidm. ^
,
t^uUding, farming, and reafforestation
benefit the i„«ge„ou. population too, and hel. ."-v^w, a p decrease the
in an. tnou..t. or .etu.nm, to
....anlatan
.a, ,.ad.all,
.eco.e le33
oompelling.
and Prosnecta for
The one leverage that Pakistan ha. i„ dealing with Kabul 1„
finding a polltloal aettle^ent la the presence of these Afghan
refugees In Pakistan. One-sixth of Afghanistan., population has taken
refuge In Pakistan, and Pakistan Is saying that something
.ust be
wrong for otherwise why would they be here.
The Kabul authorities initially would not even recognize that
these Afghans were "refugees". It called the. bandits, mercenaries,
and counter-revolutionaries, trained by Pakistan, China, and the US on
Pakistani territory to launch subversive activities against the Kabul
regime:
These (new policies) took away privileees from ^^^^^
•
elements who had exploited our 'naUo" fh varloua waya'^'li"!traitors had no choice but to Join the army o? Lp^rlllL. and Its
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allies. Some of these P-Yni^-,-*-
found
.eruge in'lj^iJ^a'n^'^r
'lllTr'' ^^^^^reaccionaries and aggressors of 'the toJ^ I ^T''^^^^^"' thepropaganda offensive through Se ZW T '^'^"^"^ ^ S^^^tcountries... These treacherous element^ f °^ imperialistfor subversion against the DRa![42] ^''^^"^^ Pakistan
The Islambad authoritipc* n^i-
facilities for thfco^^ r-r^volut onarT^': "^^^^^^Pakistan, but organize '^^^^^"^^^"^^y bands on the territory of
activities... The pLisSni TZl'''"'\ '""^'^ subversiveheadquarters staff also take n..f their
Clandestine traffic of all sorts of
P^^^tecting the illegal
the border to Afghanistan!? L f^rL'^H^^'^^'^"mercenaries is concerned fh-. T training of
offioers (aided by ChL^se^ni'L L^rtraL^irr^"'- °' '^^"'^"^
"any terrorista captured by the Afghan a™"
"
Even the Soviet press had the same to say:
a™:runlS\aL1"?n?LlsS„?r'ter"^*r'?''^ro™"'--'-^"°^""--^
X^^d .p^^^: ?h:t- --%"u:i?3d"ttivu-fl:--
Chltral, zob, Cherar Kohat u,, f Paraohlnar, Mlram Shah,
Where slbote^rsl^d JerrSr stHr" heJlirSar'/"":^""^^ ^'^"^^^
'
Chinese, A^erloan, Egyptlar:L^?:.L^ta"?l'^^^:::,:J^,^ f
J^,''^!^ °^
^^^^^ authorities have denied that they are Involved in
=istat J-Sril.- K^Ind-r^-1 ef
ooinun. :L"c'ia'' h*': Pakfstanl Lpfr?:, no
:?ts:irofncj"'hr:ssings"!S5r
Sometimes, Kabul has claimed that the refugees are nomads, forcibly
detained and taken hostage by Pakistan:
Many hostages are intimidated and driven Into oamps where US,
Egyptian and other in<?i-
army officers. The enemies o? i« '
manipulated by Chinese
nomadic tribes as a pcoi fo^ recl t?nr°""° AfShanlstan use thethere are refugees who either re 1ectfH°'^'"°!"^'''^=- I" addition,government in Afghanistan and ^led':^':^/-- "^''"^^^^^ -^"e popuia;
continue To
'usrlhorn^^^^rde^c^^i Slii • ^r^-^^"- «"°-3the hopes of forming a mercenary force "'^-""ed people inPakistani and Chinese instrStor^ . • ""^"^ "RA. us,
civilians, blow up roads and badges
alid'Sr- '° ''"I
::n.S« - -ngef^har the^^:hTto^^^S
When Babra. Karmal came to power, his regime blamed everything on
t.e Amin regime, made a distinction between the so-called refugees who
were counter-revolutionaries, and the genuine refugees who had fled
the arbitrary rule of Amin, and declared a general amnesty for the
genuine refugees, and even promised to restore the property illegally
seized under Amin. The Government Statement on the Issue of Afghan
Befugees (March 19, 198O) read in part:
t*he IS%evo\\uo"r"heir'oK" *° --i- of
arson and murder, "h^ co ernm\„ o TXlTT'^'
conflict that wiL ^r^^^r^^^l^^;
2?f 1979* fllTr.T Afghanistan prior to December
his o"?Ic[auJ1ecu'?:rtha"t'r cf '^'V'^'^^' ^^^--^ "a™:!
tribal nobility' a^Slj^han'li i en^^S^; 'lTn\TT\
rZlT^r IZr^' 1'^''°'' ^"^ abtluiJ^saJely "ZTt.Tr
oTuZrrs'' err'i ^rr^l' °'?ntLr^"°"^' ^'^'^ Interests, 'Ihe
restored to them and they will be granted freedom of action!
The Government of the DBA hopes that all Afghans deceived by the
propaganda of the enemies of th=
nature of the tranafor^aUons Iha^'h T"' understand thecountry, take note of the general the
and return to their country [S?]
^ "^^^ "^^n declared,
These refugees are not Just satisfied with an amnesty or the
Pro-lse, posslhly unrellahle, that their property and rank win he
returned to them upon return. They want i-h.i" the withdrawal of Soviet
troops and the estahUshment of a government of their own choice, it
ia said, that In September
,979. Amin had reached an agreement with
Gulbudln Hetmatyar, one of the mujahldeen leaders, whose Islamic Party
Of Afghanistan is headcuartered in Peshawar. It was agreed that the
Amln faction In the government, with the support of Hekmatyar.
3
freedom-fighters, would stage a coup, the slogans of the April
revolution would be renounced after the coup; the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan dismissed and Its leaders and activists
eliminated. m the "new state of Afghanistan", Amln was to become
president, and Hekmatyar the prime minister. [48] This report,
originating In Moscow, may have been fabricated to provide a
justification for the murder of Amln. But the elements of this
alleged agreement are precisely what the refugees would like to see
happen.
Six years have passed, and not a single "genuine refugee" has
returned home. The resistance has continued and more and more Afghans
are coming to Pakistan. These refugees probably include the
freedom-fighters who are carrying on a war of liberation against the
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camps are thus a hav^nn e and a manpower dooI f^n fv,<=p l or the guerrillas fighting
-C^O.
..e..ee3
...
,,,,,,
^^^^^^
roo. an. 3.eue.
.0. ..... „,..3 an. o.U..enM5n X„ a..Uo„,t-.e a.e tnou^an.. or
.n.e«,3te.ea
.f.nana wno 3ta, rnen.3 an.
relat,ve3
,„ Pa.,3ta„. CouX. Pa.,3tan ,ave tu.ne. tne3e
.eru.ee3
.ac.
bloce. t.ei. en.., ,„,o Pa.i3tan even ,r u wante. to, Two
faotor3 would make it difficult to do 30. The Pak k" in f -Afghan border has
ah l-en3ely unmanageable terrain, and ethnlo kinship between the
oon3lderatlon3 have Influence. But what options does a state have
into Whose territories refugees start poring In fro. a neighbouring
country. They cross a border which traditional, has been open to
traffic back and forth. People have relatives and fellow-trlbes.en on
each side of the border. it would thus have been exceedingly
difficult, requiring a massive police operation, to turn the Incoming
streams of refugees back, m all of this one should not overlook the
temptation of Internationally embarasslng a neighboring government
Which has traditionally been hostile and which, at the time the crisis
became acute, had become especially objectionable because of its new
Ideology that the government of Pakistan, and the elements supporting
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it in the country, regarded as
Ideolos..
7 - ~ - —an3MP and airoran and then truo.ed to the
.order area, china, Saudi
SuerriiXas.
,ran is aiso reported to he providing a ii„,ted amount o.
a^a to Shiite
„u3ii„s in
.rghanistan.
. ,arge portion or the ar.s
cces rro. oid Egyptian stoo.piiea or Soviet weapons, and the Saudis
anc the US are paying the hiii.
.He total cost or the operation is
estimated to have been between *5n i ,$30 million and $50 million a year for
the last three years, with the US paying about half.[52]
Will the Afghan refugees return. There are men who led the
refugees out of Afghanistan
- the leaders, political elites, call
them What you will, ihey still nead" their respective segments of
the refugee population in Pakistan Tho,,r K . They may or may not be
traditional tribal leaders. They may, as some of them say, be new
^ind Of political leaders. i„ any case, while the ordinary
unorganised fol.s may be acceptable tc Kabul, will the government
there want the "leader-^"ers
_
or as it thinks of them, the
"trouble-makers
- back in Afghanistan? As we stated before (in the
Amnesty Declaration), the Kabul regime is net inclined on having them
back. If it does not want them back, why should the "leaders"
encourage, or even allow, the rank and file to return home? Secondly,
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in spite Of the problems these reWp. h
P.^. .
^ '
^^"^^ ^'^^^^^^ Pakistan, thePakistan government is not hundred percent anx- .
return H
'°
^^f'^g-es
home. These refugees serve as a i
^
leverage for Pakistan m
important for Paki<?i-anr Kista because they serve«y as intermediaries betweent-ir peopu an.
..e Oove.»..„. p.,,^,,^.
cause t.ouMe „UMn Pa.,3.a„. 3uppo3,„,
^^^^
-o.
.o.e, tHe «ou.. Have no.o.. .
.ea. Pa..3ta„, an.
their leadership roles would oease Tn. in oase of a settlement (see
Chapter on Political Settlement), they would r,„fI, on not approve of any
proposal which leaves them h(,h ^ .high and dry. And even if the Karmal
-.i.e accepts them as partners, wnich is very unli.ely. they may not
feel safe. Those refuugees „no were wealthy tac. nome, and whose
properties have been confiscated will not ,ave the incentive to
-turn. Even if Karmal restores their lands etc, they still would
have little incentive to return because now they have set up their
businesses in Pakistan. These refugees may want to stay in Pakistan
because Pakistan is more prosperous and offers more opportunities.
They have already picked up their lives in Pakistan, and consider it
as good as home because of the affinity of language and culture.
Pakistan could not stop their entry, and it is hard to imagine that
Pakistan can force them out, or is really anxious to see them out.
Table 8
Million US$
Approved Funds, Oct 1, 1979-Sept 30, 1980.... 10.3
Revised Estimate, Oct 1
, 1979-Dec 31, 1980
...30.0
Revised Estimate, Oct 1, 1979-Dec 31, I98O
... 55.O
Estimated Requirements for 198I gg q
Approved Funds for 1981
^ 109.4
Estimated Requirements for 1 982 •••••••••• ( I » \
Approved Funds for 1982 83.4
Estimated Requirements for 1983 73 6
231
Table 9
»CR.EjiPgncliture in P^;..-.^
In thousands of US$
Source of Funds and igfti
Type of Assistance Amount Ann I ''^^3Approved Revised Proposed
obligt approp/ alloc/ alloc/
General Programmes
^sti. esti. projections
Multipurpose assistance 8q 7in q -ta i->-^ ^
Resettlement
'Jglga
70,132.0 74,654.0
Voluntary repatriation
Legal assistance
0.*6aSupplementary aid 2?'na
Program support/adm 719 qq IZ 1 ^00.0Sub-total (1) on ul; a -71 nff*^ ^36.7 994.0^°'^72.9 71,054.1 71,68.7 76,148.0
Special Programmes
Education account :}ft q ^r/; n
Other trust funds: ^^'^ 394.0
Health 10 n
^^ood 17 nftfti
^"^'^
„ If, OOO. 4 1 1 Qyc n
Transportation 81.O ' po'SReaforstation
Program support/adm 3^7 07"^
^"'^^ 109,182.5 71, 156.5 83,360.H 78,1)98.3
Regular Budget (3) ...
... 35.9 190.1
Grand Total (,.3) 109, M2. 5 71,156.5 83,446.3 78,607.4
a Obligations Incurred against overall allocation.
Source;Report on UNHCB assistance activities in 1 981-8?
the KHrGe::va"r-19L;'"g.^ TZ'-^"-'
'^^^Sn^ljm, Office of
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Table 10
GENERAL PROGRAMMR<^
Type of Activity
Multipurpose
assistance
Supplementary
Aid
Summary Description
Assistance to an estimated
2.3 million Afghan refugeesm the following areas:
-Supplementary food
-Storage facilities
-Shelter
-Health
-Clothing and shoes
-Quilts
-Fuel, etc.
-Water supply
-Veterinary service
-Skill training
-Education
-Vehicles
-Staff accomodation
-Logistic support
-Miscellaneous
Assistance to Afghan refugees
awaiting resettlement and to
other individual cases
predominantly Iranian. 1/
Planned
Amount
US$
10,800,000
700,000
13,400,000
7,700,000
9,000,000
2,800,000
8,400,000
2,900,000
900,000
1,200,000
3, 100,000
200,000
300,000
7,500,000
5,754,000
500,000
S^eralf^noL'tlon"."""
'"'''""^^ previously charged to the
Source
:
Report on UNHCH assiatan,.^ activities in ,981.82
tHHi§ffi=iifier
'.Z'^' ''"^'^^J^^- Office or
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Table 11
vities in 1Q8^
IllPakistan
SPECIAL_PRpGRAMMES
Type Of Activity Summary Description
Planned
Amount
US$
Reafforestation
394,000
Education p,,,i3,^„ scholarships
to 250 Afghan students
and 100 other individual
cases in tertiary or
technical institutions.
Reafforestation and soil
conservation projects to
minimise or repair damage
caused to the environment
by refugees livestock. 2/ 1,916,400
2/ Previously funded under General Programmes.
^Repor-t on UNHCR assistance activities in iQ8i-ftp
and proposed voluntary funds programs and budget for 198^ . Office of
the UNHCR, Geneva, 1982, p. iiiy.
234
Table 12
Name Date of Location
set up
sin NWFP
Mera
Barakai
Gandaf
Jalozai
Tindo
March
1981
Aug.
1979
Feb.
1980
Bada Ber Feb.
1980
May
1980
35 kil east
of Mardan
45 kil east
of Mardan
27 kil north-
east Peshawar
10 kil south-
west Peshawar
35 kil south-
east Parachinar
No of Total
RTVs* population
Oct. 1981
6 135,313
2 35,946
5 30,215
29,012
18,57
^Refugee Tentage Villages
Bara Kai Pefusee. Ca.p, Gandaf Refugee, r.^p
Jalozal Refugee. Ca.p
,
Bada Bar Refu.... r.^p Tlndo Refu.ee. r.. p.
Commi33ionerate of Afghan Refugees, NWFP, Peshawar, Pakistan.
Table 13
Ethnic Groups in
Jalozai Rfifnaoo P>,rnp
Name of Tribe
Population
Zadran
8,453
Maroof Khel
6,654
Ahmed Zai
. .
.
4,457
Shinwari
3,648
Safi
3,180
Khogyani
2,227
Stana Zai
1,546
Total 29,315
Table 14
Ethnic Groups in
Azakhel Re fugee Camp
Name of Tribe
Population
Ahmed Zal
. .
.
6,985
Zadran
• 1,843
Total 8,828
Table 15
Ethnic Groups in
Gandaf Refugee Camp
Name of Tribe
Populatic
Masood
12,208
Wasir
7,579
Ahmed Zai ....
7,163
Gurbaz
4,045
Shenwari
^ ,
2,561
Mohmand
2,050
Baher Khel
,
Total 35,946
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Table 16
Ethnic Groi]p5:i in
Tindo Refugee Camp
Name of Tribe
Population
Khugyani
13,152
Ghilji
1,210
'"J^ ••
1,11,
1,08i.
Chamkani
1,070
^^^^^^^i
818
Khostwai
82
Total 18,527
Table 17
Merg_Bara Kai R.fnp^^^^^
Name of Tribe
Population
Tajak
Ahmed Zai ... ^0,135
Khugyani .* .* 28,071
Mohmand 12,814
Safi ^'970
Jabber Khel ....*.*.*.*.*.* 6 , 543
Allabdin Khel ^'^^^
Kundar Khel 3, 866
Shinwari .....*.*.* 3,883
Zadran .*.*.*.*.*.*.* 3,882
Suleman Khel .....* i 3,610
Badin Khel .*.'.*.*.*.*.'.* ^'^^^
Abdur Rahmin Zai*.*.*.*.*
Isa Khel '''50''
Tota Khel .*.*.* ""'^^^
Arab .*.*.'.*!.* h359
Turk, Saidan, Mongol*
Saadat, Salar Zai, Niazi etc 9,334
Total 1,35^313
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Table 18
Ethnic Groups p
Bada Ber R^fngee Camp
Name of Tribe
Population
Ahmed Zai
.
.
13,275
Mohmand
....
4,230
Tajak
3,553
Maroof Khel
3,132
Khugiani
2,051
Stanazai
1,700
Quresh
291
Wardag
250
Jabar Khel
250
Salar Zai
205
Nooristani
75
Total 29,012
source for Tables
,3, ,5, 16, ,7, and ,8: Bara Kal Ref..... r.^,
Oandaf Refugees Camp
,
Jalozal Refu.ee. r..p Bada Ber Refugee, r.^
p
Undo Refugees Camp
, Conunisslonerate of Afghan Refugees, NWPP,
Peshawar, Pakistan.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
seven years have passed since the Communists too. power in
Afghanistan, and more than five since the Soviets moved into the
country, and they are all still there. The world loudly protested the
Soviet invasion, but the denunciation was mostly verbal and symbolic.
No credible means capable of expelling the Soviets were employed. The
united States earlier imposed certain economic and technological
sanctions but these could not force the Russians out of Afghanistan.
The NATO and EEC countries did not follow the American initiative.
Later the European proposals for a settlement, and Lord Carrington's
mission to Moscow, served to show only that the West European
governments were not unconcerned with the Afghan situation, and that
they were not incapable of making some diplomatic move. One might say
that they wanted to go on record as having shown concern. The US
sanctions (grain embargo, embargo on high tech exports, and US
Withdrawal from Olympics) did not work because alternative sources of
supply of grain were available to USSR (even Americn farmers raised
hell), American corporations were willing to sell high tech through
third parties, and the Russians did not care if the Americans did not
participate in the Olympics. Besides, US allies were willing to sell
to the Soviets. The lesson that could be drawn from this is, firstly.
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that one super power cannot coerce the ofh... •t er's international behavior
~
- ----- „.e.e us
.neenesu a. no.
3eoo„«„ even
.ajo. powers cannot
.e eoe.oe. tH.ousH eoonclo an.
technological sanctions because i-hoB the nation imposing them cannot
control the behavior of the rest nf i-h«.o the world, not even the behavior
of its friends. Consequently, there are aii-.nn.^-y, on lter ative sources of supply
because there are other parties willing, i-nf i^ie ling to make some extra money
Despite American sanctions, I- is surviving an. even wagin, a wa.
with Ira,, so sanctions, wnich are essentially in the nature of half
measures cannot and do not work.
The Islamic world was shocked to see a Muslim nation occupied by
the Red Army, but it too could not do much beyond condemning the
invasion. Not to speak of making a military move, which for the
Muslim nations was not practical, none recalled its f,om
Moscow or Shut Off trade or any other kind of relations with the
Soviet Union to show its disapproval. The Islamic Conference Standing
Committee on Afghanistan attempted to resolve the Afghan crisis but,
partly due to disunity in its own ranks, eventually left the matter to
the United Nations. Why could 'nt the Islamic world do something more
substantive? Why couldn't they make at least stronger gestures like
Withdrawing their ambassadors from Moscow, or breaking off trade
relations? Because the Islamic world is not united. Muslim states
are ready to fight one another in pursuit of their respective
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interests, an. sceti^es Just out or rooUsHness. X.an-I.a.
,3 a
recent e.aep.e;
.a.Ue. „e
.a„ oonaot.tens.ons
.et«een H.,pt an.
sout. ve.e„ an. Ho.tH
.e„e„. Pa..3tan an.
...HanUtan.
Be3i.e3, 3o.e Mu3li. oount.iea ane in.e.te. to t.e „SSH, e.g. i.a,
Syria, u..a, P,o. Z3W0 Conrenenoe not .0 annHin. w,.!
Tara.i ouate. Daou. an. i„3taUe. a oo«unl3t
.e«i.a. B,. u ,,,,,,
their 3ta.e i„ the Afgnan situation „aa vital enough to Justify
aignlfloant political,
.ipio.atic, an. economic actions against the
soviet union. So what we can expect ,ro. the Islamic Conference as an
international actor I3 resolutions, but no effective action.
The unite. Nations passe, resolutions In the General Assembly
<ie.an.ing a Soviet with.rawal fro. Afghanistan, but the resolutions
each successive year became mil.er such that the Soviet Union was not
even na.e.. However, it .1. make a serious effort towards me.iatlon
When a Special Assistant to the Secretary General was appolnte. to
search for a political formula to en. the conflict an. enable the
Soviet forces to leave Afghanistan.
The Afghan government, backe. by the Soviets, also proposed Its
own peace plans. Its .eman.s range, from recognition of the Karmal
regime an. assurances of non-tntprfor«n^a ^«u i e ie e ce, to non-aggression pacts
between Afghanistan on one hand an. Pakistan an. Iran on the other,
and military retreat by the US from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean
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as conditions for Soviet troop withdrawal.
Prospects of Geneva Talks
The UN sponsored talks between the government of Pakistan and the
Karmal regi.e have not yet been abandoned; periodically there is a
meeting. Under the UN plan, Afghanistan would be required to agree to
a ti.e-table for the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops, and Pakistan
would be required to give guarantees of non-interference. The Soviets
say: "as soon as outside interference in the affairs of Afghanistan
has been terminated and the non-resumption of such interference
guaranteed, we shall withdraw our troops". This reference to outside
interference refers also to the use of Pakistan's territory as a
conduit for the supply of arms to the Mujahideens. Pakistan wants
assurances of non-interference to be accompanied by assurances of
Soviet withdrawal. The Soviets want Pakistan's assurances to be
backed by the US and some other countries (unnamed so far), ensuring
that arms supplies to the Mujahideens will actually and effectively
stop.
Pakistan officially denies that its territory is used as a
conduit for the supply of weapons to the Mujahideens. This may not be
true. But, more importantly, Pakistan does not have the capability of
altogether stopping the flow of arms to the Mujahideens. Nor can it
direct or control the Mujahideens, that is, stop them from making
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their raids, it cannot close its differ. ,
.
I difficult and permeable border, it
cannot throw them out ii-as It oould not atop them from coming in. The
P-aent government in Is.ama.a. i3 further han.ioappe. in this regar.
the raot that Uiema an. other oonservative groups „ithi„ P..i...„
support Afghan freedom fighters. President 7i« m „r Z a-ul-Haq cannot alienate
and upset the Ulema without putting his rule in Jeopardy.
one diffieult dimension of the Geneva tal.s concerns the
Mujahideens themselves. In early ,983 Islamabad and Katul authorized
the special UN Representative. Mr. Cordovez. to meet and ascertain
the Mujahideen leaders- views. Contacts are expected to open the
way for political discussions between Moscow and the freedom fighters'
Chiefs. The expectation is that room would then be found in the
Karmal government for the freedom fighters- leaders. But these
insurgent groups are split into more than a dozen mutuUy antagonistic
factions, and their rivalries are entrenched in generations of tribal
and personal conflict. [2] Cordovez is expected to choose which of
the factions he will consult. Then he must get Afghan and Pakistan
approval for his list and also of where and how he shall meet the
Mujahideen leaders. It is problematic in the extreme that all this
Will oome to pass. While surely there is a case for consulting the
insurgency leaders, their disunity and mutual hostility ensure that
such consultations will be a long drawn-out exercise in futility. The
tribal and social structure In parts of Afghanistan, and in the
borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan, has never before allowed
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a cantPal soveP„..„t to the tn.e^ securely u„ae. u. o„„ ™ie
The a.fn..Uie3 Of a peaoe-.a.e.
,„
^^^^^^^
-sethe. anae r.o„ the 3a.e u„™..
.„3.3te„oe on tn.a. 3epa.ate„e33
and autonomy.
But there are other equally 3enou3 dlfnoultle3. There I3 no
-aaon to expect that, in the unU.ely event or the in3ur«e„t leaaera
agreeing to a 3ettle„e„t, Bahra. Ka^al woula Invite the ene„ie3 of
hl3 regime to Join hi3 ^overn^ent
- unleaa he .oe3 30 with the
intention Of 3u.3e,uently liquidating the„. Both he and hi3 patron3
in the Kremlin
.ay have agreed to Cordove..3 idea of talking with the
in3urgent3. Ieader3 to
.aintian the appearance of desiring a peaceful
political 30lution even while anticipating that the search for an
agreed solution, acceptable to all concerned, would go on
indefinitely.
Another impediment to a political solution concerns the attitude
Of the united States. Moscow wants American-supported guarantees from
Pakistan and others that external interference in Afghanistan will
cease. But the Reagan administration, since I982, has stepped up its
covert military aid to the Afghan insurgents. [3] The record of
fairly modest American assistance to Afghanistan since the 1950's
Shows Clearly that the United States does not regard Afghanistan as of
any great strategic importance to its own interests. Afghanistan is
now important to the United States in the context of its ongoing
adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union. American aid to the
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insurgents, as appPovea
,y Congress, a^cunte. to »280
.uuon fo.
198.. TMs IS „o.est enough ro. the Unite. Stats to be atXe to
Offer u indefinitely, it does not enable the Insurgents to push the
Soviets out Of Afghanistan but, ad.e. to asslstanoe oozing fro. other
sources. It Is enough to keep the Russians In a no-wln oonfllot.
It is probably incorrect to say that the United states has no
interest In the present Afghan situation outside the Soviet-American
cold «ar context. The valiant struggle of the insurgents to throw out
foreign domination and an alien ruling ideology may invite genuine
American interest and sympathy. But the Mujahldeena' goals cannot
serve as the basis of a political solution, for the Karmal regime
cannot agree to its o«n demise and the Russians cannot simply admit
failure and go home.
The Geneva talks may continue, but the difficulties and
complexities involved in achieving peace are immense. If the talks
are successful in achieving a Russian pullout, what could be the
impact on Afghanistan? Would it mean a return to the state of affairs
as it was under Daoud or under the King? Or would it be followed by a
resurgence of tribalism, anarchy and civil war? The Soviet occupation
has eroded the very base and the infrastucture required for a national
government to function outside the protective umbrella of a foreign
power. The only stable institution in that country was the monarchy.
Its fall was followed by the collapse of the incipient national
democracy and the institutional framework that went with it. What
248
ever 3e..,a„=e of oiv.o an. a.„i„,3t.atlve oontinuUy
.ay stUl eUstm Afghanistan Pests on the foroe of the Russians. The
.egi.e (or any
successor regime similarly place., „oul. ooUapse without the Soviet
crutches. The Russians, aware of this situation, „ay fear that if
they leave, the United states „ight .ove in to flu the void. They
are not anxious to let that happen in a country in their i^ediate
Vicinity and therefore of considerable strategic importance to them.
Why are the talks continuing, considering that they are not going
anywhere? Possibly because there is hope all around that perhaps they
win eventuate in a settlement. But more so, these meetings take
Place at the rate of once or twice a year, for all concerned to look
good. The Russian and Kabul authorities are not only killing the
Mujahideens but even others who are looking for a peaceful way of
ending the violence. Pakistan need not admit failure in solving the
Afghan crisis; it can claim to be negotiating. Years may pass before
anyone has to admit failure. By then the present regime may be gone,
leaving it to its successors to pick up the pieces. In other words,
all concerned have reasons to put up the appearance of action and
movement on the issue even if actually there is none. This is one
function Of all protracted International negotiations. There are
delegate visits, agendas, meetings, proposals, and counter proposals.
These could go on endlessly.
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^2st3_of_the_j^vasion
The Soviets
.ight oonalder withdrawing fPo„ Afghanistan if the
Military, eooncie, and diplomatic costs of thei. occupation we.e
perceived as prohihitive. i„ considering the political-dipiomatic
costs, they ™ust think not only of now they look to the third world,
Which is divided on the Afghan Issue, tut of how they look as a super
Willing to defend a friendly fellow-co»unist third world government;
hence the propaganda effort to blame everything on the United States.
Diplomatically, Whatever ground they initially lost as a result of
their intervention has Probably been regained because world "public
opinion" and governments have, in the succeeding years, moved on to
Other events and developments.
In any case, because of traditional Soviet secrecy in these
matters, there is no reliable figure on how much the occupation is
costing Moscow. China estimated the daily cost in 1 981 at $3 to $4
million for military supplies, gasoline, and related expenses
alone. [5] One western estimate of the economic cost, separate from
Soviet army expenses, was some $6C0 million for the first half of
1980. [6] Another western estimate was a much higher daily cost of
$10 to $12 million. [7] All these must be taken as guesses. If we
take the figure of $3 to $4 million per day, [8] (less than $1.5
billion a year), the cost is not high enough for the Soviets to
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a.a„.o„
.He 3t..,..
,,,,
^^^^
soviet cost in ,f,,a„,3ta„ ia rat.e. Insignineant w.en oo.pa.e. to
the A.e.loa„ oost of fig.tlng in Vietna. „Hio>„ for a nu..e. of yea.,.
exceeded $20 billion a year tm,. This 13 true even if „e make allowances
for the fact that the American GNP is much larger than that of the
soviet union. „e cannot overlook the fact that in economic ter.s,
Afghanistan has become, for the time being, another backward republic
from MOSC0W.C9] The Soviets are getting something of economic
Significance out of Afghanistan, namely, natural gas which helps
defray some of their costs.
There are no official Soviet casualties figures, but the
estimates are not high. Professor John Erickson, one of the foremost
authorities on the Soviet military, has argued that the total number
Of Russians dead in the first eighteen months of the invasion did not
exceed fifteen hundred; and the US embassy sources in Kabul put the
battle casualty figure over the first twenty-one months at between two
and three thousand dead. [10] The figure for the entire operation
(until November 1984) is 40,000 casualties, and 6,000 to 7,000 killed,
or on the average, a figure of 9,000 casulties (including the dead and
wounded) peryear.Ell] This is not high. It does not seem to create
any significant political impact within the Soviet Union, and the
regime does not appear to be facing a legitimacy crisis over the
issue.
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A balance sheet of how wen i-h^ll the communist regime has entrenched
itself against insurgent opposition is difficult but the o .xxi.v^ x , o conclusion
appear to favor the Soviet Union Th» q • .u . The Soviet army and air force seem
to have established control of t-v,^the major cities and towns and the
communication network. They have also built a number of major
airfields capable of taking the most advanced Soviet Jets, Mig-^S's
an. Su-U.3.Cia] The Soviets appear to be settling m for a long
occupation. The methodical tiffhtenln^. or .v, nT igntening of the Russian grip on the
country has been hampered but not reversed bv th. •x a y e insurgents'
operations, who have destroyed half of fho . .u a n it the country's schools and
hospitals in guenrina action. The Afghan ar^y is eroding,
.ut
probably not enough to affect the Soviet conduct of the war. The
army's strength is down to about 20,000 men compared with i.0,000 m
1982.[13] Demographic shifts within Afghanistan in the last five
years have helped the Russians. Successive Soviet campaigns have
driven the resistance and its supporters out of some cf the country's
most fertile areas. These have been replaced by workers chosen for
their loyalty to the communist regime. Another favorable factor for
Russia is the massive program for training Afghan students - between
6,000 and ,0,000 - in the Soviet Union to replace the often suspect
administrators, who now run the country under the guidance of the KGB.
There has been no massive Soviet reinforcement. There are 110,000
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301... an. a..en . t.e eoun.,
....
^^^^^^^^^
-3t no., o.
.onue.
..e Huss.ns
.ave a.o .Ut a .a,o.
airfield in this area. The Soviet goal is .to consolidate the
communist regime in &fr,\^^^^ ^- x Afghanistan. Some day they may withdraw their
forces, but they want to leave b^^hinHehi d a government that pays
r-espectful attention to their wishes.
Will the Soviets be abl*> t-nC3 o le to stabilize the ooamunlst regime' The
Soviets we-e reaaonabl, satisrie. „ith the
„o„.oo..u„ist governments
in Kabul. They di. not engineer the oo^unist coup in ,978 that
ouste. oaou.. But once a oo«u„ist regime was in, it became a matter
Of face for the Russians to protect it, especially since it was in
their neighborhood. Furthermore, no regime in Kabul has ever
effectively rule, all of Afghanistan. Similar to the present
altuatlon, the cities an. towns were controlled by the government and
the countryside by local tribal leaders. If Karmal stays in power
long enough, he may be able to extend his control further. The
Soviets may want to securely and safely maintain their military
presence in Afghanistan so as to use if for other goals. Using the
country to legitimize Soviet concern with Asia, or demonstrating to
Pakistan the need for Soviet friendship, are goals which have now
largely been realized. [ 14]
253
Implioatlon5^ for Pakistan
International
we discussed i„ Chapter V the earue. Pakistani peroepUcns of
the i.puoatlons of Af.Han e.isls. How let us see now, th.oug. the
years, this problem has affected thP ^r^i^r.r.^^^ii a e international scene, and with it
Pakistan's evolving position vis-i-vis the powers involved. The
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan clearly strained its detente with the
united States. The latter has sought to further extend its
cooperative relationship with China. Dignitaries from each side have
Visited the other
- the Chinese prime minister was in the US in 1983
and president Reagan went to China in 1984. The United States is now
Willing to sell sophisticated weapons to China. The Soviets would
like to repair the breach in their relations with China and, in I982,
proposed talks toward that end.[15] The list of their concerns which
the Chinese handed to the Soviets included a demand for their
withdrawal from Afghanistan.
In the regional subsystem, Pakistan continues to protest the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It has refused to recognize the
Karmal regime in Kabul; shored up its defense capability by signing an
aid agreement with the US for $ 3.2 billion; affirmed a posture of
non-alignment; increased its contacts with the Muslim world; proposed
a no-war pact to India; and engaged the United Nations in finding a
political settlement for the Afghan crisis. Thus, at the
international level, the implications of the Afghan crisis for
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Pakistan have meant renewal of close rpi.fr C relations with the US for what it
IS worth; Pakistan's increased vulnerabilitv ^o tx Dl y t Indian pressure has
induce. appeaae :n..a,
.e.at.o.
.He So«e.
„„.o„
-.ain or oo„ni=tne„.io„ p.us 3o.e ooope.atton at t.. sae. u.e.
The Soviets aay the Afghan Inaurgents have the support of
Pakistan. Th.ee
.Ulion Afghan refugees o. one-sixth of Afghanistan's
population, have ta.en refuge in Pakistan and it is a fair assumption
that so.e Of these people are insurgents, ine Soviets have many times
threatened Pakistan for harhoring, and aiding, the insurgenoe. it
security problem.
in the foreseeable future, the Soviets will probably see no need
to launch a full-scale invasion of Pakistan. It would not only be
expensive but unnecessary
.[ 16] For the Soviets still have to
consolidate their hold over Afghanistan and Pakistan does exercise
restraint. The Soviets have often violated Pakistan's airspace and
strafed refugee villages inside Pakistan. Pakistan protests these
Violations but otherwise does nothing to provoke a Soviet invasion.
Pakistani planes have not gone up to challenge the Soviet MIG's
intruding into its airspace. Pakistan knows it cannot afford a
confrontation with a super power. Yet Pakistan continues to provide
shelter to the Afghan refugees, and continues to demand Soviet
Withdrawal from Afghanistan. This is partly from lack of a better
alternative. Of the over three million Afghans at least 200,000 are
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fighting the Soviets at any given ti„e. If Pa.i3tan t.ies to ne.tnot
an. control thein
.ove.ents an. actions beyond what they themselves
be Willing to accept, they „ay turn anoun., and begin raiding the
Pakistani population and areas qnoh = ^. Suc a turn of events would cause
Chaos in Pakistan. Already, there is tension between the local
population and the Afgban refugees, so.e of who. are taking lands,
urban properties, and business opportunities away fro. the local
people. In other words, the governn,ent of Pakistan is caught in a
messy situation.
Domestic
The Soviet presence in Afghanistan has heightened its ability to
interfere in Baluchistan if it wants. For the present the Soviets do
not have to engage in high-investment and high-risk enterprises beyond
Afghanistan. If and when their goals so require, a better option
would be the indirect tactic of subversion. [ 17] Moscow may have
opportunities for this course of action among dissident tribesmen in
Pakistani Baluchistan, who have been striving for provincial autonomy
from the central government. One of the first acts of the pro-Soviet
government in Kabul was to publicise messages of goodwill for Baluchi
tribesmen. It is a way of putting pressure on Pakistan. An
autonomous Baluchistan under Soviet influence or control would mean a
weakened Pakistan. It would also provide the Soviets with a direct
corridor to the Gwadar port in Baluchistan at the mouth of the Persian
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Gulf. [18]
3o.e analyata have Wentifu. BaluoWatan as the Soviet- 3 long
te™
.oal.[,9J The thesis that Pa.lstan-s Internal ethnic
.Iscon.
weakness UO], oannot he totally
.ule. out. Howeve., the presence of
Afghan refugees
=o.plloate the politics of Baluch nationalise. So.e
600,000 Afghans are placed in Baluchistan; of these only an
insignificant number are Afghan Baluch. The Afghans, being mostly
Pumoona (Pathans), their presence has added significantly to the
number of Pukhtoons already living In Baluchistan, and composing about
forty percent of the province
-s population. The arrival of Afghan
refugees changes the provincial ethnic balance. The refugees cannot
have much sympathy for Baluch separatism, certainly not If it Is
Soviet aided.
For many years there have been reports of Soviet-aided activity
m Baluchistan. The Soviets may escalate it to relieve the situation
in Afghanistan. Soviet-inspired disaffection in Baluchistan, even if
it does not become widespread for the reasons mentioned above, could
still cause civil strife and political instability in Pakistan. But
note also that Baluch nationalism is not the only, or even the most
important, threat to Pakistan's political stability. The present
regime lacks popularity in all of the country's provinces.
Developments in Afghanistan, and the Afghan refugees in Pakistan have
given the Zia regime an excuse for remaining in power — the
257
Situation, aa.s, 13 too
.a„.e.o.3 to .0 urt to poUti=ia„3 -- an.
ro. oontinuing U3 poutioal
.ep.e33lon. Pa.utanU, an. espeoUll,
thoae in t.e 3„ane. p.ovinoe3, want poUtioai participation, t.at ia
3o.e
.in. or ae„oo.ao„ „Mo. „oui. en. tne present
.iiita.;
dictatorahip. The Huasiana can exploit thia aituation if there ia
something for them to exploit.
A profa:no3i3
PaKistan.s sense of strategic priorities is best illustrated by
the Virtually permanent deployment of eighty percent of its military
strength along its border with India. Pakistan normally deploys
two-and-half divisions in the north and northwest and this level has
not increased following the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan
does fear the USSR, but it fears India - with its traditional
relations of cooperation and mutual assistance with both the Soviet
Union and Afghanistan
- even more. Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact
to India was intended to neutralize at least one of its two hostile
neighbors. It rejected the Indian proposition of a Friendship Treaty
because such treaties almost always lead to intervention by the bigger
power. The aid from America for military modernization does not
secure Pakistan against the full range of potential threats either
from the Soviet Union or from India. It does not provide for
unequivocal American military support, nor does it significantly shift
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the existing balance of power in fh« kt e subcontinent. With this aid themost that Pakistan can do is to slow down a determined fuli-scale
attack by either Russia or India Pm.-i--. Politically, it gives Islamabad the
self-confidence to withstand c;^,,,- 4.soviet pre^aure tor an aooomodatlon withKa.u.. Pa...tan
.3 not J.t
.e.uotant to aooept the p^.ent aU.tlon
.r..an.3ta„.
.t
.3 oon3t.a.„e..
.o„e3t.oan,. tHe
....an
.er..ee3
•^av. not on., e.eate. poutloa.. eoono„,o, an. 30clal p.o.U.3 To.
to leave, and the. „n: not accept any 3eU out. Be3iae3, Zla-s
l3la„l.atlon platro™ ha3 loo.ed In a certain po3tu.e, „he.e he
cannot alienate the mte.nal oon3e.vatlve g.ouplnsa; noP can he let
.0
the external auppo.t
,l3la„lc Conrerence, Saudi A.ahla, that he needs,
^ven If a settlement I3 reached, few Afghan refugees, If any. „ay go
baChce. There 13 probably nothing for the. to return to: their
hces
.ay have been destroyed and their lands ta.en by others.
Moreover,
.any of the. have begun their lives anew In Pakistan and.
even as refugees, their Present quality of life Is probably better
than that they can look forward to In Afghanistan.
In sum, the Afghan crisis highlights the travails of a small
state Whose relative weakness lies not only In the insufficiency of
the material resources it can mobilize to deal with Its external
environment. Its weakness inheres In the very character of the regime
Which speaks and acts for the state. An authoritarian military
government, unable to command popular support, lacks the political
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re3.3t tHe 3e.u0t.ve te.ptat.c. t.at a.e orre.e. to u exte.nal
and internal forces. American aid in, its present magnitude, which
al30 oo„t.,,ute3 to CHe
.e.l^e. own 3t.e„,t. an.
.ongonty,
„ou..
P.ota.ly oea3e ,r tne ori3i3 went awa.. Any oo.p.o.i3e „nn tne
soviet an. Af«na„ ,ove.„.ent3 wouX. alienate the l3la.lo e3ta.U3n.ent
wh03e 3uppoPt the re.i.e pePoelve3 a3 e33entlal to lt3 own 3urvl,al.
It may then not be fair to ^ai, fi,= tI 3 y that the oontlnuanoe of the regime and
the oontlnuanoe of the ori3i3 have become linked.
But there I3 another
- atark, yet realletlo - way of looking at
thl3 orl3l3. MlUlon3 Of Afghans - that I3 to 3ay, forelgnere -
Whose number Inoreaaee every week, have occupied the land of Pakistan
and established claim on Its resources. It can become a permanent
occupation. This state of affairs Is not very different from that
Which might have resulted had Afghanistan Invaded and conquered a part
of Pakistan. Yet, the regime In Pakistan Is unable to make moves that
would stop, If not also roll back, this Afghan "Invasion" and
occupation.
Now, it might be argued that the Afghan refugees are not foreign
occupiers but Islamic "brothers" who are in Pakistan as "guests".
This argument is open to objection. If the refugees are in Pakistan
to stay, as seems likely, they are not guests. The Pathan
businessmen, with whom the more prosperous of the refugees are
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competing, and the Pathar. landownera or peasants .n h, o whose fields the
-u...
.a.u.
.... .0 no., an.
.nge. 3.
...03 a3
-oe.e.3». Xnaa^ucH 33 p.eaenoe or *...an3 on Pa«3.an. 30U.
an.
..e anU-Sov.e. aounuea the,
.aunoH Tro.
...e. po3e .a„«e.3
.0
Pakistan's security and survival fh«, t e regime's employment of the
Islamic ideology would seem to weaken nn^, ot enliven, the state of
Pakistan.
The government of Pakistan m^,, uf K may have determined that the
=on3e.uenoe3 or the Soviet occupation or ,rshani3tan, „MXc
on thl3 a33e33.e„t, PaW3tanl 3trategie3 ror
.eallng with the
situation
.e regarae. 33 adequate: the re3ultlng henerits -
Wlcan al.. poutloal an. rinanclal support rro. certain Mu3ll„
oou„trie3, greater political vi3lbllity m the International arena
-y he 3ee„ 33 orr3ettlng the co3t3 - political, economic, an. 3ocial
3traln3 riowlng rro. the rerugeea- preaence on P3kl3tanl aoll, a
higher level or tension with the Soviet Union, and a general „or3enlng
or the natlon-3 Internal and external security problems.
on the other hand, ir one n,ake3 the assessment that theee
consequences are much too grave to he acceptable, different strategies
for removing, or mitigating, them would have to be pursued. To start
With, Pakistan would probably have to recognize the government In
Kabul, and it would have to soften Its other preconditions for a
"political" resolutions of the Afghan crisis. Basically, this means
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that,
.5=,„t oapa.uuy or a„ro.cin« Us „U1 on the other
it wui have to
.evlse u, de.a„.3 u a way that M„3oow and Kabul can
accept the. wUhout having to abandon what the, regard aa their own
vital mtereata. But, aa atated above, auoh revialona and adjustment,
may not lie within the political caoacltv nr t-h«p i y of he present government in
Pakistan. if they can be m3fi« ^iiade at all, they would have to be tried by
a freely elected auccesaor regime.
NOTES
Chapter IT
1- Dawn Overseas, January l, 1982, p. 1.
^* G« W. Ghoudhurv t^h •the Ma,)or poweps, (few York: The Free "re^I, la'sl^^pf^^;;^'^"^'' '
^"^
3. The Premier of North We^f Cr^^^^--
Abdul Qayu. Khan welcomed the proposed ^Li. '""'
°'
sovereign state such as ours could n^f ^ '^'^"«= a
contacts with the USSR", J^e iSfig's!' '
°"
Khan"!- P^kSSS?' "T'M°''7observed that "Like most Pakistanis h» ?,% ' 1551, p. 186,but have desired to have the best o^ r!,
Soviet Union. But It must have h "^Ist^bour, the
sentiment was not reciprocated!^ " '° '"Is
Another view is that- of c m t
Pawatan", Pacirinrf^
-"^...^^^r ^9;l'^'°'1^^
^"
Liaquat Ali Khan maneuvered the invifl^.- „' ^* ' ^^^'^ ^^^t
Chessboard", without ev:ract'u:iJrS:iSLr:o\o"°t: Sosc'c:."""^^^
ia^, aondo". og::::'uni!!frr"eri;?.rr-9:"
Hasan'' '"'ed^" h'". K. Sarwar
„e,,",„„, „. . ,
The Kashmir Question; nocii,n,.ni-. r, f the Foreign
i966r;;"";6nfia^r °'- ^"--^"°°ai
to USSR ^^i"? "^""^ Khan went to US and not
l?falrf :rot. "?hL Institute of International
ES""' dT ^^^^^^^ 3o1let°t°: wlT-s"
262
263
Elucidating the views of the Ul^^m^ fr.,demands upon the ruling elite of p v f'^^ scholars) and their
Pakistan; Islam
, Politics and
Pakistan, Anwar Hussain Syed,
Publishers
;
T982r pp 6^ 8.- ^^^^^^^^-^SH^^t^, (New York: Praege;
invoked l^iam in lie hope of relu^h-'n"'
"Politicians themselves
When grave and intracLbL' p ohl L f:ceT the''' 't''''^'^' 'abroad. m the same quest thev ^"^^Offered them patronage"? l^ere^oL Tt^ l ^he Ulema's support andMarxist-Leninist ideology, in itsJi? bein^ ^ t° that
repulsive because of other Reasons
repulsive, became even more
(Pakif;an;instit\r^f 1nS;natfiiP^^
^9^^^^^^^^^ 0^:;n;'^^piki^;an^-Bratt
USSR-: PakistI; Horf : ^^e;/^!^ -f^j^tan.s Relations with th^
^fi yu^i • ^ ::::— -> no. i. First Quarter. IQfii n
10. Dawn
, Karachi, December 20, 1953.
an Entente m^^r ?«' . China & Pakistan; Diplomacv of
TmT, T T3 (Amherst; University of Massachusetts Press,
^ho I^'
February 1957, the Kashmir issue was taken back tot e Security Council, the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution, see, K
Marcrig'rp/'ir''' '"'""''^ council", Pakistan Horizon .
13. Dawn
, Karachi, December 18, 1955.
14. Dawn, Karachi, June 28, I956.
26H
15* Anwar h *^ h
Entente Cordial op. cit p^^ 43
China & Pakistan; Diplomacy of_
Pakistan-Sovif»t Trade
1955 I960 1961
0-3 6.2 6.6
(figures in million roubles)
16. Dawn
, March 24, i960.
17. Ibid .
18. Dawn, March 5, 14, 29, I960.
19. Dawn, May 9, 11, I9.6O; Pakistan Times . May 14, i960.
20. Dawn
. May 31, I960.
21. Dawn, May 11, i960.
22. Dawn, Editorial, December 23, 1959.
New York Times . June 27, 196O.
24. Dawn
, October 14, i960.
25. Oil exploration went on with Soviet technical help in thePotwar and Sind regions of Pakistan. The Russians also trainedPakistani technicians to take over oil exploration in five years, see,Ihe Times
.
London, January 21, 1 96 3.
26. "Pakistan's Bhutto Asks for Understanding"
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press , vol. XXIV, no. 11, April 12
1972, p. ~.
~
, y ±
265
28- The Pakistan Times, Lahore, December 10, 1959.
and Its • Int::na:L:;ari^;xIS:Jilf /f//-'^'-^" • "PakhtoonlstanWinter 1971-75, d p-T tlT I Affairs, vol. 137, no. 3,
for Its oL reasons to Abandon fffh ^-"-^
better relations w?th t?e u«er did u tone" T'^^'T.
rr^e?3Li:rpoi-;:!
-
r^X-erl97T3rra.
31. A Staff Study in Pakistan Hori zon, vol. 18 no ? iqA(;
de^ :rln« tSrstatrJ"":'' '"'""^'^^ ^"'^^ °" KasJr issle!
tlsTsZTl ne'ul^arstL::-:"'^*^^^ °' "
32. Khallda Qureshi, "Diplomacy of the India-Pak u=n.t
I^StSeI^ 372/3aidtStSo ;
"?he ^SSn'^nin
""^^ "^°tlvated by a multiplicity of factors -t U R's proximity to the Indo-Pak subcontinent, its own successful
East'Lst fear thSr thet-We detente would end if a world war broke out, in which case it
the''sino"so:ie"t°'i''''; ^''^
^^^^
^reat tnn, • .'f ^^^^^^^ China an^g i fluence in the subcontinent".
i-h..
^^^^^ Harrison, Washington Post. July 22, 1966, reportedthat prospects of a Pak-Soviet arms deal were regarded as "linked toPakistan's willingness to permit continuation of US electronic
A^i^Li f facilities there...". The Pakistani Foreign Minister,rshad Hussain, announced in the National Assembly on May 20, 1968that Pakistan had given notice to the US to close down its
communications unit near Peshawar when the 10-year agreement signed onMay 21, 1959 expired, The New York Times
, May 21, 1968. ThisPakistani decision to terminate the agreement apparently pleased the
266
Russians.
Bhabani Sen r.nnfa ti o
Publishing company IncT'TlO)^^^^^^^ Western
^"^nT\ Asia",vo-L. M, no. 3, Winter 1979-80, p. 34.
36. Ibid
, p. 39.
37. "Pakistan's Bhutto Aairo
"Conniot In Pai,hf^„„ r „ Pi-ess, 1973), pp. 76-90:
Political Rev1.w
. Septelberr'ssrp.' ,2.
^'"''^^ °-
thea) alainst tL'\"?Sn al° uL'of^Le^lr s^^ '".L'^
^-"i^h called
affiliated w-ifh t-h^ m 4-. T ariti h. This movement wasiixj.xeic.ea itn the National Con£rre3<? Pari-v r.f T^^^., o
PhafPor. irv, *
lidrcn 5, lybl, 0:3. For background on AbdulGhaffar Khan sec, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Zama Zhwand-o:MobaPa°"h
Pibllcauon ;9?Sv= 'd i'T'k Information and Cultural Mi^is ry
Makiabr°957) ' SSShaJChan, (Peahawar: Naiya
The Pakistan Times
. September 2, 1954.
Afghanistan, (New Jersey: Princeton University
> 1973), p. 491.Press
267
42. Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri "Tho d iAfghanistan", Pakistan Horizon
^""vTi? ''°"f °' ""^^^^^^ with498-499. no. 4, December 1955, pp.
the P^;ntier TolVZTnl
^^L^se" "%?^r^^^^^stated: "To dub them as traitors wUhourtr^^i ? ^^^^""^ly debate. Hedemocratic practices, but also 2aln.^ ^^^^ ^SainstDebate", Dawn, March 6, 1951. 6^2 tit . P^f"^ ' "^^^ Assemblyimposed, see, Abdul Ghaffar Khan "^h. PH^iw- °" harrassment
vol. 4, no. 7, July 1967, pp. 7!; 1. ^
Movement", Shakti,
Bureau!^95Tr ^^^^^^^^^^ Afghan Information
formatL o? ?he uM?Lh "The
The Pakistan T,...
. October ?6 ,955 ' * situation",
border S'june'theXleta'' H° of Pak-Afghan
«lth the AfthLs ' ^ agreement
p. Truth Ahout A?fr:;...
, J^^ , Ageno..Reports; (Moscow, T98OK ^
--^l p!!
"
Afghanistan Between East and W...^' National Planning Association'(Washington DC:US GPO, I960), p.~ 6-57.
^-Lanni ,
Problel*
^'fsu-t 24, 1961 ; Louis Dupree, "Pushtunistan: The
ZlilT^ f u Implications", AUFS Reports . (South AsiaSeries), vol. V, no. 2, November 196I, p.~8: ^
(1qfi4'^ft^^..^°'^™^^"''^''
"The Third Afghan Constitution Part I
of p.:^^^ '
jQ^^^al of Area Study; Central A.i., (Peshawar: UniversityP^^^^w^^ Area Study Centre), ^ol. 1, no. 5, Spring 198O, p. 3.
49. Hamidullah Ameen and Gordon B. SchilzA Geography of Afghanistan
,
(Omaha: University of Nebraska, Center forAfghanistan Studies, 1976), p. 70.
269
(Washington DC:US GPO, 195^!
C°™"tee on Banking and Currency,
Pre33'';973)rppf"M::,if^ai^' ^"-^ton University
(Boulde;, CoLado^'weatvIefp^el;, .^fff^^^l^tan. Key to A Continent,
Betwee'n'EaarindT^t
'1:ti:L,T '^'^^ °- Afghanistan
US GPO, 1960) 'pp "'°"'o
Association, (Washington DC=
Afghanistan and tL Sovi;t UnJn fn ^^""^ Bradsher,
Tess, 1983), p. 22 - '
(Durham, N.O.: Duke University
1965, p. 24:
^ ^^^^ Sooiety
_,
Vol. LII, part 1, January
Co., ?963)'T 270."'"'"'
The Pathan Borderland, (The Hague: Mouton &
68. For chronology, see, Adamec & f. Irwin edM^istan: Some New Appro.nh.., (A^n Arbor: The University ofMichigan, 1969), pp. 28I-338. See also, Manzur Zaidi, "Afgha^man"
IT.\;TZ H IT^T'-' --Existence^ Pakistan Hk^flo^tl;;
KrederLA~^^er^96?):r^1r^^^ ^^^^
70. US National Archives file 890h. 20/7-2048. See also LeonB. Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years"The Middle East Journal, vol. 35, no. 2, Spring I98I, pp. I86-I87.'
71. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan
, op. oit .. pp. 510-514.
268
Pre33r;973):1p""'?^?:5ifSnl3taH, ,,,3ey: P.i„eeto„ University
51. Ibid
, pp. 560-565.
^^'^.rlTT^m'^^
'T'
^^^-^^ to 5e Patient",
Autumn 1964, pp. 499-i,u"
^^^^^^^ ^ OnartPrly, vol. lXII, no. H,
53. Burke, op, cit. p. 377,
5^- Pakistan Affairs., May 31, 1970.
55. Herbert Feldman, "Pakistan iQ7-a» a •
no. 2, February 197U, pp! Ztlj " ' ^sian Survey , vol. XIV,
56. Pakistan Times. November IS 107-3. ^i
Chin^^ndjakistan: Diplomanv of L ^"^^^ ^yed,
UniverslLy ot Massachusetts Press ig^^n p lr'
^""^''""'^
and P^'ntics"";ntf™;-"'Tf""'"' Neighborhood: Pressures
Winter 1979.80;
^^''^T
'"^^^
^^
Politi;s. indir'??! M -'iK'"^ The Subcontinent in World
I
Neighbors, and the GreaFT^^;^
Praeger Publishers, 1978), p. zT.
~
59. The New York Times
. August 9, 1946.
Statef *iq48 °''n^'^'^' Relations of the Unitedates, 1948, (Washington DC:US GPO, 1975), vol. V, pt. 1, p. 492.
M=.h.- Joi* Di
^^^^"^
.
^' Afghanistan Between East and We.sh,National Planning Association, (Washington DC: US GPO, I96O), p.—87"
270
73. Peter G. Franolr A*, u
74. Ibid
, p. 48.
JouJ!-or1L":^«L1^iiS?;a;':iof
-If^^r^
Afghanistan., s^,
/> v«x. o, no. 2, Spring I98O, p. 193.
Colorad;= w;3tvie«°Pre"3r;95frp'''l"4.''"'' " ^SPtinsnt, (Boulder,
World" 1
Aid to Less n.v.i.p
.. Countrl.. of
^2£ila_12i2._ central Intelligence ^,..oy DC: US GPO.
1978 ^nI.
a""v^"°' in Less nev»l,.,.,H countries
Connie; StudTL'
. ''a:^do:*'T'%'ns":?t ''^^'^^y-'
T98OJ, no. 118
'
, p. °?
fo"- the study of Conflict,
NOTES
Chapter III
!• Kabul Times May 4, 1978 n 1. ^before and after the 1978 ooud , - ^ ^ account of events
Proble.3 of ^11°°^^: -^^!:°-;^;^ D;Pree,^n,,,,,„,3,,„
MoveJ;t3'°:1fgha':r:ta:"'\SFs^e^^"^'''"'" '"^'^ - ^= ^^"^-^
1979, LD-2-79, • ''°P°'-'^°.- 1979, no. W, September
Kabul'nme:: Oc^'^ Tmtlr\
Amln", Kabuinmes, s;pt ;979 ; 1 nj"*'""'''^
°'' "^"^"H^"
Rule: BabraK Kar^ai", Lw^orjGIIl^/Dec. 'jbIX, " Ala!
112, L-II/^'I^tTp? 22. I^-JiSH^enjevlew, no.
Af«hanista; T^'^T'^l ^ «• =<ls.,
PreC ?9b9): p!""i7;: "PP-"^-^^^., (Ann Arbor: University of Mlchlga^
Press!" 1973)^?"'649: ^i^Manlstan, (New Jersey: Princeton University
series'-, o'°:;o! TT^CITT^,: ^^^^^ South Asia
^- ^""^"-^ Dupree, "Red Flag over the Hindu Kush - Part 1".AUFS Reports, Asia 1979, no. 44, Sept. 1979, LD-2-79, pp. 7, 9.
271
272
Socie
10» Hannah Nesaran "APr,u
ty% Cu^^entJ^ nl^ ^lTZA TsTslV^^' ' ^^^^^^
"Toward* RepresentaU^e'^'aove^'n^^nt ""'^ ^^P^ee,
AUFS Report.
. Asia no. 1, 1978^''°'^"^ Afghanistan, Part 1",
12.
Afghanistan! Th^ <^r..,^^f Invasion ?n d"^ Arnold,
"1 3. NewJfoHcTimes
, April 28 iQ7ft 1 >,
April 29, 1978, 3:i. ' ^ = and New York Time... .
1^. Nancy & Richard Newell tho , ^(Ithaca: Cornell University ?ress^, ^ls^),~J^^^
15. Mohan Ram, in Farjastern,^^
...^^^^ ^^3^^
16. New York Times . May 3, 1978, l:i.
17. New York Times . May 7, 1978, 1:4.
18. Kabul Times
. May 11, I978.
18, 19?8,
"'""^ New York Time., . Nov.
Kabul1:„ea '."Ln"°^:^ ZT'l T'^^ CltizenaMp"
,
21. New York Times
. May 9, 1978, 13:1.
22. Kabul Times
. July 5, 1978.
273
23. Kabul Times, October 15, 1978, pp. i_2.
2^- Manohester Gu;,rHi.n November 5, 1978.
25. "Glorious Red Flag Hoisted", Kabul_Times, October 21, 1978.
October '1571978'"! k'" Kabul Times.
27. Kabul Times. September 23, 1978.
28. New York Times. December fi iQ7ft ^
December 3, 1978, p 1! I I' ^' Kabul Times .
Friendship, Good N^igLurllness and ^ seer^^^ii^f
the DRa! '
"'''"'^December'"" '1"'^" '''^
Journal of South and Middle Studies vol ttt ,1979, pp. 84-88" .
aue^rn b
.,
. Ill, no. 1, Fall
29. The Times. (London), April 15, 1979.
30. Washington Post. July 16, 1979, p. a12.
April 13, 1979, 1.5. ' ^ ' ^-^3°' New York Times .
32. New York Times . March 23, 1979, a1:3.
33- New York Times . June 24, 1979, 1:5.
34. For details on groups involved, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "The
stud?es1 Tl
^g^-i^^-"' survey, (A journal 'of East a^d Wesi ;, vol. 25, no. 2, Spring I98O.
274
35. NevOfork_Time3, April 12, 1979.
36. New York Tim^.., April 13, 1979, 1:5.
37. Nancy and Richard Newell th^(Ithaca: Cornell University PressriSSl ),Tr^^ Afghanistan,
38. Details of Soviet involvement
Th. in Soviet Strategy, ^.o,e Institute for the Study of Conflictf 1^8^
"Afghanistan's role In^lovi'It^^r^?'' ^""^ ^^^^^^ ^^^id Rees,tegy" conf^^ (London!
Of PDPA CCS
that^'J^; " 3:::;arda ; UteTlr-^^ T^'TlT
anlndL'^ioLTmLl!— °" ^^^^^ '^''^ Tar^^rhad^di^d^'^f
40. The Times
. September 24, 1979.'
41. Economist. November 3, 1979, pp. 52-53.
NOTES
Chapter IV
l* "Dangers to World Ppar.of» r.«w xa i'eace", Dawn
, December 28, 198O, 6:1.
aotlo'-p.,t,SrA?gtan TAUT ^^taus on t.e UN
agenj- oTMT'T,"
"zlZVZlll:' ^^^^^^ - '"^declaration of Intent to kSp the Musli™"'''?^'', Conference was ainterference and aKsresslon p """^ ^''^^ outside
the super powers, see "isJa^l. r
""^ P'-^^="'-« and rivalries ofP , I l mic Conference", Dawn, May 15, 198O, 7:1.
t- People's DallY
,
commentary in Dawn, January 2, 1980, 1:5.
Plan L leZlll^Toll-^^^^^^^^^
Interv^tll^-rNeTSlkr:^ 3"l9^9?^=^?
member 29, 1979, p. A1.
7. New York Times
,
8. New York Times,
9. New York Times
,
10. "Carter calls
December 29, 1979, p. A1; The Times (London), Decembe7
070 Ti ^P^^^^ ^° Brezhnev on hot-line", Dawn,
ons a Threat", New York Times .
29, 1979, p.
December 30,
275
276
11. New York Times, January 5, I980, A1:6.
IV, ^^^^-y'N New_York_Ti^ January 6, 198O,
IV, 2:3.* New^orl^Ti^ j,,,,,, 1980,
January ^ 1 ^1 98o!'' '°
'"'^'"^^^ editorial in Washington Po.. .
January*6,"l98S?'l6?4!° ""^^^^ New^orn<_Times
January-6,"l98o'';v,t3.''' '^'^ " New.lM-s,
re3olution'''''or'°iH''°« agreement mentions is a joint
Doc?ixnerwhich statL T'^^^' ^'"'^^'^^ Eisenhower
a...ession ^^^^^^^^^Ze^^^:^:^,—
ready" S'i'r '^'pT P^^^^^^' ""^ Moscow Hto defend Pakistan", The Times (London), December 31^1979^
18. New York Times . April 18, 198O.
19. New York Times
. January 24, 1980, p. A12.
sen ^!;n?"
^^''"^''^ announced that it was willing toll military equipment to China. This was a major policy shiftbecause for the first time since 1949, US and China were exploringpossibility of a security relationship. American decision to help theSoviet Union's major Communist adversary with military equipment andto grant it "most favored nation" status in trade was meant to convey
a warning to the Russians. However, in addition to it being aby-product of the US policy of protest against the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan, there were weighty economic factors binding the two. US
wanted to capture the vast Chinese market, and China wanted
277
technological help and assistano«
equipment, it was not to include
";eapon3-^^'''^ "^^^^^^yhelicopters, transport planes, and Til T./' ""^^ ^''"^^^^ t° trucks,aee Golaa W.
'choudhury!
"ihe ?.ir:''rWashington-Moscow-Beiiing" Asian p=..-,- f o ^^^^ngular Diplomacy:
Summer I98O, pp. 50-62?
^g^^ILlacific Community, (Japan), no. 9,
21. Richard S. Newell ht.,*.^
Afghanistan Crisis-., ThJ^ii^ ----
^
-
Proxiff
:
an^^°?aL^st°an\':;?/:::v^e"a's ^^11^''' ^^^^^
all, see, Shirin Tahir-Kheli "P.ov ^ !
serious and plausible of
and Pakistan", Orbis' vof 24 'o p T ''''f 1 ^^^^ °^ I^^", "-i-a , ox. d^, n . 2, Summer I98O, pp. 339-348.
camp'S^NevJ^^^ I^^ia is in Soviet
Asian^pLi?;^ i;^^^''^"^"^^ ' "Afghanistan invasion viewed from India"n Pacific Community (Japan), no. 9, Summer I98O, p. 727
'
Indian Express. January 3, 1980.
Bhabani Sen r
""ciLtfLliL."'"'
An interperceptlonal Study of
.ovjet-Asian Relat^o^
,
(New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, I98O), p. 484.
M.. r^ufr^^! ^* ^""^ Rajaram Panda, "Domestic Support forrs. Gandhi's Afghan Policy: The Soviet Factor in Indian Politics"Asian Survey, vol. XXIII, no. 3, March, 1983, pp. 261-279 '"'^''^ '
28. "India and the Afghan crisis", Dawn
, January 23, 198O, 7:1.
Februfr'; iri98orAl5:
1 ™° °" New York Times,
278
30. "Threat to World peace", Dawn, January 2, I98O, 1:5.
1980,'!;i."'^'^^^^^°"^™ Elates soviet step". Dawn, January 3,
32. Ibid.
33. "World reaction", Dawn, January 18, 198O, 5:4.
Morocc':; on'^sip::rr°22:i^6r
.Tre~ -the
"Israeli-engineered" a^son Of the mT'' m° described a^month before. This nrTt Olc Ll, ^" Jerusalem the
forcussed primarily on Se question of '^^""^^^Israel in the June I967 Ara ! s a"li war %ut u'ar'^'
''''''
Islamic Conference of Foreign M±n^lttL ? organized the
unified voice for \tl u "^"^^^^^^ O'^der to provide a single
international questions! ' community) on current
35. "Islamic world and Afghanistan", Dawn, January 11, I98O, 7:1.
"The 'Lgltal^oi'^f llb'^PoliUcs'' rT ^^^^^"^eitzman,
Ar..an invasion", 0^, tT 25:^^o!^ ^, ^s^r" 1 ^S^fp^"^ ^389!:0^"
37. Dawn
, May 13, 1980, 1:2.
38. "Declaration", Dawn
,
January 30, 198O, 4:1.
r,^^^.^^' J.^'!^''^''''^^
^^^"-^^^ of the Fresident or Pakistan - islamic
(oZT Conference held at Islamabad", Strategic StupesQuarter y journal of the Institute of Strategic Studies, jslamlbadvol. Ill, no. 3, Spring I98O, pp. 12-17. Also, " Zia's call forspeedy end of Kabul tragedy". Dawn, May 18, 198O, 1:K
^0. "3-member body for Afghanistan", Dawn, May 23, I98O, 1:1-Final communique of 11th IFMC", Strategi^Studies (Islamabad), volIII, no. 3, Spring I98O, pp. 18-39^
279
^2. Justus M. Van Der Kropf md^i,- .
AsiHLlffairs, Sept-Oct. 1980^?.' 17-30
""^^ security",
^3. New York Times, January 28 lofliJanuary 30, 198I, p. A3. ' ^' New York Times .
^5. "New Initiati ves on Afghanistan", Dawn, March 2, 198O, 1:1.
^^^^^46.^^"Moscow is in no .ood to leave Afghanistan", Dawn, July 2,
^7. New York Times. February 10, 198I, p. A4.
January' 198o''%v?'''°'ff °^ ^^^^^^^ Conference inigao, Syria and South Yemen did not particioate at an ^nHX ya did not participate at the appropriate lev:^^::::'^:
,'ia; I?
Mav iqan^
^^^^ °f the Islamic ^^rence iny 1980, these countries Clearly voiced Views in favour of Karma?regime m Kabul and the Soviet Union.
NOTES
Chapter V
2. New York Tlmef^. March 23, 1979.
3. The Times (London), May 30, 1978, p. 15.
Abdul'-Wa?nh:n and fo^tfPolitJ^f' ^'^'T ^^^^^^^^^ ^-^^er
Of Wall Khan and banned Natx'oial liJ"? °p '^'^'^^
conspiracy. Trial
during Bhutto's rule- Da^?^ wff 7 ^^^^"^ ^" ^P^^^ ^976
secession for Pakistan's Lr^h w T^'T °' ^"^^"^'"y °-
P-mces. SeeNef?^^^ Baluchistan
Thei^?Xe\°°22'r^^^ ^^^^ -re released,
olvll'*war'duJir^9?3'7r''.'^-":;''"'"' ^^"^'^^ ^" undeclared
Foreign P^lic^ 'nn'' ;''^!?^" Baluchistan",
pp!\ 1
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, if8 1 )
,
A.-,
^' ^^'^ "Pakistan's Search for Security".Asian Affairs (New York), September-October, 198O, p. I8-I9.
8. The Times
,
May 5, 1978, p. 7; The Times , May 6, 1978, p. 5.
9. The Kabul Times . July 5, 1978, 1:5.
280
281
10- The Kabul Time..., September 10, 1978.
ptember 11, 1978.
11. The Kabul Times,
12. The Kabul Times,
13. The Kabul Times
,
International
oms
ember 197^.
report,
The New York Times . March 23, 1979.
The Kabul Times
. July 19, 1979.
(Karachi), ""La^T^'igv'g ^'m'T 22-?^ ^"V rZj'^military training in camps in Pakistan: "All tribesmen are
i::Tr.v:iiTj'. f^r^T " ''^^^ ------
Iran Condemned", Kabul Times
. August 30, 1979, p. i.
^^^^^^an and
19. New York Times, April 10, 1979; "Kabul Charge of Raid False,Baseless", Dawn, April 10
, 1979, 1:3.
20. The Kabul Times
,
May 9, 1979; "Taraki Blames foreigninfiltrators for trouble". Dawn, April 23, 1979, 1:5; "Kabul again
accuses Pakistan and Iran", Dawn, April 28, 1979, 1:4.
21. "Taraki expresses solidarity with Pakhtoons, Baluch", Dawn,May 14, 1979, 1:8; "Afghanistan expresses implicit support of
secessionist movements in Pakistan", The Times
, May 15, 1979, p. 5.
282
22. The Kabul Timf...,, August 30, 1979.
23. The Kabul TimP., juiy 3, 1979^
24. The Kabul TImP..,, juiy 12, 1979^ p. 4.
25. The Kabul Time..., July 19, 1979^
26. The Kabul Time.... juiy 19, 1979^ p. 4.
27. The Kabul Time.g. August 7, 1979, p. 1.
28. The New York Tim^.,, juiy 31, 1973, p. a7.
arresting hundreds of Rhm-foT^ ? °^ government
violent reacMon ,Z ^^^^^^'^ supporters in an attempt to head of
As?de from dnl!^ ^^^^lot, there were still demonstrations.
Tv,I T- w '
March 21, 1978, 6:5; March 25, 1978, 2'3- andThe Times
. March 21, 1978, p. 7. '
^
Th- H^°:-.^P^^^ ^*
^i^l^ter, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's
L.^^i^^^''^
Regime", Pacific Affairs , vol. 51, no. 3, Fanri9?8
I0.1T r
-t-teshow the regime wLered 'betie^n hegoals of restoration (civil rule) and reform (Islamic).
Th. n^^K rru
^"""^ studies include Lawrence Ziring,The Ayub Khan Era; Politics in Pakistan. iq58-6Q . (Syracuse, N. Y.Syracuse University Press, 1971); Raunaq Jahan,Pakistan; Failure in National Integration . (New York; Columbia
From Crisis to Crisis; Pakistan 1962-69
. (London; Oxford University
283
Press, 1972)'
Politio in Pakistan: 'tHp Nature^and n^r-o..- ^^^^^"^ ^' Sayeed,Prae^er Pnhi.-.....^
^g^O^^"^'^^
.g-iIll-Dlr:ect^ of change
. (New York!
July
'!*198rp?"r' ^^^^ ^ Barracks", The Tl.es.
33- The New York Times . March 23, 1979.
—LlELy vo-L. ^u, no. 2, February 198O, pp. 188-96.
35. "Aid and Interference", Dawn
, April 13, I979, 7:i.
Relations between Pakistan and the United States
China And PaRisUn. Entente Cr.^JJ'" (A.ne.3t/""5nivePalty ''If
Palclstan- Ihl L^n. vf^r^^?...^.!;^^"^''-,
. ^ , ^^fl^"'^
-1-
—— —
.v^it<, xew
,
i^uurnam, N. C.: Duke University Press.
37. The Times
. May 20, 1978, p. 5.
38. The New York Times
. April 10, 1979.
39. "Pakistan-American relations: the India Factor", DawnJanuary 3, 1979, 9:3.
^0. The New York Times
. January 2, I98O, p. A12.
41. "US to cut off Development Aid to Pakistan", Dawn, April 7.
1979, 1:1, ' ^
284
Energy, Congre.a of ^^J
.S^'lZllZol^'XTrs oTTmXT'
and Pa^inr^^^alis'o? hT"' '•'^ Subco.lttee on Asian
Septelp 7: 1979- "Presid^rzia.rAif 5^a3hin£ton_Poat,
^;,,mr„^^- r J ' i' sldent Z a's Address to the Sixth Non-Aliened
A- • . ' ^ decision to cut aid 'act ofdiscrimination., Pakistan has no plan to .ake N-Weapons", Ap.u
Dece.b1; 8"'l982rp/A7''''' Th^Jiew_Yor^^
H o^^^•^^''''^"
Christopher Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia
^SvQ
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 7,1979, as reprinted in "South Asia: Promoting Stability and Security"Department of State Bulletin, April 1979, p. 48; and "Christopher's
Findings", Dawn
, March 9, 1979, 5:3.
47. Ibid.
48. Harold H. Saunders Statement before the Subcommittee onAsian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee onSeptember 26, 1979, as reprinted in "South Asia: Situation in
Afghanistan", Department of State Bulletin
, December 1979, p. 53.
49. Testimony of Harold H. Saunders, "Crisis in the
Sub-Continent: Afghanistan and Pakistan", Hearings before the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, (Washington
D. C: US GPO, 1980), p. 32.
50. The New York Times
, January 4, 198O, 1:6.
285
51. "Pakistan Reoorts tt<?
The New York Tim.. April 22 iqa, fj^"^'^ 5-year Aid Deal"
June 25, 1981, pTM. ' The Me» York TiJ.
'
52. "Pakistan to Receive *3 t,,,,.
The New York Tlm». June 16, 1981, p! Ais! "S"'
l!-jll:iorTl^ Billion in Aid",
arms from America", The Times ! June ^6, igal "PakSLfbillion of us aid. Buy F-16 FlchJ.,. ^^^kistan to get $3
The Wall street .,r..,.L,
,
June 16 ^98^ ^',0""" "I=l^o" Help",Helationship with Pakistan hJ . I "Washington's Hew
=->triea", Th^J^all!|^J|^^^ ''°*'>
R^Po^t'' Committ:e 'In^S'^^HeSr"^^
Washington D. C: US a?o, ApriTlgsT '
Afghanistan"!"''
'"'"ir' "^^^^'j".^^"- Soviet invasion of
US Strategic Inter.na in .......T^.l';, (J'^^^L'^" p
H^be'rf a'Sf^ng^ a^d"j:^es"T"Bo\er1y
"^"^L^^ml
t"
'
1979,^7:3. "^^"^ 52™, March 4,
57. Overseas Dawn
. December 30, 1978.
March'26, i9So,TT'
TV, M^^'v r^S""^®^
Leadership Sees Pakistani-Afghan War Risk",The New York Times
. June 2, I979, 4:3.
286
61. "Afghanistan: Political <;^i„<-^
The Current Di... t of the Sovllt llT.l
.IT 'Trv Possible",12, 1983, p. 2. ie _Pre33, vol. XXXIV, no. 50, January
Januaryy's/mo; etn"' '"^P^^"'^'* The Mew Yoric Ti..,
f.nn, f * ^M^T^ ^'^^''^ Fres tetter, "The Battle in Afghanistan: A Viewrom Europe", Strategic Review . Winter, 198I, p. 4.
M.-T^^^*
^^^^^^ ^* "Constraints on the USSR in Southwest Asia: AMilitary Analysis", Orbis, Fall I98I, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 607-629.
„
S.M.Burke, Mainsprings of India and Paki stanforeign Policies, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974),
pp. 235-236. ^' o
« .
-^^P Mukerjee, "Afghanistan under Daoud: Relations withNeighbouring States", Asian Survey
, vol. 15, no. 4, April 1975, p.
117, stated that such support was considered as unnecessary and even
counterproductive
.
70. The Soviet Premier offered his country's assistance once
again but he did not receive a favourable response from either of the
parties. For details see, Mehrunnisa All, "The Simla and Tashkent
287
A8™t3", Pakistan Horizon
, vol. S5, no. 3, ,972, pp. 53-7U.
CHanl:ge/"-^rnr
'X^po;t:SS;^f * ^'""^ »^
studies in India-.. ForeLn pSll^v ' r.
Surendra Chopra ed.
University, mi), p! m. '*°"^"=^'-= 0"™ Nanak Dev
to Tnr^.l^
argument may be further demonstrated by pointingI dia's relations with the other states in the reSonBangladesh Srilanka, Nepal and Bhutan. There have been Various
the^'e's'Lt s has'n:t''''r--;'^' ^^^^^^^ bltancL^iuh
as^:rthi:L^st:n o^'r^^al;::^..!^'^^"^
°^
d'^^*
..^^^^^'^^'^t by Ii^dira Gandhi in an interview with NBC's "Meetthe Press", on October 2, 1983.
V V.
^""^ ^'''"^ Pakistan threat to India: Mrs Gandhi",Kabul New Times . April 7, 1981, 4:2.
75. "India protests against US bid to rearm Pak",Kabul New Times . Apr il 12, 198I, 1:5.
76. "Mrs Gandhi voices concern in message to Pak President",
Kabul New Times . July 6, 198I, 1:5.
77. Rodney Tasker, "On the frontiers of fear",
Far Eastern Economic Review
. October 16-22, 198I, p. 42, describes
Pakistan's dilemma in the following words: "Pakistan now feels more
threatened than at any other time in its 34 years history... On its
western border it looks nervously at the presence of 85,000 Soviet
troops helping a Marxist Government in Kabul subdue a Muslim
population, while at the same time keeping the bulk of its armed
288
ant^g^nlsuc ijdLrn^JSbou;:"!^' ^^^^^ - increasingly
78. Agha Shahi's statement in Dawn, May 4, 1981.
overseas Hindu.t.n ^e. of no war pact",
Novembe; 11^ ^982!' 1:4!°'^'''
normalization of ties", Overseas Dawn .
Novembe; S^T.lT Overseas Hindustan Ti....w o r igai, i:i_i4. gge also Pakistan Times . Oohnhpr ^n^ iQfti
(London; igeS)*, p"!' ^^^^^^^^'^ Relations with India: 1947^196. ,
I^h.n"^^;.w V^^T'' "^^^ ^°^^^Sn Policy of Mr. Liaquat AliKhan", Pakistan Horizon , vol. 4, 1951, p. 195.
^
P=,„- f * "India's offer of a no-war declaration to
1972! 24
History and Import", Pakistan Horizon , vol. 26, no. 3,
Sons
Foreign Policy of Pakistan
. (Karachi: Feroz
, 1964), pp. 3_6.
86. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Biography.(Lahore: Feroz Sons, 1967), p. 122.
~ ^
—
87. "Positive response to Pak Offer", Overseas Hindustan Times.
December 3, 198I.
88. "Ball now in Pak Court", Overseas Hindustan Times, December
3, 1981, 1:1.
289
89.
in a
.
The contents of Mrs. Gandhi's lettPr i-n t-j.
Chandigarh newspaper. Asserting Jh^^^H i , ''^'^^ publishedplace from the Indian side a ^n^i^ l^^ leakage had not taken
Minsitry of India said JhJt P^- ^ ^^'^^ External Affairs
Of correspondence by leaking xfto tL ' confidentiality
embark on serious dJScisfi nn, ?! * ^aid, "We wish to
relations and L n'r oirintin?- ^^^^^^^hbour on improving our
exercise", see "Pak drafr un.oo! . ^"^^^^^ propaganda
June 17, 1982, l-U
acceptable". Overseas Hindu..t.n Ti^.o,
Tn,n.J?- ^''''^i^
Mansingh,
"Regional Cooperation in South Asia-
91. "No-war Pact: Next round of talks in Islamabad"Overseas Hindustan Times . February 11, 1 982, 1:1-4.
,
Commission will identify areas of cooperation inthe spheres Of education, culture, science and technologyfapairfromeconomic matters. The Commission's main function would be S securethe implementation of agreements reached at ministerial level!
93. "A small but promising step towards detente?".Overseas Dawn
. February 12, 1982, 1:1-3.
94. "A small but promising step towards detente*?".Overseas Dawn
,
February 12,1982,1:1-3. The differing perspectives
are also expressed in the editorial in Times of India
. February 2,19o2. "
95. "No-war pact: next round of talks in Islamabad",
Overseas Hindustan Times
, February 11, I982, 1:1-4.
96. "Pakistan seeks resumption of talks on no-war pact".
Overseas Hindustan Times
. May 6, I982, 13:1-2; also "Resumption of
talks". Overseas Dawn
. June 11, 1982, 10:1.
97. "Pakistan blowing hot and cold". Overseas Hindustan Times,
May 27, 1982, 13:1-2.
~
290
Overall's DawJ.^uty^l^^ 1982^^1:^3!'^^^^''" °^ stalled dialogue",
99. "Facilitating normalization of rpiafs^^ot.June 11, 1982, ^.^ ^."^ °;
"delations", Overseas Dawn,
Overseas Hindu.h.n t...., j^^^ 1982,^1-4. ^ breakthrough",
17, 198°; 1:2!!;/''''
unacceptable", Overseasjiin^ Times, June
101. "Very friendl
overseas HLaiu.t.. Ti.,„ August 26, 198?f 13: 1-5."""
Pakistan",
11, '°982,"'7v'' »n'f°T"' ^^SSSSiOlndustain^ Hcvember-
overseas r>Ln . Novembe^ n'fgsirui ' normalization of ties",
103. In September 1982, when Mrs. Oandhi went to n'?<m
ZZLIT and^la^Lta^n "Le^^^-St"^ "^^^ n:g:ti:?ioL"^;tw:S:2~sJU^^ a Friendship",
V. Eshwa; Anand'''"uil[^f '"^^^ ^^^^^-^
America's Tnuly. a ^n^^^' ^"^^ ^^PP^^ ^° Pakistan: A Study of
(Zr.^ n ^^"-^ Diplomacy", Pun.jab Journal of Politics(Amrxtsar, Guru Nanak Dev University), vol. /, ^no. 2, jil^-Dec! 19^2 !
View ^°^°"^\,^'^af
Friestetter, "The Battle in Afghanistan: Av from Europe", Strategic Review . Winter 198I, pp. 36-42. It is
xn'
thesis that the^alient that the SovieJa'are'esta^lishi^g
i^Hnf^S '
whatever additional leverage it may give them in theMiddle East, may be directed more eastward - toward Pakistan, India
IT. T!u 5^"^^ally to the creation of the "Asian Collective Securitybystem" that remains a prime Soviet objective, p. 43.
106. "The talks always swings back to India",Overseas Hindustan Times
, August 5, 1982, 9:1-5.
291
107. Mujtaba Razvi, "Paki <?fan f = n
Security", Pakistan Horizon vo] ^r
Political Environment and
All Shah, "Southwest Asia: Can the ii^ ' I ' ^^-"^^J Shafqat
Strategic Review
, winter 1981, PP 27 35 I Mistakes?",of Conflict and Cooperation in Souih l^.!. pT^ "^'^^ Politics
no. 3, 1982, pp. 44-59. ' Pakistan Horizon, vol. 35,
Ten3ion';n ?L''prLt1""\i:es"of'fr °' ^^^^^^ ^-^^^ oftroncs
,
Tim f India, January 7, I98I, p. 79.
Afsha::3;anr"^L^^inS
"'Zl 7:
'^'''''1 '''^ '""^'^^ °'
pp. 416-437.
At t airs
,
vol. 61, no. 2, Winter I982-83,
(New York: Preager Publishers, 1982), pp. 35.66.
t-oiitics
,
^"i^^":
"^^^^onal Security and Military Policy inIndia", in Zirmg ed. The Subcontinent in World Politic.. (New YorJ"Preager Publishers, 1982), pp. 87-94.
'
'
^
NOTES
Chapter VI
Foreign Mlniater^^^za eh ? ^ L Jha '%hronir ''^^problem I3 for USSR to withdraw It, ?!^Lr, 1.^ solution to the
6, 1980, 1:2.
i s troops, see Dawn (Karachi), May
ill sndniStan
, and with a view of HpffanHinrr
TrP^fr^rr- ^"^^."^^^f^tammg peace and security proceeding from the
r ^Q7ft r'^^"""'' Good-neighborliness and Cooperation of December
D^li ^PP'^^f
the USSR With an insistent request for Urgent
reuue^ed fro!^ i-h r
^^"'^^^^^^^ Republic of Afghanistan repeatedly
^nvof / ^ ^ Government of the Soviet Union previously. TheGovernment of the Soviet Union has met the request of the Afghan
3. The Times (London), December 29, 1979.
4. "Kabul Regime says it invited Russians", New York TimesJanuary 1, 198O; also "Karmal regime calls for Soviet military aid" !Dawn
. December 29, 1979, 1: 1.
J ^'-l^
,
^- The Current Digest of the Soviet Press , vol. XXXII, no.
8, March 26, 198O, p. 4. See also, "US 'meddling' preventing Sovietpullout — Brezhnev", Dawn, February 23, I98O, 1:2-5.
6. "Karmal lays down tough conditions", Dawn
,
April 3, 1980,
8:6.
292
293
7. "Brezhnev sets vo.^
8. »Ka™al laya do™ tough conditions", Da™, April 3, 1980,
Da™,';pnlTri98ri:^':i3Tli°L'^""''^
April 29, 1980, 10:4. friendship offer", Dawn;
1980,'°-l::f^rL'°:Kabi^:fJL'^^?' SSSl, April 19,
The Current Di^;°° of the Scvf^ p ' " P°""=^l settlement"^ ^ °' "^"^ oviet Pre.....
. vol. XXXH, no. 20, p. 6.
11. "Talks with Kahul regime ruled out". Da™, April 22, ,980,
12.
Undeclared War; Armed Intervention and other fo™s of
-rro::;:rAff:irr ^ni^^Pr^^^"^'^^^^^ ^ Mi-istr,rureign Aiiairs, Information Department, I98O), pp. 49-52.
see als^ l^7,^^l
withdrawal conditions", Dawn, October 20, 198O, 1:3;o. White Book pp. cit., pp. l40-l¥37^ '
14. "Assurances to Pakistan", Dawn, October 1, 198O, 1:6.
15. Dawn October 1, 198O, 12:1.
16. New York Times
. December 10, 198O, p. A10.
294
10, 1980, n^T?"*' interference In region", Dana, December
18. Jeanne Kirkpatrick,
"The <^ii;.^^-^Current History, vol. 8l, no.' 475, May 1982^ p? 231.
^^3^^"^^^^"%
Negotiation:''"
'''''' failure of Three-track
fi^f^rS^^^^^^ vol. 4, no^'T'TX's
?u,l,lLsT'^^^^^^^ Allied
21. "Afghanistan Diplomatic Moves", Dawn, March 7, I98O, 7:1.
22. New York Times . March 15, I98O.
23. "Afghan Issue", Dawn, February 25, 198I, 10:3-4.
198l,^t;2-3^^™^^
Giscard's proposal". Dawn, February 21,
25. "Afghan issue". Dawn, February 25, I98I, 10: 3-5.
"EEC Ministers to moot next move". Dawn, July 13, 198I,
^'^* "A"°^^®'^ effort on Afghanistan", New York Times
. July 5,
28. "European Proposal on Afghanistan Scored",
Current Digest of the Soviet Press
, vol. 33, no. 31, September 2,
1981, pp. 5-6; "Conflicting Soviet Signals on Afghan Conference",
The Times (London), July 2, 198I; "Final Soviet Rejection of EEC
Plan", The Times (London), August 6, I98I.
295
1981,1;:/;''°'°°" Discounts Afghanistan Plan", New York Ti.e. . July 7,
Asia ll'cinTrlf^
Mustafa, "The Islamic Conference and Afghanistan"
_Asi Pacific Community, no. 14, Fall 198I, pp. 34.36.
^'^n
,
Negotiluonl'^''
'''''' "''''°^'^'
^^^^^^ Three-track
SMirf^^ -1. r^no;!"-;:
the ^fl,ff^ ^^^'^ ^ P^^^^ °°"f*e^e"ce that Moscow had informedcommittee that it should first talk to the Kabul regime and Jhenhold discussions with Moscow, Dawn, July 17, 1981, 1:2.
33. "Islamic body contacts Kabul", Dawn, July 17, I98I, 1:1-2.
34. "Afghan issue", Dawn
.
February 25, I98I, 10:3-4.
35. "43 states call for UN Council's urgent meeting", Dawn,January 5, I98O, 1:1-2; and "Naik urges UN Council lo aW^kAfghanistan", Dawn, January 6, 198O, 1:1-2.
36. "Efforts to call UN Assembly as USSR uses veto", Dawn,January 9, 1 980, 1:4-5. '
37. "UN Assembly calls for Soviet pullout". Dawn, November 21,
38. "Soviet pullout: draft motion for UN", Dawn, November 18,
1980, 1:12. Also see "The UN and Afghanistan", Dawn, October 23,
1980, 5:1.
39. "UN envoy to try for a dialogue on Afghanistan", The Times,
July 28, 1981.
296
40. "Talks Offer to Kabul", Dawn, January 5, I98I, 7:1-2.
41. "Why Pakistan favours t^^^.cFinancial Times, (London), February 10, 1981' p. 3!'
^^S^^^i^^-""
»
13, 1985, l':^.'''''
Afghanistan and Kampuchea", Dawn, February
^^^J3.
"Shahi rules out bilateral talks". Dawn, February 9, 1981,
White Book
. od. oi 1-
Current Digest'o f p^^^„ PP* 117-119;
— 5;
S ooviei: t-ress
.,
vol. 33, no. 31, September 2, 1981,
Pakis^a;.s'1uJrude"'ir;he"'Af ^^^-^ ^^^t
influenced pres^^L^T^nt^^iLls":^^^^
""No^^ev^^Lio^:from policy". Dawn, May 15, 1 98 1, 1:3.5. '
deviation
1981.
""^^^^ 3=0U3se3 Pakistan", The Times
. (London), July 30,
Augusre, ;?8,ri=r
'""^
'° 5-,
49. "De Cuellar's mission". Dawn, August 7, 1981, 13:1-2.
UoiHw^°*„ "^^P^^^^®
tal^s Afghan issue: Shahi & Dost agree to meetWaldheim", Dawn
, August 21, I98I, 1:6.
297
Department omclals^afc^nf^irSr^ that the State
"convey an understanding ofT^eTussTaT'T '° clesigned toWillingness to discuss internal oo^i^? Afghanistan, a3ense of the importance of the Shan •f'''^' compromises there and arelations". The Soviet retctfd t^^"^ '° ""^'""^ Soviet-AmericanAfghanistan, offering recognuJon ol abou?Afghanistan in retSrn for a^med forL, interests in(see, "Moscow rejects US secret def?" L'"'''^r^^' ^^^^ country;However, the Reagan Adminis^ratfon ^' ^98l, 1:7)that it had been rebuffedIfSe Kr^mlin'a?? fe-lHUH-IiSes reportto start secret talks, said that ^^^^^/^^eral recePTtTttemptsOfficials to start serious ne^oti. J f ' ^^^^^^^^ Sovietinvolvement in Afghanistan! (see '^r'n.'^ "^ili^^^yAfghanistan", Dawn, August 9, mT,\:lT, ""^^^ '"""^ '^^^ °^
52. White Book, op. cit. pp. 53.54 „^ , ,involve UN in search for settlement" th! t- r ^^^"^ ^^^^^ to1981, p. 6.
'. The Times, (London), August 26,
53. "Russians offer i-prmc, p„„ <.
(London), August 3 1 , 1 98 1 ™akif?L withdrawal",. The Times
J^^ Times (London), September 2T198I, 6:K
'""^''^^^"^ KabuF^ff^
54. Dawn Overseas. September 4, 1981.
55. "Kabul pressure on Paki=>i-an
Ilienmes (London), August 2, 198I negotaiations",
56. "Afghan-Pakistani talks ai- mi
New York Time.
. September 29' I981' p. a9.
""'"^ deadlocked",
57. White Book
, op. cit. pp. 53-54.
= "l^^^^
to send emissary soon", Dawn, February 19. 198 1 l-i-also "De Cuellar confers with Kabul e^S Dawn, Lnuary ^ ' igs],'
298
es=hi';.o;a1aLt";:ii:":3ue:..™Df:r^?^^ General = Kabul as.ed toxasues
,
Dawn
, January 7, 1982, 1:1-3.
^o<^^^Z\?ToZ"^T'^%Z^^^^^^^^ Kabul accuse, cf
FebPufr; ,9!'°1982:''' ""'^ Initiative", The Ti^es (London).
62. Dawn Overseas. December 2, 1982, pp. 2.3.
64. Dawn Overseas. December 9, 1982, pp. i, 5.
n«wn nf
* '^^^^es Afghanistan mission with cautious hope"Da Overseas
. January 27, 1 983, p. 1.
ux n
,
Februar; 2o!'lfs'^^?""' '° refugees", New York Times,
January'-2o7?983r3!l.
^ale-Afghan border", 0^™,
68. "Soviet pull-out imperative for Afghan solution",Dawn Overseas
. January 20, 1983, 3:1.
x ^-luu
,
69. Fred Halliday, "The limits of Russian Imperialism",New Statesman, vol. 100, December 5, I98O, pp. 10-12: from theperspective of conditions in Afghanistan, the author argued that "itIS futile to call for an unconditional Soviet withdrawal".
70. "Efforts to solve Afghan issue: Perez hopeful".
Dawn Overseas
. April 7, I983.
299
iaaue"!
"
pawfOversearL.°^"f ^^solutlon of Afghanistan
vol. % FauN^a"^^;;'^!^-;^?-^^^^^-Pi- '° Orbla,
win not contemplate handing back' Iflan^^?'
established Communist regime^ whuf Ji - '° ^will never wiumgiy consent uJe unde^'oL"" '"'''^
Februa"; 2oTmT,\Tu""' '° refugees". NeiOorknmes,
74. Leonard Ravner "n-!H m
World Press Review vol ?7 . Miscalculate?",
^^^^^S^^^^i^^^^at i:a;ted 'is a" plVto''
'''''
''''
^^^^
political power balance in r„, • ? ^
restructure the world
Brezhnev's face".
Russia's favor has blown up in Mr.
198l/?:\-6?'^''" political settlement I", Dawn, August 11,
ILetXsl: r'^',;9-l?r™addlt"nan' -
outer belt of neutralitv J = addi io lly suggests to create an
Afghanistan
-- a is^^denlza?r"» of'T/°' Flhlandlzation of
tHarg^thS^^^^^
Faicistan, and India to remain non-aligned.
NOTES
Chapter VII
newspaper,
2. Syed
Afghan Refugees in Paki3t;, n. The Long Waf?^^^^'' (t . k .
Hussain,
Publishing House, not dated), p! 8?^
(Islamabad: Kamran
the n;.-for^M\'r^^°V'^ ""^^ Pass-book", Refugees Magazine , new from
^aLary"^;83,'p!'16.
^^-^-ioner fo7 Refugees, Geneva, no. 2,
6. Hussain, Afghan Refugees in Pakistan , op. oit. p. 9.
7. UNHCR Information: Paki.ct;.n, n^no,,.
, 6, January 1983,PP
8. Charles B. Keely, Global Refugee Policy ; The Case for
a Development Oriented Strategy. A Public Issue paper for thePopulation Council, New York, I98I, p. 20.
9. "Voluntary repatriation and UNHCR: A Traditional role with a
New Perspective", Refugees
, no. 16, April 1983
300
301
solutions frRe?uge:si:To::iclTefu^:7.
'"''"'.o^
^~nt
for Nationalities lervi^e^^iHf^ff^ifl^^ ^--^^
1982/9:2."''^''''"^" Q^^^^eas Hindu.t.n t...., February 11,
1981 Ilk, ^erl'l .n!!L\!'°"n...^^^^!;-^,
,
to Pakistan",
York, pp. 15-17.
-""^^^^
^
""^ted States Committee for Refugees, New
^^^^^13.
"The Afghan Resistance", Dawn, Karachi, February 27, I98I,
R.mJ'^*.,
"^"terview: Poul Hartling, UN High Commissioner forRefugees", Refugees
, no. 15, March 1983, 5:2.
la
.mnJ^* /T. ^^li^^ assistance to long-termsolutions". Refugees Magazine, no. 4, January 1 983, pp. 11-12?
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
1983 ^pp
^^8^19^^°'''^' "'^^^ P^ys?", Refugees Magazine
,
no. 4, January
19. In 1980-81, EEC funds were used to purchase 143,000 tents, 1
million quilts, 40,000 ground sheets, and 15,000 tarpaulins at a total
cost of $15.7 million. Ibid.
20. Hussain, The Long Wait
, op. cit. pp. 14-16.
21. Ekber Menemenicioglu, "From tents to Katchas",
Refugees Magazine." no. 1, September I982, pp. 39-40; Joachim
Bolger, "Education", Refugees Magazine , no. 2, January 1983, reported
that 341 primary schools were established, over 1,200 teachers
302
appointed and almost 60,000 children enrolled, p. 30.
22. Hussain, TheJ^on^jJait
, q^_,__cit_, pp. 17.18.
no. 13,* January 1983rp: T ^^^^ ^-^^ Bagh", Refugees.
10, Oet';ber"l98r^:LT' -^"^-^ Bara.al", Refugees, no.
25. Ekber MeneraeniGioglu,
"From t^nt^ f« v u ^ ,.
Refugees Magazine, no. 1, September 198rpp. 39-40.
'
26. Refugees, no. 6, November-December I981, 12: 1.
Thirtf °f the High Commissioner's Programmeirty Second Session", Refugees
,
no. 6, November-December 1981^^2:
28. Marcel Ackermann, "Prospects and limits for self-reliance"Refugees Magazine, no. 2, January I983, pp. 19-20.
^-e ian
,
May 1982,
2;3.^°'' "Self-help in Pakistan", Refugees , no. 5,
30. Thomas J. Barnes, "ILO projects for Afghan refugees".Refugees
,
no. 15, March I983, p. 1. ^
*
31. Ekber Meneraencioglu, "The logistics of the humanitari
effort: Afghans in Pakistan", Refugees
, no. 15, March 1983, 6:1-3.
an
32. Japan gave 50 Isuzu trucks. South Korea gave 21 SMC Heavyduty trucks, and Federal Republic of Germany gave 70 Mercedez Benz
trucks, Hussain, The Long Wait , op. cit.
, pp. 25-27.
303
33* Mervyn Powell "Th*» a ^
no. 2, January 1983, p^.
^^_3^^°l°gi°al drama", Refugees Ma;,azlne.
34. "With Settlement of so-callPH af^w. • •increased In Pakistan", !CabuOewS^/D^2::;,r3ri98o;^:^!l'"^
1980,'?;2."'''^''^' P""^'' ^ boomerang", KabuOe^rijes, August 4,
September ^2?°\llT \ZTr,l T"/™ ^iven by President Zla on
Refugees H^.lJ.''t X .^l^^'f,';'' «^ by UNHCR,
38. The Governor of NWFP refers i-n it- »
«tivltles", Refugees, no. ,0, October 1982, ^2?'
""'«""«-'>'-ln8ing
p. 2!°*
ilNHCR Information: Pakistan, Geneva, no. 6, January 1983,
41. Thomas J. Barnes, "ILO projects for Afghan Refugees"Refugees
, no. 15, March I983, p. 1.
" i
,
42. Kabul Times
. March 25, 1979.
43. "Afghan delegate exposes foreign intervention in DRAattairs", Kabul New Times . December 18, I98O, 2:4-7.
^^r^' USSR, January 23, I98O, as appeared inThe Truth About Afghanistan, Document, Facts Eyewitness Reports,
compiled by Volkov, et. al., (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency
304
Publishing House, 198O), pp. 77.9.
TJ^eJ^^^^ 14, 1979, as appeared in
A. s!'*GpiKi7rfS^i^^ -.Piled by
Progress PublishersrigsSi! pp!" ' Belyavsky, (Moscow:
The Undeclared W^n, ibid, pp. 52.53.
The Truth About Afghani 5. t;,
n
. ibid, pp. 91.92.
1982,1:5."''^''"^'^" Qve^^eas Hindustan Ti..., February 11,
Dece.be; 8',''i982!"a7!k"''' " 'Jl^l^-Jor^i^,
ThP wfii
"Afghans say Soviet brutality grows"e Wall Street Journal . March 7, I983, p. 27.
1983,^Ail:1-3f^"^
^^"^ ^^^"^ ^° increase". New York Times
. May 4,
NOTES
Chapter VIII
Februl;y 2™ %IT. 6:l!'"' '° Refugees", New York Tl..., .
will \.,l"r:iolTJ°lll TiZT^ °l "'''"''^ ^---p^' -
Afghanistan", said one A?,.h!; f!fi ^''^ resistance In
war Vo„ C.o.LrT.,-.roT^^Z^
went ^to 'paS^L'r "h^'
""''"'^ Secretary, Casper Weinberger
LI i£' r rvr - - ^:ir^"xbe%r-scont nue to do whatever possible for the success of the struggle ofthe Afghans against Soviet occupation" see "Afahan rJ?Z.ll tWeinberger", New York Times . October 2, I983, J:l ^ ' ^^'^^'"^
NevLY^^l^ Hebels",
June 19, ^98^rp^^Cl/^^"°^
Beijing, June 12, 198I in FBIS/SU
,
6. The Economist
. August 20, 198O, p. 3
7* Washington Star
. December 27, I98O, p. A7.
8. The New York Times , May 27, 1983, p. A3.
9. Keshtmand, the Afghan Prime Minister, said in I98I that "we
obtain all vital materials and means for the defense of the revolution
from the USSR", Kabul Radio, August 25, I98I, in FBIS/SU. I98I.
p. CI-3.
305
306
the New York Times gave the figure g\o'nnn' = 1°7,000 killed for five years ofoLnL ' "^^^Ities and 6,000 to
help for Afghan rebels"! New ?ork ^I^e^"; "'k "^^^^^^' ^^e l K Timssi^ November 28, 1984, A9:6.
Mo„ v^^,* -P
^"''^^^
^^S'^^'^ bases seen asNew York Times. November 1982, 21:1.
Peril to Gulf",
13. "Afghan War isn't over but SovietsNew York Times . May 1, 1983, E3:4.
^^''^^^^ seem to be winning",
14.
Benefits Soviet
Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "The
Th. Q . n
^""^ Costs", in Roberte Soviet Union in the Third World: Succes
Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 229-230.
Union in Afghanistan:
H. Donaldson ed.
ses and Failures
. (Boulder,
Nove.be'; CmT.'^T' "^^ Times .
lnv»rfl^'»
"Oi^" have to deploy twelve or more divisions to
in A^ghanlsLr ITr'^"" ^° l"' '"^^ now ^aL^ax^ftrgn nistan. See Colonel Franz Frestetter, "The Battle fnAfghanistan: A View from Europe", Strategic Review .' winter Im" P. 1.
r^nri : "SfShanistan's Role in Soviet Strategy",Tut MaTl980, .'"T- '"^'""^^ "'^
Al^i" J- Cottrell, et alSea Power and Strategy in The Indian Ocean . (Beverly Hills-
*
SacePublications, 1981),%p. 129-I3O. The Authors claim till' Bhulfo
offered this facility to the US in return for a lifting of the US arms
embargo. They added that it is "an ideal spot" if the US can have it.
307
19. Edgar O'Ballance,
"Sovif»i- t=«^-
E. Griffith, "ThfussTS'?ISr™°"^^ ^T^' ""1^^"1982, no. 31, pp. 38-4H- Alfred I m' °f t:omm„r.i».n Jan-Feb.,
on Human Aglls InT{ntlZlt 'TT^ atatement before Suboonunitte;
Foreign Affal^a, House o? ReS^enL^if^f'^m^°"' °' °"July 22, 198,), (Wa3hington"DcrSn?ori98l)!'p"^inr''
13 of-the'%e=Une."1he°"'"^l^%"°' ^he .ardars authority
LTir ^i- -H-:?:a\i=i-^^ jJS;- rt\-
-S^. r-y ^ft^^^^^^
^ Robert Wirsinff
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Broadcast And News Agency Sources
Associated Press of Pakistan.
Bakhtar, Afghan News Agency.
British Broadcasting Corporation, London.
Tass, Soviet News Agency.
Voice of American, Washington D.C.
Periodicals And Newspapers
American Universities Field Staff Reports
, New York and Hanover.
Boston Globe .
Christian Science Monitor .
Current Digest of The Soviet Press , New York.
Far Eastern Economic Review
,
Hong Kong.
308
309
Kabul Times (before I98O).
Kabul New Times, (renamed this in I98O).
Mashriq International
. Lahore.
Pakistan Affairs. Washington D.C.
The New York Times
.
The Times of India .
The Wall Street Journal
.
The Washin^^ton Post .
World Press Review
.
Documents and Reports
Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the World, 1975 .Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC: US GPO, July 1976.
Communist Aid Activities in Less Developed Countries, 1978
,
National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington DC: US GPO, September I979.
Crisis in the Sub-Continent: Afghanistan and Pakistan
.
Hearings
before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific
Affairs, Washington DC: US GPO, I98O.
310
Of Strategic It^dlLfIslLabar'^o ' f^^^^f° ^tudle. , institutepp. 12-17. ^axdm oa , vol. 3, no. 3, Spring 1980,
x:."«iKy, i^ongress of the US, Washington D.C.: US GPO, I974.
Fnnd/p^°''^
^"'^^ Activities in 198I-82 and Proposed Voluntaryu s Progranunes and Budget for 1983, Office of UNHCR, Geneva.
ForPi^^^'f 1°^-""
^^^^^"^•^^'^'^> Hearings before the Committee
D!c!ruS GPo!'l982.
'''''' "^^^
^' ^^^2' ^-^^^^^
on
on
"South Asia: US Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan"Department of State Bulletin . October 1979, p. 56.
'
"South Asia: Promoting Stability and Security",
Department of State Bulletin
. April 1979, p. 48.
"South Asia: Situation in Afghanistan",
Department of State Bulletin
. December 1979, p. 53.
"The Truth About Afghanistan: Documents, Facts, Eyewittness
Reports", Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 198O.
The Undeclared War: Imperialism vs Afghanistan
. compiled by
A. S. Grachev, translated from Russian by Dmitry Belyavsky, Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 198O.
"Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation
Between the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan",
Journal of South and Middle Eastern Studies
, vol. 3, no. 1, Fall 1979,
311
pp. 84-88.
Undeclared War: Arn,.H Tntervention ;.nd n^.h.. forms of
W^Fk^^^^^^^W^^^^^^^~^^'^^ Ministryruiexgn Hiiairs, Information Department, I98O.
United States Security Tnt^rp^f. in South Asia ^i-=.f«f u
"Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in th^
lZZ:%,lT.%s°f -^-n-tan", ^esty Inte™::J:n:i T.^olT,
,
"h^te Book; Foreign Policy Documents of the Demot-rati,^ RepublicOf Afghanistan
,
tCabuU DRA Ministry of Foreign Affairs' lnformitlonand Archives Department, 1982.
Books
W. and F. Irwin ed
.
Adamec
,
Lugwig
Afghanistan, Some New Approaches
. Ann Arbor: University'of Michigan!
Ameen, Hamidullah, and Gordon B. Schilz,
A Geography of Afghanistan. Omaha: University of Nebraska, Center for
Afghanistan Studies, 1976.
Arnold, Anthony, Afghanistan; The Soviet Invasion in Perspective
.
Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 198I.
Barnds, William J.
,
India, Pakistan and the Great Powers
, New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1972.
312
N C .^''nu^fn'-"^''''^. '
Afghanistan and the Soviet Ilninn
. DurhamDuke University Press, I983. " > u n ,
Bukhari, Farig, Bacha Khan, Peshawar: Naiya Maktaba, 1957.
Burke
,
Mainsprings of India and Paki s tan Foreign Pmi.i.., Minneapolis'University of Minnesota Press, 1974. ^ nm eapoi .
Burke, S. M.
,
Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historica l AnalysisLondon: Oxford University Press, I973.
^^^^j^u^ ^ ,
Choudhury,
^ ^India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers . New York: The Free
Cottrell, Alvin J., et. al., Sea Power and Strategyin the Indian Ocean
. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 198I.
Donaldson, Robert H. ed.. The Soviet Union in the Third
World; Successes and Failures
. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1981. '
Choudhury, G. W.
,
Pakistan's Relations with India: 19 47-1966.
London, I968. ' ' '—
Dupree, Louis, Afghanistan
, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1973.
Frank, Peter G.
,
Afghanistan Between East and West
, National
Planning Association, Washington DC: US GPO, I960.
313
Grassmuck, G., L. W. Adamec, and F. H. Irwin ed
Prfssf 19?3."
^"""^ "^^^ Approaches
,
Ann Arbor: Princeton Universii;
Griffith, J. C, Afghanistan: Key to a Continent
. Boulder.Colorado: Westview Press, 198I .
v^uxuci
,
Gupta, Bhabani Sen, The Fulcrum of Asia . New York: WesternPublishing Company Inc. 1970.
Gupta, Bhabani Sen
The USSR in Asia: An Interperceptional Study of Soviet-Asian '
Relations
,
New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 198O.
Harrison, Selig, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and
Soviet Temptations, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1981.
Hasan, K. Sarwar ed., The Kashmir Question: Documents of the
Foreign Relations of Pakistan
, Karachi: Pakistan Institute of
International Affairs, I966.
Holborn, Louise, Refugees: A Problem in Our Times
,
(The Work of
the UNHCR for Refugees, 1951-1972), Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow
Press, 1975.
Hussain, Syed Shabbir, Afghan Refugees in Pakistan:
The Long Wait
, Islambad: Kamran Publishing House, not dated.
Jahan, Raunaq, Pakistan: Failure in Natianal Integration
, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
314
Keely, Charles B., Global Refugee Policy; The Casefor a Deyelopment Oriented Strategy
. New York; A Public Issue Paperfor the Population Council, 1981. ^
Khan, Abdul Ghaffar, Zama Zhwand-o-Mobarazeh
. (My Life andStruggles), Kabul: The Information and Cultural Ministry Publication,
Khan, Ayub, Friends Not Masters; A Political Biography. New York-Oxford University Press, 1967.
' &--JL^»
Newell, Nancy & Richard, The Struggle For Afghanistan. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 198I.
Organski, A. F. K., World Politics. New York: Alfred Knoph,
1968.
Palmer, Norman D.
,
South Asia and United States Policy
, Boston;
Houghton Mifflin, 1966.
Pazhwak, Rahman, Pukhtoonistan
, London: Afghan Information
Bureau, 1952.
Sayeed, Khalid B., Politics in Pakistan: The
Nature and Direction of Change
, New York; Praeger Publishers, 198O.
Siddiqi, Aslam, Pakistan Seeks Security
,
Longman, Green, Pakistan
Branch, 196O.
Spain, James W., The Pathan Borderland
, The Hague; Mouton & Co.,
1963.
Steele, Jonathan, The Soviet Power; The Kremlin's Foreign
Policy - Brezhnev to Andropov
,
New York: Simon and Schuster, I983.
315
p , • ^J^"^' Anwar H
^^l^^^^.,Jolit,os and National .nU^.m,, New York: Praeg;;
Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, ed
Pubu::::;ri^^^!^^^^^ ^--^^-^ New York: Prae^;;
^i^sing, Robert edProtection of Ethnic Minorities; Comparative PerspectivP. New York-Pergmon, 198I. xv^in..
Ziring, Lawrence, ed., Pakistan; The Long View
. Durham, N. C •Duke University Press, 1977.
Ziring, Lawrence, edThe Subcontinent in World Politics; India, Its Neighbors.
*'
and the Great Powers
. New York; Praeger Publishers, 1982.
Articles
Ackerman, Marcel, "Prospects and Limits for Self-reliance",
Refugees Magazine
, no. 2, January 1983, pp. 19-20.
Alford, Mike, "Who Pays?", Refugees Magazine
, January I983,
pp. 18-19.
Ahmar, Moonis, "The Politics of Conflict and Cooperation in South
Asia", Pakistan Horizon
, vol. 35, no. 3, 1982, pp. 44-59.
316
Pai.i.^^r»'
^^^^^"^^ Developments in Indo-Pakistan Relations"kistan Horizon, vol. 2, no. 2, 1982, pp. 71-95.
*
P.i..-,f^'u
"The Simla and Tashkent Agreements"akistan Horizon, vol. 25, no. 3, 1972, pp. 53-74.
'
Anand, Eshwar V. and Jaya Krushna, "United States Arms Supply toPakistan: A study of America's South Asia Diplomacy",Punjab Journal of Politics. Amritsar, Guru Nanak Dev University
vol. 7, no. 2, July-Dec. 1982, pp. 35-50.
Bridges, Saint, "Afghanistan: The Empire Plays to Win", Orbis
vol. 24, Fall 1980, pp. 533-540. ^'
Burke, S. M.
,
"India's offer of a no-war declaration to
Pakistan: Its History and Import", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 26. no. 3.
1972, pp. 23-37.
Chaudhri, Mohammed Ahsen, "The Relations of Pakistan with
Afghanistan", Pakistan Horizon
, vol. 8, no. 4, December 1955,
pp. 494-504.
Chopra, Surendra, "Indo-Pakistan Relations: A Study of New
Challenges and Opportunities", in Surendra Chopra ed.
Studies in India's Foreign Policy
, Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev
University, 1983, pp. 71-212.
Choudhury, Golam W. , "The Triangular Diplomacy:
Washington-Moscow-Beijing", Asian Pacific Community
,
(Japan), no. 9,
Summer I98O, pp. 50-62.
Dunn, Keith A., "Constraints on the USSR in Southwest Asia: A
Military Analysis", Orbis
, vol. 25, no. 3, Fall I98I, pp. 607-629.
Dupree, Louis, "Pushtunistan: The "Problem of Its Larger
Implications", AUFS Reports
,
South Asia Series, vol. 5, no. 2,
November I96I, pp. 1-11.
317
^^Pree, Louis, "Afghanistan
- 1966", AUFS Reports
. South AsiaSeries 10, no. 4, 1966, pp. 1-32.
^
Dupree, Louis, "Afghanistan's Big Gamble: Part II, The Economic
no 4 1960^^pp ^1^2?^ ^"^S Reports . LD-4, vol. 4,
Dupree, Louis, "Afghanistan under the Khalq"
Problems o f Communism
, vol. 28, July-August 1979, pp. 34-50.
'
Dupree, Louis, "Red Flag Over the Hindu Kush - Part I: Leftist
^r^pp^ e'9
AUFS Reports
.
Asia 1979, no. 44, September
Feldman, Herbert, "Pakistan - 1973", Asian Survey
, vol. 14,
no. 2, February 1974, pp. 136-137.
Frestetter, Franz, "The Battle in Afghanistan: A View from
Europe", Strategic Review
. Winter I98I, pp. 36-43.
Fukuyama, Francis, "Pakistan since the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan", in Shirin Tahir-Kheli ed.,
US Strategic Interests in Southwest Asia
, New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1982, pp. 183-193
Gallagher, Dennis, and Gary Rubin, "Seeking Permanent Solutions
for Refugees", World Refugees Survey, 1982 , New York: American Council
for Nationalities Service, 1982, pp. 42-44.
Ghosh, Partha S., and Rajaram Panda, "Domestic Support for
Mrs. Gandhi's Afghan Policy: The Soviet Factor in Indian Politics",
Asian Survey
,
vol. 23, no. 3, March I983, pp. 261-279.
Griffith, William E., "The USSR and Pakistan",
Problems of Communism
,
no. 31, Jan-Feb 1982, pp. 38-44.
318
Gustafson, Eric W., and Richter, "Pakistan in 1979. Back toSquare One", Asian Survey, vol. 20, no. 2, February 1980! p^. 188^196!
no . 3rFar;9?8:ip!-;3;!jr^^^^ naluCistan", Porei,n_^
Selig S., "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit ThroughFinland?", Foreign Policy, no. 41, Winter 198O-8I, pp. 163-I87.
Hasan, K. Sarwar, "The Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan",Pakistan Horizon, vol. U, no. 4, December 1951, pp. I8I-I99.
_
Hasan, Sarwar, "Kashmir before the Security Council".Pakistan Horizon
. March 1957, pp. 26-33.
Khalilzad, Zalmay, "The Super Powers and the Northern Tier"
International Security, vol. 4, no. 3, Winter 1979-80, pp. 6-29.
'
Khalilzad, Zalmay, "The Struggle for Afghanistan", Survey
, (A
Journal of East West Studies), vol. 25, no. 2, Spring 198O.
pp. 189-216. '
Khalilzad, Zalmay, "The Strategic Significance of South Asia",
Current History
, vol. 81, no. 475, May 1982, pp. 193-196.
Khalilzad, Zalmay, "Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan",
Problems of Communism
, November-December I98O, pp. 23-40.
Khan, Abdul Ghaffar, "The Red Shirt Movement", Shakti, vol. 4,
no. 7, July 1967, pp. 7-11.
Khan, Hafeez-ur-Rahman, "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR",
Pakistan Horizon
,
vol. 14, no. 1, First Quarter, I96I, pp. 33-55.
Khan, Mohammad Anwar, "The Third Afghan Constitution Part I (1964-65),
Journal of Area Study; Central Asia
,
University of Peshawar Area Study
Center, vol. 1, no. 5, Spring 1980, pp. 1-4.
319
Kirkpatrick, Jeanne, "The Situation in Afghanistan"Current History, vol. 81, no. 475, May 1982, pp. 224, 230.
Kroef, Justus M. Van der, "Pakistan's Search for Security"
Asian Affairs (New York), Sept-October I98O, pp. 17-30.
Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce, "The Fragmentation of Arab Politics:
Inter-Arab Affairs since the Afghan Invasion", Orbis, vol. 25, no 1
Summer 198I, pp. 389-407. '
Mansmg, Surjit, "Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Imperatives
and Obstacles", Punjab Journal of Politics
, Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev
University, vol. 6, no. 1, Jan-June 1982, pp. 130-144.
Marwah, Onkar, "National Security and Military Policy in India",
in Ziring ed.. The Subcontinent in World Politics
, New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1982, pp. 87-94.
Mehta, Jagat S., "A Neutral Solution", Foreign Policy
, no. 47,
Summer 1982, pp. 139-153.
Menemenicioglu, Ekber, "From Tents to Katchas",
Refugees Magazine
, no. 1, Sept. 1982, pp. 39-40.
Mustafa, Zubeida, "The Islamic Conference and Afghanistan",
Asia Pacific Community , no. 14, Fall I98I, pp. 26-40.
Negaran, Hennah, "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and
International Security", Orbis , vol. 23, no. 1, Spring 1979,
pp. 93-113.
Negaran, Hannah, "Afghanistan: A Marxist Regime in a Muslim
Society", Current History
, vol. 76, April 1979, pp. 172-175.
Newell, Richard S., "International Responses to the Afghan
Crisis", The World Today
,
vol. 37, no. 5, May I98I, pp. 172-181.
320
Noorani, A. G., "Soviet Ambitions in South Asia",
International Security
,
vol. 4, no. 3, Winter 1979-80, pp. 31-59.
O'Ballance, Edgar, "Soviet Tactics in Afghanistan",
Military Review
,
vol. 60, no. 8, August 1980, pp. 45-52.
Poullada, Leon B., "Afghanistan and the United States: The
Crucial Years", The Middle East Journal
,
vol. 35, no. 2, Spring 1981,
pp. 178-190.
Powell, Mervyn, "The Ecological Drama", Refugees Magazine
,
no. 2,
January 1983, pp. 33-34.
Qureshi, Khalida, "The Soviet Union, Pakistan, and India",
Pakistan Horizon
, vol. 14, no. 4, Fourth Quarter, I963, pp. 344-355.
Qureshi, Khalida, "Diplomacy of the Indo-Pak War",
Pakistan Horizon
,
vol. 13, no. 4, 1965, pp. 357-373.
Rees, David, "Afghanistan's Role in Soviet Strategy",
Conflict Studies , London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict,
1980, pp. 1-18.
Richter, William L., "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third
Military Regime", Pacific Affairs , vol. 51, no. 3, Fall 1978,
pp. 404-26.
Riencourt, Amaury de, "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of
Afghanistan", Foreign Affairs , vol. 61, no. 2, Winter 1982-83,
pp. 416-437.
Razvi, Mujtaba, "Politico-Strategic Impact of Soviet Intervention
in Afghanistan", Pakistan Horizon , vol. 33, no. 3, 1980, pp. 12-30.
Razvi, Mujtaba, "Pakistan's Geopolitical Environment
Security", Pakistan Horizon , vol. 35, no. 3, 1982, pp. 29-43.
321
Rooyen, Rene Van, "From Relief Assistance to Long-termSolutions", Refugees Magazine , no. 4, January I983, pp. 11-12.
Rose, Leo E., "India and Its Neighbors: Regional Foreign andSecurity Politics", in Ziring ed.. The Subcontinent in World Politics,New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982, pp. 35-66.
'
.H^tJ^r'^:- n
^'^^^^'^ "P^^^^" Regionalism",South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 4, Autumn 1964, pp. 478-503.
Shah, Shafqat Ali, "Southwest Asia: Can the US Learn from PastMistakes?", Strategic Review . Winter I98I, pp. 27-35.
Syed, Anwar H., "Pakistan and Its Neighborhood: Pressures and
Politics", International Security Review. vol. 4, no. 4. Winter
1979-80, pp. 404-427.
Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, "Pakhtoonistan and Its International
Implications", World Affairs
. vol. 137, no. 3, Winter 1974-75,
pp. 233-245.
Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, "Proxies and Allies: The case of Iran and
Pakistan", Orbis, vol. 24, no. 2, Summer I98O, pp. 339-351.
Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, "The Soviet Union in Afghanistan: Benefits
and Costs", in Robert H. Donaldson ed.
The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures
,
Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, I98I, pp. 217-231.
Vivekanandan, B., "Afghanistan Invasion Viewed From India",
Asian Pacific Community
,
(Japan), no. 9, Summer 198O, pp. 63-82.
Wirsing, Robert G. , "The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan", in
Wirsing ed.. Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspective
,
New York: Pergmon, I98I, pp. 277-312.
322
_
Wirsing, Robert G. and James M. Roherty, "The United States and
1 Qftf ^«^"^nn''^^^°"^^ ^^^^^""^ > (London), vol. 58, no. 4, Autumn19o2, pp. 588-609.
Ziring, Lawrence, "Dissonance and Harmony in Indo-Pakistani
Relations", Punjab Journal of Politics. Guru Nanak Dev University,
vol. 6, no. 2, July-Dec. I982, pp. 1-18.

